Reddy v. National University CA4/2 (2021) · DecisionDepot
Reddy v. National University CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 2, 2021 No. E075425Unpublished
Filed 12/2/21 Reddy v. National University CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LAKSHMI REDDY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E075425
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1603294)
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David Cohn, Judge.
Reversed.
David L. Prince and Miles L. Prince for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Spencer C. Skeen, Jack S. Sholkoff
and Jennifer M. Hendricks for Defendant and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Lakshmi Reddy appeals from (1) the judgment dismissing
her complaint in this action, based on her former counsel’s failure to pursue the court-
ordered arbitration of her wrongful termination, other employment-, and breach-of-
contract-related claims against defendant and respondent National University (NU)
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2),1 and (2) the postjudgment order denying her motion to set
Under its vestigial jurisdiction, the court may, for example: (1) appoint
arbitrators, if the method selected by the parties failed (§ 1282.6); (2) grant a provisional
remedy, if the arbitration award might be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief
(§ 1281.8, subd. (b)); and (3) conform, correct, or vacate the arbitration award (§ 1285;
Titan/Value, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 487). As to other matters concerning the
arbitration, “the arbitrator takes over.” (Id. at pp. 487-488.) Thus, “[i]t is up to the
arbitrator, and not the court, to grant relief for [a party’s] delay in bringing an arbitration
to a resolution.” (Id. at p. 488.)
It is undisputed that Reddy’s action was ordered to arbitration and ordered stayed
on January 31, 2019, the day the remittitur issued in Reddy I—the earlier appeal in which
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this court reversed the January 10, 2017 order denying NU’s motion to compel arbitration
of Reddy’s claims as alleged in her SAC. (Reddy I, supra, E067913.) The arbitration
and stay orders were not subsequently vacated. Thus, the court did not have jurisdiction
or authority to dismiss the action when it did so on November 21, 2019, based on
Reddy’s counsel’s failure to pursue the arbitration. (Titan/Value, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th
at p. 488; Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.)
Again, “[r]ather than seek relief from the trial court for [Reddy’s or her counsel’s]
failure to proceed [with the arbitration], [NU] should have sought relief in the arbitration
proceeding, by pursuing the remedies available under the arbitration agreement and the
rules of the arbitration association designated therein. [Citations.] Therefore, the trial
court had no jurisdiction to grant the motion to dismiss, and its order dismissing the
action must be reversed.” (Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738.)
C. Reddy Did Not Forfeit Her Jurisdictional Claim
NU argues that Reddy has waived or forfeited her claim that the trial court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing Reddy’s action. NU observes that Reddy did not
bring the court’s lack of jurisdiction to dismiss the action to the court’s attention at the
OSC hearings on October 22 and November 21, 2019, or at the July 2, 2020 hearing on
Reddy’s motion to set aside the judgment of dismissal. NU relies on the general principle
that: “points not urged in the trial court may not be urged for the first time on appeal.
(Damiani v. Albert (1957) 48 Cal.2d 15, 18.)” Blake rejected a similar waiver or
forfeiture argument (Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738, fn. 9), and we find Blake’s
reasoning persuasive.
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As Blake explained: “We summarily reject defendant’s argument that plaintiff is
precluded on appeal from raising this [excess of] jurisdiction[] objection because she did
not raise it in the trial court. As we said in Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan
Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, even though an appellant did not raise an issue in the
trial court, if that issue is one of law that may be resolved on undisputed facts, it may be
raised for the first time on appeal; indeed, it could even be raised by the court rather than
the appellant, as long as the respondent has had an opportunity to address it. (Id. at
p. 1341, fn. 6.) Jurisdiction is clearly such an issue and it has been fully briefed and
argued by both parties.” (Blake, at p. 738, fn. 9, italics added.)
Here, as in Blake, the facts relevant to whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
dismiss Reddy’s action are undisputed: the action was ordered to arbitration and stayed
on January 31, 2019, before the court dismissed the action on November 21, based on
Reddy’s counsel’s failure to pursue the arbitration after January 31. Thus, whether the
trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the action is a question of law
that may be raised, as it is here, for the first time on appeal. (Blake, supra,
93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738, fn. 9.)
NU correctly points out that the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the
action after it ordered the case to arbitration (Roberts v. Packard, Packard & Johnson
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 822, 841-842), and that the court, at most, acted in excess of its
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jurisdiction in dismissing the action.2 NU notes that claims that the court lacked
fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction to act may be raised for the first time on
appeal, but claims that the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction may be precluded by
“ ‘ “such things as waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.” ’ ” (People v. Lara (2010)
48 Cal.4th 216, 225; People v. Taylor (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 920, 937-938 [“[A] claim
that a trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, as opposed to lacking fundamental [or
subject matter] jurisdiction to act, is subject to forfeiture by failing to preserve it in the
trial court.”].) As we have explained, however, a claim that a court acted in excess of its
jurisdiction—like Reddy’s claim here—is not waived or forfeited on appeal when, as
here, the claim is based on undisputed facts and, as such, presents a pure question of law.
(Blake, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 738, fn. 9.) Therefore, we conclude that Reddy has
not waived or forfeited her claim that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
dismissing Reddy’s action.
D. The Court Did Not Set an Arbitration Completion Date (§ 1283.8) by Setting the OSC
Concerning the Completion of the Arbitration
NU points out that the court had authority, pursuant to section 1283.8, to set a date
by which the arbitration had to be concluded and the arbitration award rendered.
(Bosworth v. Whitmore (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 536, 539 (Bosworth).) NU claims that
2 “The principle of subject matter jurisdiction relates to a court’s inherent authority to deal with the case or matter before it. In contrast, a court acts in excess of jurisdiction where, even though it has subject matter jurisdiction, it has no jurisdiction or power to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.” (Law Offices of Ian Herzog v. Law Offices of Joseph M. Fredrics (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 672, 680.)
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the court set a completion date for the arbitration (§ 1283.8) when it set the OSC hearing
concerning the completion of the arbitration. Thus, NU argues that the court acted within
its jurisdiction in dismissing Reddy’s action because she did not comply with the court’s
“ ‘completion’ deadline.” We disagree.
Section 1283.8 provides in pertinent part: “ ‘The [arbitration] award shall be made
within the time fixed therefor by the [arbitration] agreement or, if not so fixed, within
such time as the court orders on petition of a party to the arbitration.’ ” (Bosworth, supra,
135 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) The question in Bosworth was whether section 1283.8
authorizes the court (1) only to set a date “after completion of the evidentiary hearing
within which the arbitrator must render [the] award”; or (2) further authorizes the court
“to regulate the duration of the arbitration proceeding itself” by referring to the time
within which the award must be made. (Bosworth, at p. 545.) Bosworth reasoned that
section 1283.8 was susceptible to either interpretation and, upon reviewing the statute’s
legislative history, concluded that the statute was “intended to give the trial court power
to prevent undue delay in completing the arbitration.” (Bosworth at pp. 546-548.)
Bosworth held that, absent an arbitration completion deadline established by the
parties’ agreement, section 1283.8 “gives the trial court the power, on petition of a party
to the arbitration, to set a date by which the arbitration proceeding must be completed
and the award rendered.” (Bosworth, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 550, fn. omitted,
italics added.) But contrary to NU’s argument, the court did not set a completion date for
the arbitration or for issuance of the arbitration award (§ 1283.8), when it set the OSC
hearing concerning the completion of the arbitration.
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“ ‘An order to show cause is a notice of motion and a citation to the party to
appear at a stated time and place to show cause why a motion should not be granted.’ ”
(Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 483.) The October 22, 2019 OSC
concerning the completion of the arbitration required Reddy to appear and show cause
why the arbitration had not been completed. The November 21, OSC concerning the
dismissal required Reddy to appear and show cause why her action should not be
dismissed. But neither OSC set an arbitration completion date, and neither NU nor
Reddy petitioned the court to set a date by which the arbitration had to be completed or
the arbitration award rendered. (§ 1283.8.)
As Bosworth illustrates, section 1283.8 affords parties to an arbitration agreement
a means to ensure that the court-ordered arbitration is completed in a timely manner and
that the arbitration award is also issued in a timely manner. (Bosworth, supra,
135 Cal.App.4th 546-549.) But section 1283.8 does not authorize a court to dismiss an
action, as the court did here, when a party fails to timely pursue the arbitration or
cooperate in its completion, but the court did not fix a date for completing the arbitration
or issuing the arbitration award.
Bosworth noted that Blake and Titan/Value were “no doubt” “correctly decided.
In each case, the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority after the case was ordered
to arbitration.” (Bosworth, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 550.) Bosworth disagreed with
Blake and Titan/Value, only “to the extent the language of the opinions suggests that a
trial court has no authority to fix an arbitration completion date.” (Bosworth, at p. 550.)
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Had NU petitioned the court to set an arbitration completion date, and had Reddy
failed to complete the arbitration by that court-ordered completion date, we might agree
with NU that the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Reddy’s action based on
her counsel’s failure to complete the arbitration by the court-ordered completion date.
But that is not the case here. There simply was no arbitration completion date.
Therefore, the court erroneously dismissed the action for failing to complete the
arbitration by the time of the hearing on the OSC regarding the completion of the
arbitration, or the hearing on the OSC regarding the dismissal of the action.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The March 4, 2020 judgment dismissing Reddy’s action is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate the order of dismissal,
reinstate the action, and order the matter to arbitration. Except as authorized by
section 1283.8, any other applicable law, or agreement between the parties, any disputes
regarding the failure to timely prosecute the arbitration shall be submitted to the
arbitrator. The parties shall bear their respective costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A trial court lacks jurisdiction to dismiss an action that has been stayed pending court-ordered contractual arbitration; the remedy for a party's failure to initiate or pursue arbitration lies within the arbitration proceeding itself, not the trial court.
Issues
Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to dismiss an action that is stayed pending court-ordered contractual arbitration due to a party's failure to pursue the arbitration.
Whether a trial court's order to show cause regarding the completion of arbitration constitutes a court-ordered arbitration completion deadline under Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.8.
Whether a claim that a trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction is forfeited if not raised in the trial court.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the trial court had no jurisdiction to [dismiss the action] and its order dismissing the action must be reversed.”