Curtis v. County of Sacramento
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
Pbiob to the Consolidation Act,'the Recorder of the City of Sacramento was entitled to collect the same foes as a Justice of the Peace for services in criminal eases; but he was bound to pay them over to the City Treasurer.
Such Recorders are not within Art. 6, Sec. 2, of the Constitution inhibiting judicial officers, except Justices of the Peace, from taking fees.
The Constitution, when it exempted Justices from the operation of this restraint meant to exempt, also, those by whatever name called, who are intrusted with the duties assigned by the law to those officers.
Under the Consolidation Act of 1858—query: What becomes of the indebtedness of the County of Sacramento to the City of Sacramento for the services of the Recorder in criminal cases under the laws of the State?
Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Terry, C. J. concurring.
The Appellant was Becorder of Sacramento City, and as such, claims that the' county is indebted to him for fees due him for convictions made by him of divers criminals, prosecuted under the laws of the State. The only question presented by the record is, whether he is to be considered as a Justice of the Peace in respect to this claim, and is entitled, as if he were, to the fees.
It seems that the charter of the city of Sacramento, (C. L. 966, Sec. 35,) provided that the Becorder “ should exercise all the powers of a Justice of the Peace in regard to offenses committed within the city limits, subject to all the rules governing-justices of the Peace, and have power to administer all oaths known to the law.”
The general Act, (C. L. 512, Sec. 693,) declares, “ The fees allowed to Justices of the Peace, and other officers having the jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, * * * shall, when the defendant is convicted, be considered and recovered against him as costs in the suit, and be collected in like manner as costs in civil cases.” The next section seems to be equally indicative of the legislative construction, that Becorders were embraced within the purview of the statute allowing fees to Justices.
By the Act of the 10th April, 1855, a Justice is allowed a fee of three dollars, for services and proceedings before him in criminal action or proceeding, whether on examination or trial. (Wood’s Dig. 452, Sec. 14.)
[293]By another Act, (C. L. 728, Sec. 33,) it is provided that where a fee is allowed to one officer, the same fee shall be allowed to the other officers for the performance of the same services when such officers are allowed by law to perform such services, and the compensation is not specifically fixed.
The Act of 1853, (C. L. 511, Sec. 688,) provides “that the magistrate, if he be a Justice of the Peace, or a Mayor, or a City Recorder, may receive for all the proceedings before him to, and including his decision upon, the question of discharging the defendant, or holding him to answer, three dollars; for taking bail after a commitment by another magistrate, one dollar. By Section 693, of the Act of 1853, (C. L. 512,) “the fees allowed to Justices of the Peace, and other officers having the jurisdiction and authority of Justices of the Peace, Clerks, Peace Officers, and District Attorneys, shall, when the defendant is convicted, be considered and recovered against him as costs in the suit, and be collected in the same manner as costs in civil cases.”
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)