Muldrow v. Norris
Before: Murray
Synopsis
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, for the County of Sacramento.
At the March Term, 1851, of the District Court, Muldrow filed in said Court, sealed articles of submission, dated February 14th, 1851, executed by himself and Norris, reciting that various differences had long existed between the parties, and submitting all matters of difference, suits, &e., arising or accrued before the 1st day of December, 1850, to White, Homer and McDaniel, and agreeing that the award of them, or any two of them, should be final and conclusive; and constituting the said arbitrators, jointly and severally, attorneys in fact, to confess judgment in said Court against the parties, or either of them, according to the award to be made by the arbitrators; and further agreeing that neither party should appeal from such judgment, nor sue out any writ of certiorari, or other writ to review the same, or prevent execution thereon; and declaring the submission and power of attorney irrevocable, provided the award should be made on or before the 1st of April, 1851; and authorizing the arbitrators to determine as to the costs of the arbitration, and of all suits between the parties, &c. Muldrow, at the same time, also filed the award of Homer and McDaniel, made February 28th, 1851, which, after reciting the submission, &c., awarded, in substance, as follows: That Norris had violated a lease executed by him to Mul- * drow, in November, 1849,—which lease was by the award declared valid; and thereby caused damage to Muldrow in the sum of $23,500, as follows; that by the lease, Muldrow might use, at his option, from one to 1000 acres of land belonging to Norris; that Muldrow was able and desirous to cultivate 200 acres of said land, but was prevented by Norris from using more than 40 acres, and thus deprived of the use and profits of 160 acres; that the produce of 20 acres of the said land was proved to have been worth $9000, making the produce of 200 acres, when cultivated, worth $90,000; that by the lease Norris was to receive one-fourth of the produce; which would have left $67,500 for Muldrow, had he cultivated the 200 acres; that after deducting from said $67,500, three-fourths of the gross amount for the expense of ditching and cultivating the 160 acres, and $3375 for the use of the 40 acres cultivated by Muldrow, there remained a balance of $13,500 in his favour; to which the arbitrators added $6000 damages for the violation by Norris of Muldrow’s Ferry privileges, and $4000 damages for the refusal of Norris to furnish Muldrow the number of cows specified in the lease ; making in all the said sum of $23,500: and further awarding to Muldrow the use of the 200 acres referred to, as designated in a map made an exhibit, and of the ferry; that the expenses of the arbitration be paid by the parties equally; that the costs of the suits referred to in the submission be paid by Norris; and that the parties execute mutual releases.
Justice Murray delivered the opinion of the Court. It is unnecessary, for the determination of this cause, to consider many of the points raised on the argument. The first point we propose to examine, is, as to the power of the Court below to inquire into the award now before us. It is a well settled principle that courts of equity, in the absence of statutes, will set aside awards for fraud, mistake, or accident, and it makes no difference whether the mistake be one of fact or law. It is true, under a general submission, arbitrators have power to decide upon the law and facts: and a mere mistake of law cannot be taken advantage of. The arbitrators are not bound to award, on principles of dry law, but may decide on principles of equity and good conscience, and make their award ex eequo et bono. If, however, they mean to decide according to the law, and mistake the law, the courts will set their award aside. A distinction seems to have been taken in the books between general and special awards. In the case of a general finding, it appears to be well settled that courts will not inquire into mistakes by evidence aliunde: but where the arbitrators have made any point a matter of judicial inquiry by spreading it upon the record, and they mistake the law in a palpable and material point, their award will be set aside. ' 2 Sto. Eq., sec. 1451. The mere act of setting forth their reasons must be considered for the purpose of enabling those dissatisfied to take advantage of them. Kent v. Elstob, 3 East. In all cases where the arbitrators give the reasons of their finding, they are supposed to have intended to decide according to law, and to refer the point for the opinion of the Court. In such cases, if they mistake the law, the award must be set aside; for it is not the opinion they intended to give, [78]the same having been made through mistake. Kline v. Katara, 2 Gall. In the case already cited, the Court say, “these special awards are not to be commended, as arbitrators may often decide with perfect equity between the parties, and not give good reasons for their decision; but when a special award is once before the Court, it must stand or fall by its own intrinsic correctness, tested by legal principles.” See also Chance v. Westman, 13 East; Williams v. Craig, 1 Dall.; Kyd on Awards, 351; 1 Steph. N. P. 75.
In the case before" us, the arbitrators have set forth the particular grounds upon which their finding was based: and it follows from the authorities already cited, that the correctness of the principles by which they must be supposed to have been governed is a proper subject for judicial inquiry.
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