Pond v. Pond
Before: Baldwin
Synopsis
There is no relation of inferiority in the constitution or powers of the Probate Court as respects the District Court. They are unlike; but, within their respective spheres, equal. They are both Constitutional Courts. No appeal lies from one to the other.
Issues of fact are sent from the Probate Court to the District Court, not as from an inferior to a superior tribunal, but for the sake of convenience, because the Probate Court has not the machinery of jury trial and its incidents. But it was never intended to transfer any portion of the jurisdiction of Probate Courts to the District Courts. Nor was it designed, by the act of 1855, directing those issues, to make the judgments of the District Courts binding upon the Courts of Probate.
The Probate Court does not lose its jurisdiction over a subject of which it has taken cognizance by adopting the proceeding of an issue whereby to determino the issue advisedly; the finding of a jury in the District Court is merely in aid of its jurisdicdiction, by settling the facts, and thus furnishing the material upon which it is to act, and after such findings, the functions of the District Court cease.
The District Court, by virtue of its common law powers alone, derives its power to try issues of fact, and that Court, as a Court of Daw, has no jurisdiction over probate matters. Its jurisdiction over matters of account and the like, is derived from its grant of equitable power in the Constitution, and in that respect it has only concurrent jurisdiction with the Probate Court.
Therefore, where an administrator filed in the Probate Court his account for final settlement, and an issue of fact was made thereon, which was certified to the District Court for trial, and trial was had, the jury finding on each issue, and the Judge rendering his decision on such findings; and this was certified back to the Probate Court, which Court refused to give effect to the decision and judgment of the District Court, but gave judgment on such findings as it construed them: Held, that there was no error in the judgment of the Probate Court.
Baldwin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court Terry, C. J., and Field, J., concurring.
This appeal is from an order of the Probate Court discharging an administrator, and allowing his account.
The proceedings out of which this appeal grows, seem to be singularly irregular. It will be necessary to give a brief history of them, in order to an understanding of our decision.
In 1856, respondent was appointed administrator of one Hiram Pond, deceased, who died intestate in the year 1854. On the 23d of September, 1856, the administrator filed’ in the Probate Court his account for final settlement, and Edward Pond, the father and heir of the deceased, contested the account, and filed written exceptions. The account set forth that no property of the estate had come into the administrator’s hands, and no claims had been presented against the estate; that the administrator had incurred much expense in endeavoring to find property, without success, and prayed to be discharged. The appellant appeared and filed certain exceptions to the account; all of which went to show that there was a balance due to the estate from a partner of the deceased, which sum the administrator had failed to reduce -o his possession. These exceptions constituted the issues of fact; they were certified to the District Court. To the account of the administrator was attached a statement, made by the surviving partner, of the indebtedness due to deceased. This statement, it seems, was given to the administrator by the surviving partner, on the demand of the former. The contestation of the appellant seems to attempt to put in issue the correctness of this account, alleging that the amount of the indebtedness was greater than as set forth in the statement.
After the issues were brought into the District Court, a trial was had, and a finding by the jury upon each; whereupon the Judge rendered Ms decision thereupon, hereafter quoted, in which it was declared that the surviving partner was indebted to the deceased partner in the sum of $-. These proceedings were certified to the Probate Court, and a motion made in that [500]Court to render judgment upon the basis, and in pursuance, of this decision and these findings. But the Probate Court, giving effect, as it construed them, to the findings as ascertained facts, refused to give effect to the decision and judgment of the District Court. It discharged the administrator, and found no sum due from Aaron Pond to the estate of the deceased.
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