Smith v. Brannan

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1859Published

Before: Baldwin

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Holding. The court affirmed a decree quieting title in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff established prima facie title and possession while the defendant failed to provide legal proof of any valid title.

Issues

Whether the plaintiff established sufficient title and possession to maintain an action to quiet title under Section 254 of the Practice Act.
Whether the defendant's evidence of title was properly excluded for lack of proper recording and failure to produce subscribing witnesses.
Whether the defendant could challenge the validity of the plaintiff's chain of title derived from the common grantor.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The plaintiff deduced a regular chain of title from Sutter—fhe common grantor—to himself, and proved himself in possession, through one Stevens, his tenant. Brannan failed to show title of any sort.”

“The paper being the only evidence of the title of the defendant, was, therefore, properly excluded. This left the defendant without any proof of the case made by his answer.”

“the decree, resting on a few simple propositions, viz : title and possession in plaintiff, and claim without title by defendants, must be affirmed.”

Synopsis

A jttby Being waived, it is immaterial whether an action under Section 254 of the Practice Act, is an equitable or a legal proceeding.

An executory agreement between a landlord and tenant, that, after the title to the premises is settled, hy a suit tobe prosecuted by the former against third persons, the tenant may purchase, docs not destroy the relation of landlord and tenant.

To maintain a suit to quiet title, by a party in possession, it is enough that he claims under a deed which creates an equitable estate, or even a right of possession.

A deed, recorded January 30th, 1850, hy a person acting as Recorder, hy virtue of an election hy the people, without authority of law, 'is not properly recorded.

To make the copy of an unrecorded deed evidence, the loss of the original being shown, the testimony of the subscribing witnesses to the deed, if such there be, should be had, at least to the fact of the execution of the paper, unless they are shown to be without the jurisdiction of the Court.

To admit evidence of notice of a prior unrecorded deed, to defeat a subsequent deed, there must first be proof of the prior deed. There can be no notice where there is no title.

Whether the conditions of a deed are complied with or not, is matter between the grantor and grantee, with which third persons have nothing to do.

The fact that the record is erroneous in stating that the parties waived a jury, cannot be shown by an affidavit of the Judge who tried the cause.

It would seem that a party cannot try his cause before a Judge without objection, and, after losing it, complain that the case was not tried by a jury.

Baldwin, J. delivered the opinion of the Court Terry, C. J. concurring.

Suit brought to quiet title to two hundred acres of land.

The plaintiff avers himself to be in possession, and charges that the defendants claim title to the premises.

Brannan answered, setting up title from Sutter, older in date than the title through which plaintiff claims—the source of both titles being the same.

The Court tried the case—a jury being waived.

The plaintiff deduced a regular chain of title from Sutter—fhe common grantor—to himself, and proved himself in possession, through one Stevens, his tenant. Brannan failed to show title of any sort.

The Practice Act, (Section 254,) provides that “ an action may be brought by any person in possession, by himself or his tenant, of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate, or interest.”

It matters not whether the action under this section was intended to be an equitable or legal proceeding, as a jury was waived.

As Brannan offered no legal proof of title, it is hard to see what errors, to his prejudice, could have intervened, after the plaintiff had shown title prima facie in himself, possession by his tenant, and a claim by the defendant.

[114]Many technical points are made; but the great pressure of business will not enable us to notice them all in this opinion, as they are mostly technical exceptions, involving no new principles.

We will glance at some of the most prominent:

1. The fact that an executory agreement was made between the plaintiff and the tenant, that after the title was settled, the tenant might purchase—but that the plaintiff should go on and prosecute the suit for such settlement—did not destroy the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

2. The deeds from Robinson, McDougall, Mesick, and Gillespie, to McOorkle, were not on condition precedent. There is no definition of a condition precedent which embraces a paper containing words of sale in presentí, and then providing for the payment of the purchase money on subsequent condition. The vesting of the title is not made to depend upon any future acts or facts. The provision in the conveyance for a future deed does not affect this view. There was a bargain and sale, or an agreement of bargain and sale, on a good consideration, and the covenant for further assurance does not alter the nature of the transaction. It is enough, perhaps, to maintain this action, that the deed created an equitable estate, or even a right of possession, which it certainly did.

Smith v. Brannan

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