Osborne v. Endicott
Before: Murray
Synopsis
A party making a deed is not estopped, as between the original parties to it, by recitals unnecessary to the conveyance.
A plaintiff's recovery cannot be barred by the Statute of Frauds, unless the statute be pleaded.
Where land is purchased in the name of one person, and the consideration is paid by another, a trust immediately rises, and the person in whose name the conveyance is taken, is deemed in law to hold as trustee for the one furnishing the money.
In order to create such a trust, the facts need not appear affirmatively on the face of the deed, but may be proved by any note or memorandum in writing of the nominal purchaser, even though he plead the Statute of Frauds.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Murray. Mr. Justice Terry concurred.
The opinion of the Court below is based upon two propositions; first, that plaintiff is estopped by the recital of his deed to the defendant; and second, that the trust sought to be established is within the Statute of Frauds.
The general rule of law is, that recitals in a deed bind all persons who are parties or privies thereto; but this rule does not extend to that which is mere description, or an averment which is not essential. The doctrine of estoppels has always been construed with great strictness, because loose statements or recitals may often, so far from expressing the truth, (which no one should be permitted to deny,) exclude the party from setting it up.
Testing the present case by this rule, the correctness of which I apprehend no one will deny, how can it be said that the plaintiff is es-topped by the recital in his deed to Endicott “ that he hold the lot in question for him.” The recital was not necessary for the purposes of the conveyance; the exact facts of the case were within the knowledge of the party taking it; no new parties have intervened to change the character of the transaction; no surprise, fraud, or imposition has been practiced, and in fact the recital is not attacked by this proceeding. Osborne did hold the lot in trust for the defendant, being himself entitled to a certain interest which he now seeks to maintain. We have examined all the authorities cited by the respondents, and can find none that would warrant us in holding the present plaintiff estopped by his conveyance.
Upon the second point, it is equally clear that the plaintiff’s recovery is not barred: First, because the Statute of Frauds is not pleaded; and second, because this is not a case within the statute, but a resulting trust, or trust by operation of law, which is expressly excepted by the statute.
It is a well recognized principle, that where, upon the purchase of real property, the conveyance of the legal estate is taken in the name of a third person and the consideration is paid by another, a trust immediately arises, and the person in whose name the conveyance is taken, is deemed in law to hold as the trustee for the one furnishing the mo[154]ney. So, if two furnish the purchase money, or one money and the other skill, and the deed be taken in the name of one, he will be held to be a trustee for the other.
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