Whitney v. Higgins

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1858Published

Before: Field

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Holding. A party who holds an interest in property prior to the commencement of a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, but who is not made a party to that suit, is not bound by the resulting decree and retains the equitable right to redeem the premises.

Issues

Whether a purchaser of property whose interest was acquired prior to a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien is bound by a decree in that suit if not made a party.
Whether a party holding an interest prior to the commencement of a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien possesses an equitable right to redeem the property after the statutory period has expired.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“If such purchasers or incumbrancers are not made parties, they are, in no respect, bound by the decree or proceedings thereunder.”

“The plaintiff, by his purchase, took the title as it existed in the mortgagor, at the date of the mortgage; his position in Court, therefore, is that of the owner of the legal title, subject to the mechanic’s lien.”

“As the mortgagees were not made parties to the suit to enforce that lien, he is entitled, like them, to come into a Court of Equity to redeem the premises.”

Synopsis

A decree for the sale of premises in a suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien, has the same and no greater effect upon the rights of purchasers and incumbrancers, prior to the commencement of the suit, than a similar decree would have upon the foreclosure of a mortgage. If such purchasers or incumbrancers are not made parties, they are not bound by the decree or the proceedings thereunder.

All persons interested in the premises, prior to the suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or to enforce a mechanic’s lien, whether purchasers, heirs, devisees, remainder-men, reversioners, or incumbrancers, must be made parties, otherwise their rights will not bo affected.

Persons who acquire interests by conveyance or incumbrance after suit brought, need not be made parties.

The right to redeem, under the statute, from a sale on execution, exists in some instances where there is no equity, and in other instances in connection with the equitable right. Parties to the suit in which the judgment is rendered, under which the sale is made, are restricted to the six months given by statute. Parties acquiring interests, pending suits to enforce previously existing liens, or after judgment docketed or sale made, have no equity, and are confined to the rights given by the statute; but parties obtaining interests, subsequent to the plaintiff, and before suit brought, who are not made parties in such suit, possess the equitable and the statutory right. They may redeem, under the statute, or they may file their bill in equity.

Where a mechanie’s lien attached on certain premises January 18th, 1856, and a mortgage was placed on the same premises February 21st, 1856, and a suit was brought, subsequent to the execution and record of the mortgage, to enforce the mechanic’s lien, in which suit the mortgagees were not made parties, and under the decree rendered in such suit, a sale was made, and after the expiration of six months, no redemption being had, a deed was executed to the assignee of the sheriff’s certificate: Held, that the right of the mortgagees to redeem the premises, by paying off the incumbrance of the mechanic’s lien, was not affected by the decree and the proceedings thereunder; and that the purchaser of the premises upon a decree of foreclosure of the mortgage, having received his deed upon such purchase, was entitled to the same right to redeem.

The Hens, which, by the Act of April 19th, 1856, entitled “ An Act for securing Liens to Mechanics and Others,” are required to be exhibited and proved, upon publication of notice in some newspaper of the county, or be deemed waived, are liens arising under that act, and do not apply to other liens.

Field, J., delivered the opinion of the Court Terry, C. J., and Baldwin, J., concurring.

The plaintiff purchased the premises at a sale upon a decree rendered in a suit to foreclose a mortgage executed on the 21st of February, 1856. The defendant claims under a purchase at a sale made upon a decree rendered in a suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien which attached on the 18th of January, 1856. The property was not redeemed from either sale, and the sheriff executed a deed to the plaintiff June 27th, 1857, and to the defendant on the 30th of Lecember following. The plaintiff was one of the mortgagees, and neither he nor his co-mortgagee was made a party to-the suit to enforce the mechanic’s lien; and the present bill is filed to redeem the premises from the sale under the decree rendered in that suit. The defendant demurred to the bill, the demurrer was sustained, and from the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appeals.

The conveyance to the plaintiff took effect, by relation, at the date of the mortgage, the 21st of February, 1856. By it the [551]plaintiff acquired all the estate which the mortgagor possessed in the property on that day. He, therefore, stands in precisely the same position as though he bad purchased the property of the mortgagor at that time; and the question is thus presented—and it is the only question in the case—whether a subsequent purchaser possesses, after the expiration of the six months allowed by statute, a right to redeem property sold to enforce a mechanic’s lien, upon a decree rendered in a suit to which he was not made a party.

The suit tp enforce the mechanic’s lien was instituted, and the decree rendered therein, before the execution of the deed to the plaintiff, though not until after the sale to him, and the defendant contends that the lien of the mortgage was waived by a failure of the mortgagees to present it in that suit. To this it may be answered : first, that the lions which must be presented under the seventh section of the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1856, are those arising under that act; and, second, if this were otherwise, that the act was passed on the 19th of April, 1856, and its provisions do not apply to or affect any previously acquired liens. (Laws of 1856, chap. 134, §§ 7, 11.)

The plaintiff’s claim to the relief he seeks rests upon the general principle that the rights of a person can not be affected by a suit to which he is a stranger. By the judgment in a suit, parties and privies are alone bound. The estate of Stephens had passed from him by the proceedings under the foreclosure, and as, had it continued, his rights could not have been cut off without his day in Court, so neither can the rights of the plaintiff, his successor, be thus defeated.

Whitney v. Higgins

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