Low v. Burrows
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
Appeal from the Fourth District, County of San Francisco.
This was an action brought on a judgment obtained in New York. One William Young recovered judgment in 1851, in the Court of Common Pleas of New York, against defendant. Afterwards, in 1858, Young having died, his son of the same name took administration on his estate in the Surrogate’s Court of the City of New York. Young, the administrator, transferred and assigned to one Swartwout this judgment, who afterwards transferred it to the plaintiff, who instituted this suit. On the trial, plaintiff offered in evidence an exemplification of the proceedings of the Surrogate’s Court of New York. The certificate of the Surrogate is as follows:
“ I, Alexander W. Bradford, Surrogate of said County, and acting as Clerk of the Surrogate Court, do hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy of the petition, bond, letters of administration, etc., in the matter of granting letters of administration on the estate of William Young, deceased, with the original record thereof, now remaining in this office, and have found the same to be a correct transcript therefrom, and of the whole of such original record, and that this certificate is in due form of law.
“ In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office, this twelfth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and of our Independence the eightieth.
To the introduction of this transcript in evidence, the defendant objected, on the ground that the Surrogate’s certificate was not sufficient under the Act of Congress, to admit it to evidence, and on the further ground that the complaint contained no averment that the Surrogate’s Court had jurisdiction. The Court sustained the defendant’s objection, and the transcript was not read in evidence.
Plaintiff then offered in evidence the assignment of the judgment by the administrator, which was admitted under the objection of the defendant that the administrator could not make the assignment.
Defendant had judgment. Plaintiff moved the Court for a new trial, which was denied, and he appealed to this Court.
Baldwin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court—Terry, O. J., and Field, J., concurring.
One William Young recovered judgment in 1851, in the Court of Common Pleas of New York, against defendant. Afterwards, in 1853, Young having cRed, his son, of the same name, took administration on his estate in the Surrogate’s Court of the City of New York. Young, the administrator, transferred and assigned to one Swartwout this judgment, who afterwards transferred it to the plaintiff. The questions made on the trial of the case in the Court below were these : 1. That the exemplification of the proceedings of the Surrogate’s Court was not sufficient to admit it in evidence—the certificate not being in form or substance as prescribed by Act of Congress, or the statute of this State. 2. That the administrator in New York had no right to assign [188]the judgment—the debtor residing at that time beyond the State of New York.
As to the first question : It seems that the Surrogate is Judge and Clerk of the Court. This being so, it is only necessary that the certificate should state the main facts which are made necessary by the Acts of Congress to the authentication of the records of a Court, which has both Judge and Clerk. In this case the certificate states that A. W. Bradford is Surrogate of the City and County of New York, and acting as Clerk of the Surrogate’s Court; that he has compared the transcript of the papers with the original records in the matter of the estate of William Young, and finds the same to be correct, and a true copy of all the proceedings; and that the certificate is in due form of law.
In testimony of which he sets his hand and affixes his seal of office.
We do not see what more could be required to authenticate to us the records which the officer certifies. The papers show upon their face the jurisdiction of the Court. It is not necessary that the complaint should aver this jurisdiction, and if it were, the defect should have been noticed by demurrer, not by motion to exclude or objection to the admissibility of the transcript.
The second objection is equally untenable. We concede that the administrator has power over only those assets within the State where letters are granted ; and we might concede that in the case of notes, bonds, etc., on debtors who live and have their property beyond the jurisdiction, the administrator has no jurisdiction or dominion. But this is not the case in respect to judgments. There can be no doubt if a debtor, against whom the intestate in his lifetime obtained judgment, though at the time of the death of the intestate the debtor was beyond the jurisdiction, afterwards came within the jurisdiction, the administrator might proceed to collect the money from him. The effect of a judgment, as such, unlike a note, is confined to the State where rendered. It is therefore record evidence of a debt. It may be sued on, it is true, out of the State.' But it is not easy to see how an administrator of the creditor in California could take to himself as assets a judgment remaining on record in New York, merely from the fact that the debtor happened, for the time being, to reside in California. If the debtor went back to New York, or had property there, it is clear
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