City of San Francisco v. Hazen
Before: Murray
Synopsis
The charter of the City of San Francisco provides, that no ordinance or resolution shall be passed except by a majority of all the members elected. The number of members elected being eight; held, that an ordinance passed by a vote of four in the affirmative to three in the negative, was not passed by a majority of all the members elected, and was therefore void.
In construing statutes, force and effect should be given to every part of them.
Where a law is capable of two constructions that one must be adopted which will preserve the sense as well of the several parts, as of the whole Act.
Murray, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Heydenfeldt, J., concurred.
The first and second sections of the third article of the charter of the city of San Francisco, passed April 16, 1851, provide, that “ the legislative power of the city of San Francisco shall be vested in a Board of Aldermen and a Board of Assistant Aldermen, which shall each consist of one member from each ward, and shall form the Common Council of the City. A majority of each Board shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from time to time, and may compel the attendance of absent members. Either Board may originate or amend any ordinance or resolution, and no ordinance or resolution shall be passed, except by a majority of all the members elected.”
The ordinance under consideration in this case was passed by a vote of four in the affirmative to three in the negative; there being a vacancy in the Board by reason of the resignation of one member.
The first position assumed by the appellant is, that the ordinance is void, because five members, a majority of eight, the whole number originally elected, did not vote in favor of its passage.
On the part of the respondent, it is claimed that the word “ elected,” as used in the second section already quoted, is not to be taken in its past, but perfect or present sense, and must be limited to those actually in office, Without regard to those who may have resigned. In construing statutes, force and effect should be given to every part of them. Thus, where a law is capable of two constructions, that onp must be adopted which will preserve the sense, as well of the several parts, as of the whole Act. Testing the present case by this rule, it is apparent, that either the second or fourth subdivision of the second section of the third article, before quoted, are redundant, if the doctrine contended for by the respondent is correct; the second subdivision having provided that a majority of the members elect shall constitute a quorum, the fourth but re-enacts the same provision. Such is not the case. The charter has provided the number of members in each Board; the [172]second section provides that a majority of each Board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The number of members being eight, five would constitute a quorum; and by the fourth subdivision, a majority of all the members elected (which would be five) must vote in favor of every ordinance or resolution. If such is not the plain meaning of the section, and if the word “elected” is to be taken in its present sfense as applying to members actually in office, it follows as a necessary consequence, that by resignation, or otherwise, the Board may be reduced to one member, and he would be as competent to act as a full Board.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)