Wild v. Van Valkenburgh

Murray, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court—Burnett, J., concurring.

This was an action on a promissory note. Demurrer to the declaration and judgment for the plaintiff. The note sued on was made payable at No. 128 Pearl street, New York, on the 7th of September, 1854, and suit commenced on it on the 17th of September, 1856, in San Francisco. No presentation and demand of payment was alleged in the declaration.

The question whether a promissory note, made payable at a particular place, should not be presented at such place for payment before the payee can maintain an action thereon, is one upon which the Courts of the United States and those of England differ entirely; and, as it is presented to us for the first time, we feel at liberty to establish such a rule as in our opinion is in consonance with sound principle and the commercial convenience of this country.

In England, the doctrine is firmly established with regard to bills of exchange and promissory notes, that the place of payment is a substantial contract, and that it is necessary to allege and prove a demand at the place specified. Convenience may require that the payment should be made at a particular place, and a party who is not in default ought not to be called upon to pay at a different place from that specified in his contract. This question was very fully discussed before the House of Lords in the case of Rowe v. Young, (2 Broad. & Bing.,) and the opinion of Lord Eldon delivered in the case seems unanswerable.

In the United States, with the exception of Louisiana and Indiana, (which States adhere to the English rule,) a different doctrine prevails. “ It was, probably, in the first instance adopted,” says Mr. Justice Story, in his work on promissory notes, “ from the supposed tendency of English authorities to the same result, and there certainly was much conflict in the authorities until the doctrine was put at rest by the final decision in the House of Lords, a decision which seems founded upon the most solid principles, and to be supported by the most enlarged public policy, as to the rights and duties of parties. The received doctrine in America seems to be this: that as to the [168]acceptor of a bill of exchange, and the maker of a promissory-note, payable at a bank, or other specified place, the same rule applies, that is, that no presentment or demand of payment need be made at the specified place on the day when the bill or note becomes due, or afterwards, in order to maintain a suit against the acceptor or maker; and, of course, that there need be no averment in the declaration in any suit brought thereon, or any proof at the trial of any such presentment or demand; but that the omission or neglect is a matter of defense on the part of the acceptor or maker. If the acceptor or maker had funds at the appointed place at the time to pay the bill or note, and it was not duly presented, he will, in the suit, be exonerated, not, indeed, from the payment of the principal sum, but from the payment of all damages and costs in that suit. If, by such omission or n eglect of presentment and demand, he has sustained any loss or injury, as if the bill or note was payable at a bank, and the acceptor or maker had funds there at the time, which have been lost by the failure of the bank, then, and in such case, the acceptor or maker will be exonerated from liability to the extent of the loss or liability so sustained.