Thomas v. Croskrey CA2/8

Filed 12/30/21 Thomas v. Croskrey CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

DENISE THOMAS, B299272

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC701476 v.

CARLY RAE CROSKREY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Affirmed with directions. Ernest Calhoon for Plaintiff and Appellant. Nemecek & Cole, Jonathan B. Cole, Mark Schaeffer, and Janette S. Bodenstein for Defendants and Respondents.

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The trial court granted a special motion to strike Denise Thomas’s complaint and awarded attorney fees to her opponents. Thomas asks us to reverse through a deficient brief that disregards appellate rules and fails to demonstrate error. We affirm. I Thomas’s opening brief is heavy on accusations but light on relevant details. It provides no chronology and little that we can follow about the procedural history of this case. We know Thomas sued her ex-husband’s former lawyer, Carly Rae Croskrey, and Croskrey’s law firm. Thomas’s lawsuit springs from statements Croskrey supposedly made in underlying family law litigation between the ex-spouses. Croskrey responded with a special motion to strike Thomas’s amended complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Thomas tried to forestall a ruling for various reasons, but the trial court ultimately granted Croskrey’s anti-SLAPP motion and a later motion for attorney fees. Though she concedes she “barely opposed” the anti-SLAPP motion, Thomas challenges the trial court’s rulings and numerous aspects of the proceedings. In an unfocused and inflammatory opening brief, Thomas appears to complain about, among other things, possibly insufficient notice of the anti- SLAPP motion. She also faults the trial court for refusing to grant a continuance, to address requests for disability accommodations, to enforce subpoenas, to permit oral objections to Croskrey’s evidence, and to allow testimony at the hearings. II Thomas’s deficient opening brief dooms her appeal.