Deck's Estate v. Gherke

California Supreme Court Jul 1, 1856Published

Before: Terry

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Holding. The court held that a probate judge has discretion to remove an administrator, that statutes requiring the transfer of previously decided probate issues to district courts are unconstitutional, and that claims against an estate allowed by an administrator and judge have the force of judgments.

Issues

Whether the Probate Court abused its discretion in removing the administrator.
Whether the Act of 1855 requiring transfer of probate issues to the District Court is constitutional.
Whether the Probate Court erred in rejecting claims against the estate that had been previously allowed.

Disposition. Reversed and remanded.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The Probate Judge, as the general supervisor and guardian of the estates of deceased persons, has power, by law, to suspend or remove an administrator”

“So much of the Act of--, 1855, as provides for the transfer to the District Court of issues of fact already decided in the Probate Court, is unconstitutional and void.”

“claims against an estate which have been allowed by the administrator and the Probate Judge, have the force and effect of judgments.”

Synopsis

The power of the Probate Judge to remove, in his discretion, an administrator for any of the causes named in the statute, will not be interfered with by the appellate Court, unless it should be clearly shown that there has been a gross abuse of discretion.

So much of the act of 1855 as provides for the transfer to the District Court of issues of fact already decided in the Probate Court, is unconstitutional and void, as the effect of the act would be to indirectly confer appellate jurisdiction upon the District Court.

By our probate law, claims against an estate, which have been allowed by the administrator and the Probate Judge, have the force and effect of judgments; and it is error in the Probate Court to reject, on the final settlement of the administrator's accounts, sums paid by him on claims so allowed.

This rule only applies to such claims as are debts againát the estate, and not to expenses incurred, or disbursements made, by the administrator, the policy of the law being merely to prevent estates from being squandered in useless litigation.

Mr. Justice Terry delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Chief Justice Murray and Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt concurred.

[669]This case comes up on an appeal from the judgment of the Probate Court of San Francisco. The errors assigned are,

1. The removal of the appellant from the administration of the estate.

2. The refusal of the Court below to transfer to the District Court for trial, certain issues of fact which had already been tried and decided by the Probate Court.

3. Rejecting on the final settlement of the administrator’s accounts certain sums paid on claims against the estate, which had been duly allowed by the administrator and Probate Judge.

1. The Probate Judge, as the general supervisor and guardian of the estates of deceased persons, has power, by law, to suspend or remove an administrator “ whenever he has reason to believe, either from his own knowledge or from credible information, that such administrator has fraudulently wasted or mismanaged the estate, or is about to do so, or has become incompetent to manage it.” C. L., 418, §§ 281, 283.

With the exercise of this power, so necessary to the protection and security of estates, an appellate Court should not interfere, unless it be clearly shown that there has been a gross abuse of discretion by the Probate Court. The facts of this case, as disclosed by the record, establish no such abuse of discretion.

2. So much of the Act of--, 1855, as provides for the transfer to the District Court of issues of fact already decided in the Probate Court, is unconstitutional and void. As the power to try de novo issues, which have been tried and decided, necessarily includes the power to reverse or modify such decisions, the effect of the Act would be indirectly to confer appellate jurisdiction, which, under our Constitution, the District Courts cannot exercise.

3. By our probate law, claims against an estate which have been allowed by the administrator and the Probate Judge, have the force and effect of judgments. C. L., 395, §§ 132 to 141. At common law, an administrator who paid a claim without suit, did so at his peril. The evident design of our law was, by protecting the administrator in the payment of such claims as were duly presented and allowed, to prevent the property of estates from being squandered in useless and expensive litigation. 1 How. Miss. Rep., 119; 3 ib., 216 and 303.

Deck's Estate v. Gherke

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