Natoma Water & Mining Co. v. Clarkin
Before: Field
Synopsis
In a complaint in ejectment, parties may seek, in addition to a recovery of the premises, an injunction restraining the commission of trespass in the nature of waste pending the action, but the grounds of equity interposition should be stated subsequently to, and distinct from, those upon which the judgment at law is sought.
Where plaintiffs, having excepted to tlic ruling of the Court excluding certain evidence, take, in consequence of such ruling, a nonsuit, with leave to move to set it aside, they do not waive any of their rights as to the exception taken. Objections to the introduction of evidence confined, in the Appellate Court, lo the grounds taken below.
A duly certified copy of a Mexican grant, from the IT. S. Surveyor-General’s office, is admissible in evidence, againsu the objection that the absence of the original is not accounted for. But it is admissible only when the original itself would be. The statute (Acts of 1357, p. 317,) simply removes the objection to the copy as secondary evidence.
A certificate of the Surveyor-General, that the paper “ is a. true and accurate copy of ». document ” on file in his office, is sufficient, against the objection, that the copy is not duly authenticated, it being conceded that such document wa» the original grant.
In ejectment on a Mexican grant, the decree of the Land Commission confirming it, rendered final by the withdrawal on the part of the United States of any appeal therefrom, and an order of the District Court permitting the claimant to proceed thereon as on final decree, are conclusive evidence of the validity of the grant, of its recognition by the United States, and also of the location of the specific quantity granted—the decree in the case confining the claim under the grant, to a. particular tract, describing it with specific boundaries.
Such a decree and order, in connection with the grant, arc as conclusive as to the title of plaintiífs as a patent, provided the premises are within the designated boundaries.
A patent could have no greater eifact upon the title; the patent would save the parties the necessity of proving anything beyond it, and limit the evidence in the ease to matters arising upon mesne conveyances under the original grantee, but so far as the title is concerned—the boundaries of the land being given—its segregation in other words from the public domain being made by the decree itself, nothing further could be required.
The privilege of moving for a dissolution of an injunction upon the filing- of an answer, is limited to cases where the injunction is originally granted without notice.
Where the injunction is granted on a rule to show cause, it cannot be dissolved until the final hearing, unless the right to apply for dissolution on filing the answer, be expressly reserved.
Opinion — Field
Field, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Baldwin, J. and Cope, J. concurring.
The complaint in this case seeks a recovery of certain premises, situated within Sacramento County, as in an ordinary action of ejectment; and also, an injunction to restrain the commission of [548]trespass in the nature of waste, pending the action. This blending of an action at law, with a petition for ancillary relief to the equity side of the Court, is admissible under our system of practice. But to prevent confusion, and preserve the simplicity and directness requisite in the averments of a complaint in an action at law, the grounds of equity interposition should be stated subsequently to, and distinct from, those upon which the judgment at law is sought. It would be the better practice, in such case, to commence that portion of the complaint which seeks the equitable relief, with the form: “ and for equitable relief, pending the above action, the plaintiff further represents •” or, “ and, for a further cause of action, the plaintiff represents.”
The principal acts charged as trespasses, for the restraint of which the injunction is sought, consist in cutting, destroying, and carrying away, wood and growing timber, which are alleged to be of great value for farming, building, and other purposes, and to constitute the chief value of a portion of the premises.
Upon the answers of the defendants, and on their motion the injunction, originally granted on the complaint upon an order to show cause, was dissolved. To recover in the ejectment, the plaintiffs relied upon a grant from the Mexican Government to Win. A. Leidesdorff, from which they derive title. The grant was issued by the Mexican Governor, Mioheltorena, in October, 1844, and the claim under it was presented to the U. S. Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation, and was by the Board adjudged to be valid, and confirmed in June, 1855. The ease being removed by appeal to the United States District Court, the Attorney-General gave notice that the appeal would not be further prosecuted, and upon the stipulation of the District Attorney, in pursuance of such notice, ¡he claimants, by order of the District Court, made in April, 1857, had leave to proceed upon the decree of the Commission, as upon a final decree. The grant, with the accompanying papers, describes the land as lying on the American River, adjoining land previously granted to the colony of Sutter. The decree of the Commission confines the claim, under the grant, to a particular tract, describing it with specific boundaries. On the trial, the plaintiffs gave in evidence, without objection, the petition of Leidesdorff for the land, and the several
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