Shaver v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.
Before: Terry
Synopsis
Bf., the president and managing agent of a corporation for ditch and mining purposes, and who was vested, by a resolution of the company, with discretionary powers as to “ all matters pertaining to the prosecution of the projects of the company,** and who had been in the habit of making such contracts as he deemed necessary for the good of the corporation, purchased of plaintiff and one S., in the name and for the use of the corporation, a house, to be used as an office for the corporation, and a boarding-house for the laborers employed by the corporation, for $3000, $500 of which IT. paid down, and to secure the balance he gave a mortgage, in the name of the corporation, on the premises. IT. then, as agent, took possession of the premises, and, subsequently, several meetings of the trustees of the corporation were held in the house. Six weeks after the purchase, at a meeting of the trustees, a resolution was offered and rejected, declaring the contract legal and valid. Subsequently, the premises were destroyed by fire. The present plaintiff, who had obtained S/s interest in the debt, brought suit against the corporation to recover the amount, and for a foreclosure of the mortgage: Held, that IT. had authority to make the contract to bind the corporation; and if such authority were doubtful, the acts of the corporation amounted to a ratification of the contract.
And where IT., after the rejection of the resolution, made arrangements with the tenant in possession, who was a married woman, to pay the purchase-money and take a conveyance of the premises, and in pursuance of this agreement she paid $500, which was credited on the mortgage, and plaintiff was informed of this arrangement, and approved of it: Held, that this agreement was void, because the tenant, being a married woman, had no capacity to contract, and any agreement on the part of plaintiff to accept her as purchaser, and release the corporation, was void, for want of consideration.
Parol proof of the existence of a debt intended to be secured by mortgage is admissible. See Bennett v. Solomon, (6 Cal., 134.)
Such a mortgage is void, but this fact does not invalidate the debt intended to be secured by the mortgage.
Terry, C. J., after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the Court Field, J., concurring.
The first question presented is as to the capacity of defendants to enter into the contract. By the law under which they were incorporated, defendants are authorized to purchase and hold “ such real and personal property as may be necessary to enable the company to carry on their operations.”
It is contended by respondents that the property in question was not necessary to the operations of defendants, and for this reason the contract was without authority, and void. But upon this point there appears to be no evidence, and the law presumes in favor of the validity of contracts.
Besides, it does not follow because an agent purchases property which is not absolutely necessary for the purposes of the company that the latter can, after receiving the property, avoid the payment of the purchase-money. This question arose in the case of Moss v. The Rossio Mining Company, (5 Hill, 137,) Cow-en, Justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “lam [401]not aware that a corporation, more than another, can purchase and convert an article to its own use, and then object that it acted beyond the statute power. It is itself a sort of agent, and must be the judge as between itself and the vendor whether the article be wanted or not. The vendor can not pronounce on the question. * * * Purchasing a shop for the purpose of keeping goods and carrying on trade is objected to. But is the loss to fall on the grantors of the shop or the vendors of the goods ? The goods to be purchased, for aught Moss and Knapp knew, might be wanted by the workmen of the company in payment for labor, and been even more acceptable than cash.”
This authority applies directly to the case before us. It was certainly necessary that defendants should have an office in which to keep the papers and books of the corporation, and which would serve as a place of meeting for the trustees, and it was probably thought advantageous to the defendants to have a place at which the hands employed by them could be boarded. Considerable stress is laid by the respondent, on the fact that the house purchased was a hotel, and it is said “ it was certainly no part of the objects of the corporation to embark in hotel-keeping.” . It is true, the house is called in the conveyance the “ Empire Hotel,” but the description of it in the evidence, as well as the price for which it was sold, raise a strong presumption that it was susceptible of being put to other uses.
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