Moore v. Wilkinson

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1859Published

Before: Field

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Holding. A United States patent issued upon the confirmation of a Mexican land grant is conclusive evidence of the validity and location of the grant in an action of ejectment, and cannot be collaterally attacked by parties who did not possess vested rights prior to the initiation of the confirmation proceedings.

Issues

Whether a United States patent for a Mexican land grant is conclusive against third-party pre-emption claimants in an action of ejectment.
Whether the judiciary has the authority to review or correct the survey and location of a land grant determined by the executive department.
Whether pre-emption claims initiated after the commencement of confirmation proceedings constitute prior vested rights that can defeat a patent.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The survey and patent are conclusive upon it in actions of ejectment, except when in conflict with the prior rights of third persons”

“The patent, which is the final document issued by the government, is conclusive evidence of the validity of the original grant, and of its recognition and confirmation, and of the survey”

“It cannot be attacked collaterally, even for fraud, whether charged to have existed in the procurement of the original grant, or in the proof of its execution, or in the making of the survey.”

Synopsis

Whebe a grant is for four leagues of land, within a larger tract, the right to measure off the specific quantity granted rested with the former government, and upon the cession, passed with other public rights to the United States. That right is political, and cannot be exercised by the judicial department.

Courts may ascertain and fix the position of boundaries which are designated, but cannot give boundaries to a specific quantity which has none, and lies in a larger tract.

The judiciary must determine whether the prior rights of third persons have been interfered with by the survey and patent, but it cannot correct the one nor the other. The survey and patent are conclusive in actions of ejectment.

Even though the title of a grantee, in a particular case, to a specifically described or designated tract be perfect, without further action by our government, yet if such action be had, and the grantee accepts the land described in his patent as satisfying his claim, no other persons can object that a portion of the land thus taken is without the boundaries of the grant, unless their prior rights are interfered with. This is a matter between the government and the grantee, with which strangers have no concern.

The survey and location are to follow the decree of confirmation. The approval of the survey by the proper officers is the determination—the judgment of the appropriate department of government that the survey does conform to such decree. That determination or judgment is not the subject of review by the judiciary. It is conclusive upon the Courts in actions of ejectment as the adjudication of a competent tribunal, upon a subject within its exclusive jurisdiction. A patent cannot be attacked collaterally, even for fraud, whether charged to have existed in the procurement of the original grant, or in the proof of its execution, or in the making of the survey. Eor these matters the right of interference rests only with the government. Individuals can resist the conclusiveness of the patent only by showing that it conflicts with prior rights vested in them. The 15th Section of the Act of Congress of 1851, provides that the final decree of confirmation and patent shall be conclusive between the United States and the claimants only, and shall not affect the interest of third persons. If conclusive between the United States and the claimants, it must be equally so between persons holding under either of those parties.

A patent takes effect, by relation, at the date of the presentation of the petition of the patentee to the Board of Land Commissioners. And where such petition was presented in March, 1852, at which time the pre-emption laws of the United States were not extended to California; the rights, if any, of parties, claiming under those laws, are subordinate to the result of the proceedings then pending by the grantee before the tribunals and officers of the United States.

Field, J. delivered the opinion of the Court— Terry, C. J. and Baldwin, J. concurring.

This is an action of ejectment, to recover the possession of a tract of land situated in Butte County. The plaintiffs deraign their title to the premises from a grant issued to Maximo and Dionisio Fernandez, by Pio Pico, formerly Mexican Governor of California, and a patent issued, upon its confirmation, on behalf of the United States. The grant bears date on the twelfth of Juno, 1846; the claim under it was presented for confirmation to the Board of United States Land Commissioners in March, 1852, and was confirmed by that Board to the claimants in July, 1855, and subsequently by the United States District Court in March, 1857. The Attorney-General of the United States soon afterward gave notice that no further appeal would be prosecuted on the part of the United States, and by an order of the District Court, the claimants had leave to proceed as upon a final decree. The grant describes the land as lying in the immediate vicinity of the river Sacramento, and as bounded on the north by the base of the Snowy Mountains; on the south by the lands of John A. Sutter, and on the east by Feather River. No boundary on the west is specified, but to the espediente a map of the tract was annexed, and to this map reference is made in the grant, the third condition of which is in the following language : “ The land of which donation is made is merely four square leagues (or four ranges of neat cattle), in conformity with the map annexed to the proceedings (espediente). The Judge who may give possession will cause the same to be measured according to the Ordinance, leaving the remainder which may result to the nation for its proper uses.” In April, 1857, four leagues— the specific quantity granted—wore laid off and surveyed under the directions of the Surveyor-General of the United States for California, and the survey was, in May following, approved by that officer. Upon this survey, and in pursuance of the confirm[485]ation, a patent on behalf of the United States was issued to the claimants, bearing date on the 14th of October, 1857, for four leagues of land with the specific description of the official survey. This patent includes the premises in controversy, and the defendants were in their occupation at the commencement of the action.

To resist a recovery, the defendants offered parol evidence, to show that the four leagues, as surveyed and patented, were different from the tract designated in the grant, and the map to which the grant makes reference; that a correct location of the tract, as granted, would not include the premises in suit; that the defendants arc citizens of the United States, and had each entered upon a separate quarter section of the promises, claiming the privileges of pre-emptioners under the laws of the United States, and made the improvements required in such cases, and had, in May, 1858, filed their separate declaratory statements in the office of the United States Register, at Marysville, insisting that as such pre-emption claimants, they had acquired vested rights, and that the confirmation of the grant, and the patent issued thereunder, were not conclusive against them under the provisions of the 15th Section of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851. The Court below excluded the evidence offered, and its ruling in this respect constitutes the principal error assigned for a reversal of the judgment.

Moore v. Wilkinson

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