Yount v. Howell
Before: Field
Synopsis
lx ejectment, the value of improvements, even when defendant holds under color of title adversely to plaintiff, can only be allowed as a set-off to damages.
A patent from the United States proves itself. Courts take judicial notice of the signature of the President and of the seal of the government.
Where the complaint in ejectment avers that the land sued for is known by the name of “La Jota,” heretofore granted to plaintiff by the Mexican Government, and the patent issued thereon refers to the grant, the proceedings before the Land Commission and United States Court for confirmation, these recitals in the patent support the averment of title through the grant.
The patent is in itself, as against the government, evidence of the existence and validity of the grant recited in it, as well as of the relinquishment of all claim of the United States to the land it embraces.
The rule of the common law as to the necessity of proof in ejectment, of a legal estate and a right of entry in the plaintiff at the date of the demise laid in the declaration, has no application under our system.
It is sufficient in our system if it appear that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the premises at the commencement of the action, and the date of the alleged seizin or possession and ouster is only material when the question of mesne profits is involved.
Such profits, when claimed in the ejectment suit, are limited to such as accrue subsequent to the ouster alleged—or in other words, the occupation of the defendant. When they are claimed in an independent suit, the record of recovery in the ejectment, is, as to the title, only evidence of the right of possession of the plaintiff at the commencement of the action in which the recovery was had.
It is otherwise at the common law; there, the proof of title being held strictly to the date of the demise laid, the judgment was conclusive of such title.
Under our system the judgment in ejectment is only conclusive of two points; the right of possession in the plaintiff, and the occupation of the defendant at the commencement of the suit.
Other facts, necessary to recover mesne profits, must be shown by evidence aliunde.
A defendant in ejectment claiming under the government of the United States as a mere pre-emptioner, cannot show that the land described in the grant from the Mexican Government and petition to the Land Commissioners, is different from that embraced in the patent.
The action of the officers of government, in the location of lands claimed under confirmed Mexican grants, cannot be inquired into in an action of ejectment. The patent is conclusive upon these matters, and implies a compliance with every prerequisite of the law to its issuance.
Field, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Cope, J. and Baldwin, J. concurring.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the instruction of the Court in reference to the rents and profits claimed by the plaintiff, as the remitting of the amount found by the jury was made a condition of refusing a new trial, and the condition was accepted. Ror is it for the same reason necessary to notice the exception taken to the exclusion of evidence of the value of the improvements upon the premises. Their value, even were the defendant holding under color of title adversely to the plaintiff, in good faith [467]could only be allowed as a set-off to the damages. (Prac. Act, Sec. 257.)
The case must be determined upon the sufficiency of other grounds urged for the reversal of the judgment. The action is one of ejectment to recover certain premises situated in the county of Mapa. The complaint alleges the seizin and possession of the plaintiff on the 1st of January, 1852, and the subsequent entry and ouster by the defendant on the same day. On the trial the plaintiff gave in evidence a patent of the United States of the premises in controversy bearing date of the 18th day of December, 1857. The patent was issued under the Act of Congress of 1851, for the settlement of land claims in California, upon a grant of the Mexican Government, and its recognition and confirmation by the United States Board of Land Commissioners, and the final decree of the District Court of the United States. The grant bears date of the 23d of October, 1843. The petition to the Board for its confirmation was presented on the 5th of April, 1852, and the survey under the final decree was approved by the Surveyor-General on the 4th of August, 1857.
Objections were made to the admission in evidence of the patent in substance, as follows: First, that it was not sufficiently authenticated as such. Second, that the complaint contains no averment in relation to the same, but refers to the grant as a source of title. To the first objection the answer is found in the fact that the patent proves itself, and requires no authentication other than the signature of the President and the seal of the government. The Court takes judicial notice of both signature and seal. (Patterson v. Winn et al. 5 Wheat. 232; 1 Greenl. Ev. Sec. 6.) As to the second objection the answer is as ready and complete. The complaint designates the tract of land as known by the name of “La Jota/7 heretofore granted by the Mexican Government. The patent refers to the grant and the proceedings before the Land Commissioners and United States Court for recognition and confirmation, and is itself, as against the government, evidence of the existence and validity of such grant, as well as of the relinquishment of all claim of the United States to the land it embraces. The reference to the grant in the complaint is more by way of description than as a
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