California Court of Appeal Nov 4, 2021 No. E076504Unpublished
Filed 11/4/21 P. v. Miskam CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E076504
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1503713)
DUSTY MATIS MISKAM, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Harold T.
Wilson, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Jeanine G. Strong, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Eric A.
Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant and defendant Dusty Matis Miskam was charged with first degree
murder but pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter. He filed a petition under Penal
Code1 section 1170.95 to vacate the manslaughter conviction. A trial court denied the
like the defendant in Sanchez therefore “ ‘has failed to establish the threshold
requirement of an equal protection claim: disparate treatment of similarly situated
persons.’ ” (Sanchez, at p. 920.)
Defendant nonetheless contends there is no rational basis for applying Senate Bill
1437 in a discriminatory manner. He claims that, “[e]xcluding a plea to a less serious
offense would irrationally treat people who have lesser convictions . . . more harshly than
those with [a] more serious conviction.” However, “the Legislature could have
reasonably concluded ‘that the punishment for voluntary manslaughter was appropriate,
but the punishment for murder based on the [natural and probable consequences theory]
could be excessive and reform was needed only there.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 921, see Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 888 [“The decision not
to include manslaughter in section 1170.95 [fell squarely] within the Legislature’s
‘linedrawing’ authority as a rational choice that [was] not constitutionally prohibited.”].)
C. The Provocative Act Murder Doctrine is Inapposite
Defendant additionally asserts that People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254 (Lee),
review granted July 15, 2020, S262459, held that Senate Bill 1437 did not abrogate the
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provocative act murder doctrine, and argues that Lee was wrongly decided and “should
not be adopted in this district.” “Under the theory of provocative act murder, the
perpetrator of an underlying crime is held liable for the killing of an accomplice by a
third party.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 602.) Here, defendant was
not convicted under the provocative act murder doctrine; rather, he pled guilty to
voluntary manslaughter and is thus ineligible for relief.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that Penal Code section 1170.95 does not provide resentencing relief to individuals convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as the statute is limited to murder convictions.
Issues
Does Penal Code section 1170.95 apply to convictions for voluntary manslaughter?
Does excluding voluntary manslaughter convictions from section 1170.95 relief violate equal protection?
Did the trial court err in denying the petition for resentencing?
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The plain language of the statute is explicit; its scope is limited to murder convictions.”