Uhlfelder v. Levy

Burnett, J., after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the Court—Terry, C. J., concurring. The rule established by repeated decisions of this Court is not controverted by the learned counsel of plaintiffs. But they insist that this case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Ricketts and Wife v. Johnson and others, 8 Cal. R., 34, and Anthony v. Dunlap, 8 Cal. R., 26. It is contended that as those cases are between the same persons who were parties to the former suit, those decisions can not apply to this case, in which new parties are brought in, who could not have set up the same matters in the suit between Bernard Levy and Rime, because these plaintiffs could not intervene in this case.

But we conceive that this circumstance can make no difference in the application of the true principle on which the decisions, in those cases, were predicated. Those decisions are not based upon the personal rights of parties, which, of course, they can waive, but upon the rights of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The power of one District Court to restrain proceedings in another, in cases where as adequate relief can be as well had in the Court in which the proceedings are pending, is denied by the former decisions of this Court. If, therefore, a bill was filed in the District Court of Sacramento, to restrain proceedings in the District Court of Tuba, in a case where the latter Court could as well give the relief sought, the former Court, of its own motion, should dismiss the bill.

In the case of Ricketts and Wife v. Johnson and others, we said:

“ In the present case, the plaintiffs could obtain the most ample relief in the Court whose proceedings they wished to restrain ; and there was no reason for seeking another tribunal possessing only the same powers.”

So, in the case of Anthony v. Dunlap :

“ The only case in which it will be allowed is where the Court in which the action or proceeding is pending is unable, by reason of its jurisdiction, to afford the relief sought.”

In the opinion of Judge Duer, (5 Sand., 612,) the true reason of the rule is given. This decision in Sandford is referred to and confirmed in 24 Barbour, 160.

It is true that there may be exceptions to the general rule, that one District Court cannot restrain the proceedings of another. A case not coming within the reason of the rule, would not come within the rule itself. The reason of the old rule having ceased, the rule ceased; and the new rule came into existence because of the existence of the new reason. Where [615]