Manson v. Koppikus

First. The error, as alleged by appellants, may be confined to the following propositions : That the grant in evidence did not convey an immediate interest in any land whatever, but that its validity depended upon subsequent events which never happened, and therefore title derived from it should not sustain ejectment.

Second. The grant does not cover the land in dispute.

The first point is well settled by the Supreme Court of the United States, in Fremont’s case, where the Court decided that upon the delivery of the grant, the fee at once passed to the grantee, and that all the conditions contained therein were subsequent, and did not prohibit the vesting of the estate. This conclusion has been recognized by this Court in the various cases involving the title to the “ Las Mariposas,” and may be regarded as at rest.

In Gunn, Admr. v. Bates & McCarty, 6 Cal. R. 263, this Court determined in a case similar to one at bar, that where possession was had and retained of a portion of the land embraced within the limits 'of a Spanish grant, the grantee was thereby invested with sufficient title to sustain ejectment for the whole of the land, though by measurement the quantity of land embraced within the boundaries thereoi [90]exceeded the calls of the grant. This rule is undoubtedly correct, as any other would exclude the Mexican grantee from the right to recover a single acre, merely because the government of Mexico had failed to specifically designate the exact location of his grant, and define the surplus. The doctrine of the foregoing case is peculiarly applicable to the present one; the Court below finding as a fact, that Sutter, upon the receipt of his grant, went into possession of a portion of the tract granted and retained visibly and substantially down to the present period.

The grant in this case is entitled to a liberal and not a technical construction: in other words, the grantee is to have that which the Mexican Government intended that he should have. In 19 Howard, 363, the grant confirmed contained only the following words of description:

“ A tract of land known by the name of the El Gabon, near the Mission of San Diego. The land of which grant is made is that which the map attached to the expediente expresses.”

Here there was a valid grant described altogether by reference to the map, the Court holding that the map was a portion of the grant itself; and so it will be noticed that in matters of description the map exercises a controlling force. Larkin’s case, 18 Howard, U. S. R. 561.