Rogers v. Huie
Before: Bennett
Synopsis
Action of trover. The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that, on the 12th day of December, A. D. 1850, he was the owner of twenty-nine kegs of butter, of the average weight of twenty-five pounds each, and of the value of thirty cents per pound; and also of one hundred cheeses, weighing fifteen hundred, pounds, and worth twenty cents per pound ; and that the value of the butter and cheese together was five hundred and seventeen dollars. The complaint further alleged that the butter and cheese were taken away from, the plaintiff without his knowledge and consent by some person or persons to him unknown, and passed into . the hands of the defendant, an auctioneer in San Francisco, who converted them to his own use without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff.
A general answer was put in by the defendant denying the allegations of the complaint.
The cause was tried before a jury, win rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $437,50.
It was established, on the trial of the cause that the plaintiff, who was a merchant in Boston, shipped the butter and cheese in question to his agent- at San Francisco, and that, on their arrival at that place, the agent had them lightered from the ship, and deposited on shore, on the 9th day of December, where they were left. On the 14th day of December, the agent went to show them to a customer, and found that they had been carried away. They had, in fact, been' stolen, and taken by the thief to the defendant, who was an auctioneer, and by him sold in the usual course of 1ns business. The proceeds of the sale, after deducting the commissions of the defendant, had been paid over to the thief. There is no suspicion that the defendant supposed that the property had been stolen, or that he acted otherwise than in perfect good faith.
There was no evidence to show that the thief had been convicted for the larceny.
The court was asked to charge the jury upon several points, only two of -which it will be necessary to refer to, as they were the only ones insisted upon by the defendant’s counsel on the argument in this court. They were as follows :—
1st. That if the defendant acquired the possession of the goods in market avert, or in the course of his public employment as an auctioneer, then the plaintiff cannot recover.
2d. That the plaintiff cannot recover, if the goods were stolen, until conviction of the felon.
The court refused to charge the jury as requested, and the defendant’s counsel excepted.
After verdict a motion was made for a new trial, on the ground of surprise, founded on affidavits. The affidavits set forth, that on the trial of the cause the defendant was taken by-surprise, and wholly deprived of the evidence of II. D, Mewliall, W. J. Sherwood, T. McMahon, J. Josephs and L. Josephs, by whose testimony he expected to prove a complete and valid defense to the action ; that, on the day of the trial, the names of the said witnesses were inserted in aprecipe directed to the clerk of the district court, desiring him to issue subpoenas for the witnesses, and that such precipe was placed on one of the desks in the clerk’s office, during the temporary absence of the clerk therefrom, in a position the most likely to attract the attention of the clerk oil his return, but that, owing to some accident, it did not come to the knowledge of the clerk until a period too late for the purposes of the trial, in consequence whereof the defendant was obliged to go to trial, without the witnesses upon whose testimony he relied to support his defense, and who, as he believed, had been subpoenaed. The affidavits further set forth, that the defendant has a good and substantial and meritorious defense against the claim of the plaintiff, and that the testimony of the witnesses above named is important and material to his just defense, that he can produce such witness on a new trial, and that the failure of his witnesses to attend on the former trial, was not the result of negligence on his part, hut was an accident which diligence could not prevent nor prudence foresee, and against which the defendant had attempted to guard.
By the Court,
Bennett, J. The first point which I shall consider is, whether a new trial should have been granted; and this depends upon the question whether the affidavits on the part of the defendant, presented to the consideration of the district judge sufficient facts to require him to grant a new trial. The application ought not to have been granted, unless the defendant had used due diligence in endeavoring to procure the attendance of his witnesses. Did he use such diligence'? I think not. His witnesses had not been snbpcenaed, as appears from his own affidavit. Did he make reasonable efforts to have [433]them subpoenaed ? I think not. He made no attempt to subpoena them, until the morning of the day on which the tidal was to take place, and actually did take place. This was not using due diligence. For this reason alone the court properly denied the motion for a new trial.
There is also another defect in the papers upon which the motion for a new trial was made. The affidavits do not state the facts which the defendant expected to be able to prove by his absent witnesses. In all cases in which a new trial is moved for, on the ground of surprise, or on the ground of newdy discovered evidence, the evidence which the party moving expects to be able to produce on the second trial, should be fully and distinctly set forth in the affidavits on which the application is based, in order that the court may see whether the testimony, if given, could have any legal effect on the result of the controversy. And, as a general rule, the party ought not to rely on his owm single and unsupported statement, but should, if possible, by the exercise of due diligence, procure the affidavits of the persons whose testimony he deems material, so that the court may be satisfied as to what facts they will testify. (Ruggies v. Hall, 14 J. R. 112; Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Cai. R. 182; Kendrick v. Delafield, 2 Cai. R. 67; Denn v. Morrel, 1 Hall, 382.) In the case at bar it does not appear that the witnesses who were absent could have testified to any state of facts which would have influenced the result. The same reasoning also applies to that portion of the defendant’s affidavit, in which he states that he has a good and substantial defense. He does not set'forth specifically wherein that defense consisted. A new trial should never be granted on such a general statement. If this practice were to be sanctioned, there would be no limit to applications for new trials. The court properly denied the motion.
An auctioneer who receives and sells stolen property, is liable for the conversion to the same extent as any other merchant or individual. This is so both upon principle and authority. Upon principle, there is no reason why. he should be exempted from liability. The person to whom he sells, and who has paid
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