McDonald v. Maddux
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
The Act of 1854, to fund the Floating Debt of the City and County of Sacramento, forbidding the redemption of any warrants accruing prior to a certain date, is obligatory upon County officers. The Legislature is the paramount political power, and can control and direct them in this respect.
The Board of Supervisors, therefore, has no power to direct and authorize the Treasurer to pay warrants in violation of the provisions of the statute.
I. The plaintiff is not affected by the Funding Act of 1854; as section 8 of that Act clearly exempts him from its operation so far as the present case is concerned.
II. Neither is he affected by section 120 of the General Revenue Law of 1854, for the following reasons :
1st. That section has reference exclusively to revenue collected for that purpose.
2d. By the Act of 1855, creating Boards of Supervisors, and conferring upon them general supervision and control over the affairs of the county, they are made the fiscal agents of the county. If you take from them all discretionary fower, as to the appropriation of its moneys, you necessarily weaken the energies of the Board, and defeat many of the purposes for which it was created.
3d. The Supreme Court has recognized in the case of Laforge v. McGee, 6 Cal. 285, the power that is here contended for, as residing in the Board .of Supervisors.
If any additional authority were required to establish the proposition that the Board of Supervisors possessed the power exercised by it in passing the Order of March 16th, the following may be given:
In the ■ case of Thompson v. Rowe, 2 Cal. 68, the Supreme Court says: “ The Act concerning Courts of Justice and Judicial Officers, [188]passed May 11th, 1851, confers general powers of taxation and appropriation upon the Court of Sessions for county purposes.”
Section 25 of the Act of March 20th, 1855, creating Boards of Supervisors, is in the following language :
“ The Board of Supervisors shall have and exercise in its county all jurisdiction and powers, other than criminal, conferred by any law on the Court of Sessions, or heretofore exercised by said Court under any statute, or by any statute provided to be exercised by said Court, when the same do not conflict with the provisions of this Act.” See Laws of 1855, p. 56, sec. 25.
This section clearly gives to the Board of Supervisors the same power to appropriate the county revenue which the Court of Sessions possessed under the Act of March 11th, 1851.
Upton & Hereford for Respondent.
Appellant’s counsel cites Laforge v.- McGee, 6 Cal. 285, and Thompson v. Rowe, 2 Cal. 68. In the former case, the principal point decided is with respondent, viz., that the Legislature having appropriated the fund, the discretion of the Supervisors was at an end. The latter had reference to powers of the Court of Sessions, supposed to be conferred by the Act of May 11th, 1851, to appropriate the County revenue. That power was repealed prior to the passage of the Act of 1855, creating Boards of Supervisors.
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