People v. Moore
Before: Burnett, Murray
Synopsis
On a trial for murder it is not error to instruct the jury that if the killing was the result of deliberation, no matter for how short a period, it would be murder in the first degree, under our statute; where the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding the fact, that the killing was deliberate and premeditated.
There can be no murder without malice, either express or implied.
Where the Court erroneously defined the crime of murder in the first degree in its charge to the jury, but in a subsequent instruction clearly and correctly defined it, the erroneous ruling is nota sufficient ground for a new trial.
A mere want of perspicuity in an instruction to the jury, which does not injure the prisoner, if erroneous, is not sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment. The objection must go to this extent, that the instruction is wholly erroneous, or susceptible of different and doubtful constructions.
Murray, O. J., delivered the opinion of the Court—Burnett, J., concurring. The appellant was convicted of murder in the first degree. On the trial, the Court instructed the jury, “that any kind of unlawful, willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, is murder in the first degree.”
The statute of the State (Compiled Laws, 640,) defines murder to be the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought, express or implied. This is but an enunciation of the common law definition of the crime. Murder is thus defined by Coke: “When a person of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the King’s peace, with malice aforethought, either express or implied.”
To constitute the offence, it must appear:
1. That the parfy was of sound mind.
2. That the killing was unlawful; and,
3. That it was done with malice.
Every killing is unlawful, unless done by warrant, or legal [93]excuse; but every unlawful killing is not murder; as for example : if an officer should execute a criminal, before or after the day appointed, or upon a void warrant, this would be an unlawful killing; and also, a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, but would not be murder, unless the ingredient of malice was established.
There can be no murder without malice, either expressed or implied, and the instruction of the Court, as a legal proposition, was incorrect. At common law, this error would have been a sufficient ground of reversal, but our statute makes it the duty of the Court to examine the whole record, and affirm the judgment, if it shall appear that substantial justice has been done. We are to disregard technicalities, and to determine, from the whole case, whether the prisoner has had a fair trial, and the judgment is correct.
In the subsequent part of the charge of the Court, the law of the case is stated with great clearness and accuracy, and it is impossible to imagine that the jury could have been misled by the first instruction asked by the district attorney, and after-wards explained by the charge of the Court.
The appellant complains of the second instruction given by the Court, to the effect that the law fixes no time for deliberation, or reflection, to constitute murder; that it may be for a year, month, day, hour, or minute; that if it appeared that the killing was the result of deliberation, no matter for how short a period, it would be murder in the first degree under the statutes of this State; “that no time was too short for a wicked man to frame, in his mind, a scheme of murder, and to contrive the means of executing it.”
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)