Taylor v. Robinson
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
Authobity to an agent, in general terms, to collect, or secure a claim of the principal, is not an authority to purchase for the principal the property of the debtor to secure the claim. Such purchase is not the natural or usual means of securing the debt.
General words in an agency, must be construed in reference to matters specially mentioned.
Acts of an agent without authority, subsequently ratified by the principal, bind the principal back to the inception of the transaction.
But such ratification cannot defeat rights of third persons acquired between the act of the agent and the ratification by the principal—as attachments levied on property of a debtor after a sale by or to an agent.
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court—Field, C. J. and Cope, J. concurring.
Trespass against the Sheriff and Robinson for taking certain goods as the property of Johnson, defendant in process; of which goods the plaintiff alleges he was the owner in possession.
This case turns on the construction to be given to certain acts of one Dunlap and Johnson, Dunlap being the agent of the plaintiff.
Johnson was indebted to the plaintiff in a considerable sum of money. Dunlap was his (plaintiff’s) Attorney and agent. He [398]was a witness on the trial, and testified as follows: “I loaned money to Johnson, for the plaintiff; Taylor gave me a verbal agency to do all acts necessary in and about the premises for the collection and securing of the debt; I acted in the exercise of that authority in taking the deed and bill of sale from Johnson to the plaintiff.” It appears, further, that Taylor subsequently gave him a written power of attorney, which is found in the record, but it is unnecessary to consider it here, as the terms of it • evidently do not support the case of the plaintiff, if the authority of the verbal instructions and power was not sufficient to uphold his claim.
Some other testimony was given of this verbal agency, but it is no stronger, and is less specific than that of Dunlap just quoted.
The agent, Dunlap, took a bill of sale of this property, and other property, in liquidation of this indebtedness, as by a purchase of it; and, a few days afterward, the Sheriff, at the instance of Robinson, a creditor of Johnson, levied the process upon the personal property of Johnson, so sold to Taylor—the process issuing upon a debt existing before the alleged sale. After this levy, the plaintiff residing in St. Louis, Missouri, on being informed of the sale, ratified the acts of his agent, Dunlap, in the premises.
Two questions arise on this statement:
1. Whether Dunlap had original authority from Taylor to make this purchase ?
2. Whether, if he had not, the subsequent ratification of the purchase by Taylor, had the effect to give validity to it as against the execution levy of Robinson ?
1. Dunlap was not a general agent in the sense of the books. His agency, however extensive, was limited, it appears, to this particular transaction. It embraced the collection and security of this debt, and, as ancillary to this object, the usual means for effecting it. The question here is, was the purchase of this property, by payment or part payment of the debt of Taylor, within the power given the agent? It is laid down that an agent employed to ‘buy, has no authority to sell, and vice versa. (Story on Agency, 81, 82.) So an agency for accepting or indorsing bills or notes, does not authorize the agent to purchase or sell goods for his principal. (Id. 84.) And an authority to take a
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