Taylor v. Hargous
Before: Heydenfeldt, Murray
Synopsis
Appeal from the Superior Court of the City of San Francisco.
This was an action of ejectment brought by Mary Ann Taylor, widow of James Taylor, deceased, on the 14th of July, 1858, to recover a lot of ground in the City of San Francisco, near the corner of Pacific and Sansome streets, on the ground that at the time, and previous to its conveyance to the defendant Hargous, by her husband, on the 7th day of April, 1852, it was, and had been the homestead of the family, and that she did not unite in the said conveyance, as required by law.
The facts of the case distinctly appear in- the special verdict rendered by the jury, in reply to interrogatories submitted by plaintiff and defendant.
Plaintiff’s interrogatories:
1st. Was the plaintiff Mary Ann Taylor, the wife of James Taylor, now deceased, on the 7th day of April, 1852, at the time of the alleged sale of the premises described in the complaint to the defendant, and was she lawfully married to him, and when?
*Answer. She was his wife, and she was married [269] to him in 1845.
2d. Was the property in question acquired during marriage, by the joint earnings of the said Taylor and the said plaintiff, his wife ?
Ans. It was.
Bd. Were the premises described in the complaint, occupied as a residence by the said Taylor and his wife (said plaintiff), on the 7th day of April, 1852, at the time of the alleged sale and conveyance thereof, by the said Taylor to the said Hargous, and did the said plaintiff reside thereon at the time of the said alleged sale ?
Ans. The premises described were occupied as a residence by them at that time.
4th. How long did the said Taylor and the said plaintiff occupy the said premises as their residence ?
Ans From October, 1849, to about April 21st, 1852.
5th. Had the said Taylor and his wife, the said plaintiff, any other residence than the premises described in the complaint, on the said 7th day of April, A. D. 1852?
Ans. They had none.
6th. At what time did the defendant Hargous, complete his building upon said lot ?
Ans. In the month of November, 1852.
7th. Was Mary Ann Taylor, the plaintiff, present at the execution and delivery of the deed by J ames Taylor, to the defendant, Hargous ?
Ans. She was not,
Defendant’s interrogatories:
1st. Did the plaintiff and the said James Taylor, in the month of April, 1852, and after the sale of April 7th, 1852, by the said J ames Taylor to the defendant, voluntarily leave the house and lot described in the complaint, and did they, within a few days thereafter, rent a lot. of ground near the Presidio’, and purchase á house on said lot of ground ? And did they, the plaintiff and the said James Taylor, live in said house, and on said lot of ground, from the date of [270] said renting and pur-*chase, till the month of October, 1852? And did said James Taylor die on the last day aforesaid ?
Mr. J. Heydenfeldt delivered the opinion of the Court.
Mr. Ch. J. Murray concurred. In Cook v. McChristian (ante p. 23), we decided that the Homestead Law required no specific act to indicate thé selection of a homestead, and that the occupancy of .the family was presumptive evidence of the appropriation of the place as a homestead, and was consequently notice to all the world.
The main difference between this case and that of Cook v. McChristian consists in the fact, that here the husband and * wife remove from the premises, after .a [273] sale by the husband in which the wife did not join, and it is argued by the appellant that this was evidence of an abandonment of the homestead, and the acquisition of a new one.
It seems to me, on the contrary, to be the very case against which the statute intends to provide. If the husband can sell at pleasure, and remove to another place, without the consent or approbation of the wife, then the design of the statute to protect her against the improvidence, misfortunes or misconduct of the husband, would be totally nugatory.
As soon as a place, by the occupancy in good faith, of [274]the family, acquires the nature of a homestead, the nature of the estate becomes changed, without reference to the manner in which the title to the property originated, whether it was the separate estate of either husband or wife, or the common property of both. It is turned into a sort of joint tenancy, with the right of survivorship, at least as between husband and wife, and this estate cannot be altered or destroyed, except by the concurrence of both, in the manner provided by law.
The conveyance by the husband alone, is declared by the statule to be void, and this rule cannot be subverted, unless it be in favor of an innocent purchaser, without notice.
It is argued for the appellant, that if during several years husband and wife buy several homesteads, live in them for a time, and then the husband sells, the wife, after the death of the husband, may sue for and recover them all. Although it is not called for by any of the facts in this case, yet I have no hesitation in saying, in answer to the argument, that no such consequence could follow; because we have said that occupancy is only presumptive evidence of homestead, and therefore, when the wife has recovered one homestead, this recovery would completely rebut the presumption which occupancy might raise, in reference to any other for which she might bring suit.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)