Mansfield v. Dorland

Appeal from the Superior Court of San Francisco.

This was a rule to show cause why the entry of satisfaction upon a judgment should not be set aside.

The facts as set out in several affidavits upon which the rule waS founded, appear to be, that plaintiffs applied to Eli and Rankin, attorneys at law, to bring suit against the defendants, who agreed to commence and prosecute the same, the plaintiffs paying all disbursements, and further agreeing that if the cause should be decided in favour of plaintiffs, said attorneys were to receive the costs of said action, and a portion of the amount of the judgment, to be collected from the defendant. The attorneys commenced and prosecuted the suit accordingly, and obtained judgment at October term, 1851, for ¡¡¡>840 with interest and $234.66 costs.

Satisfaction was entered upon the said judgment, Oct. 9,1851, by the plaintiffs without the knowledge or consent of the attorneys, who claimed an interest in the same as above, which plaintiffs by then.' affidavits explained by saying, that the defendant Dorland called upon one of them after the judgment was had against him, to compromise it; and that the deponent informed him that the said attorneys were entitled to the costs and one third of the balance of the said judgment, and that plaintiffs could compromise only as far as their own interest was concerned, and that Borland then offered §500 for the interest of the plaintiffs in the judgment, and agreed to pay and arrange the matter with the said attorneys as far as their interest was concerned, and upon their terms the money (§500) was paid, and received by plaintiffs, and deponent (Charles T. Mansfield) entered satisfaction on the said judgment for himself and H. A. Mansfield.

Upon these facts the Court granted a rule upon defendant Borland, to show cause why the entry of satisfaction should not be set aside and cancelled, &c., and why execution should not issue against defendant, to satisfy the interest of plaintiffs’ attorneys in the costs and judgment; and June the 2d, 1852, the Court ordered that the entry of satisfaction be set aside to the extent of the costs and one third of said judgment, and that execution issue against defendant, for the purpose of satisfying the interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys in the costs and judgment.

Defendant excepted; and appealed.