S267624.) Specifically, an aider and abettor of a nonhomicide target offense could be
liable for murder if the direct perpetrator of the target offense committed murder and the
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 845 (Gentile).) The doctrine thus allowed the accomplice “to be
convicted of murder without personally possessing malice aforethought.” (Ibid.)
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 eliminated second degree murder
liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 1 (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at pp. 839, 841.) It did so by amending section 188. (Gentile, at p. 846.) As
1 Senate Bill 1437 also changed the first degree felony murder rule by amending section 189 to impose new requirements for the rule’s application. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.) The changes to the rule effected by Senate Bill 1437 are not relevant here, because the jury convicted Jenkins of second degree murder.
8
amended, section 188 states that except for first degree felony murder, “to be convicted
of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).) The requirement that the principal act with malice is “incompatible” with the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Gentile, at p. 847.)
Senate Bill 1437 did not change accomplice liability for murder under direct
aiding and abetting principles. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595-596.)
“One who directly aids and abets another who commits murder is thus liable for murder
under the new law just as he or she was liable under the old law.” (Id. at p. 596.)
Under direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of a murder
perpetrated by another “if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with
‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.’” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal. 5th at p. 843.) The direct aider
and abettor of murder, like the direct perpetrator, must act with malice. (Id. at p. 844;
accord People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 [direct “aider and abettor must
know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator”].) “Malice can be express
or implied. It is express when there is a manifest intent to kill.” (Gentile, at p. 844, citing
§ 188, subd. (a)(1).)
II. Section 1170.95
Senate Bill 1437 added section 1170.95 so that defendants convicted of murder
under prior law could seek retroactive application of amended sections 188 and 189.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) Subdivision (a) of section 1170.95
9
provides that any “person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory may” petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction
and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if the following criteria are met: (1) “A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine,” (2) “[t]he petitioner was convicted of first degree or
second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which
the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder,” and (3) “[t]he
petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
Upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must (1) appoint
counsel for the petitioner if requested, (2) permit the People to file a response and permit
the petitioner to file a reply, and (3) determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief. (§ 1170.95, subd. (c); People v. Mancilla (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 854, 863.) In conducting the prima facie review, “‘“the court takes [the]
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding
whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court may consider the record of
conviction, but it must not engage in factfinding, weigh the evidence, or reject the
petition’s allegations on the basis of adverse credibility determinations. (Id. at pp. 971-
972, 974.) But if the record of conviction “‘“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,”’” then the court is justified in rejecting them. (Id. at p. 971.)
10
“If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief,
the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (c).) We independently
review the trial court’s ruling on whether the petitioner has made the requisite prima facie
Once the order to show cause issues, the court “must hold a hearing ‘to determine
whether to vacate the murder conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960, quoting
§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. . . .
The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of conviction or offer new or
additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)
III. Jenkins’s Section 1170.95 Petition
By denying Jenkins’s petition without issuing an order to show cause, the court
implicitly determined that Jenkins had not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. We agree with Jenkins that the court’s ruling was erroneous and must be reversed.
Jenkins’s petition contains the required factual allegations. He alleges that the
charging document allowed the People to proceed against him under the felony murder
rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, he was convicted of second
degree murder following a trial, and he could not now be convicted of murder because of
changes to section 188. The court had to assume the truth of those allegations, unless the
record of conviction contains facts refuting them. The jurors necessarily rejected the first
11
degree felony murder theory when they convicted Jenkins of only second degree murder,
but the record does not exclude the possibility that they convicted him under the natural
and probable consequences theory, which is no longer a valid theory because of changes
to section 188. The court therefore erred by denying Jenkins’s petition at the prima facie
review stage.
The basis for the court’s ruling is unclear, but to the extent that the court relied on
the sentencing court’s section 654 ruling, that ruling does not refute Jenkins’s allegations.
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishment where an act or course of conduct violates
more than one criminal statute but a defendant has only a single intent and objective.
[Citation.] In such circumstances, the court must impose but stay execution of sentence
on all of the convictions arising out of the course of conduct except for the offense with
the longest sentence.” (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338.) But “[i]f
[the defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and
not merely incidental to each other, [the defendant] may be punished for independent
violations committed in pursuit of each objective.” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d
625, 639.) The sentencing court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard
when determining whether the defendant entertained multiple criminal intents and
objectives. (People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 844-845 (Carter).)
Here, by declining to stay Jenkins’s sentence on the kidnapping count, the
sentencing court necessarily found that Jenkins “‘formed a separate intent and objective
for each offense.’” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) Thus, the court
implicitly found that Jenkins formed an intent to aid and abet murder—that is, an intent to
12
kill. (See People v. Bradley (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 765, 770 [aider and abettor “must
personally have had the objective of committing both the robbery and the attempted
murder” to authorize unstayed sentences for both offenses].) And in our 2004 opinion,
we held that the sentencing court’s finding was supported by substantial evidence.
Even so, the sentencing court’s finding does not preclude relief under section
1170.95. Ordinarily, a defendant is ineligible for relief if the trier of fact found beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill. Intent to kill constitutes express
malice (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)), so the prior finding establishes that the defendant “act[ed]
with malice aforethought” under amended section 188. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see also
People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449, 460 [special circumstance findings that
require the defendants to have intentionally killed bar relief under section 1170.95];
People v. Bentley (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 150, 152, 154 [special circumstance finding
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21), incorporated finding of intent to kill, rendering
the defendant ineligible for relief under section 1170.95], review granted Dec. 16, 2020,
S265455; People v. Jones (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 474, 482 (Jones) [special circumstance
finding under section 190.2, subdivision (d), barred the defendant from relief under
section 1170.95, “because a jury has already found [him] to have satisfied the new
definition of felony murder under amended section 189”], review granted Jan. 27, 2021,
S265854.) Such a prior finding therefore establishes that the defendant could still be
convicted of murder after Senate Bill 1437.
But prior findings by the sentencing court under section 654 do not have the same
preclusive effect in this context. Unlike the jury’s findings underlying the verdict, the
13
sentencing court’s findings are made “under the lower standard of preponderance of the
evidence.” (Carter, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.) Findings by a preponderance of
the evidence do not establish that the defendant could be convicted of anything, because
conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Aranda (2012) 55
Cal.4th 342, 356 [“[T]he prosecution must prove a defendant’s guilt of a criminal offense
beyond a reasonable doubt . . .”]; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1007 [“[I]n criminal cases . . . the prosecution’s burden of proving a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt affects how an appellate court reviews the record for
substantial evidence”].) Consequently, the sentencing court’s implicit finding that
Jenkins formed an intent to kill does not establish that Jenkins could be convicted of
murder after Senate Bill 1437, and the finding does not refute his allegation of eligibility.
While the trial court had only the 2004 opinion before it, other pertinent portions
of the record of conviction (the charging document, verdict forms, closing arguments,
and jury instructions) are before this court. The facts in the more comprehensive record
do not refute Jenkins’s allegation of eligibility for relief, so we cannot affirm the court’s
order as correct on another ground disclosed by the record. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4
Cal.4th 929, 976 [a correct ruling “‘“will not be disturbed on appeal merely because
given for a wrong reason”’”].)
Still, two aspects of the record merit discussion, even if they do not refute the
allegations of the petition: (1) the witness-killing special circumstance finding, and
(2) the court’s instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
14
First, the witness-killing special circumstance required the jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jenkins acted with intent to kill. (§§ 190.2, subds. (a)(10), (c),
190.4, subd. (a); People v. Pearson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 306, 322.) As already discussed,
that prior finding of intent to kill would ordinarily render a defendant ineligible for relief
under section 1170.95. But here, the court struck the special circumstance finding at
sentencing. The finding therefore was not incorporated into the judgment, and Jenkins
had no opportunity to challenge that finding of intent to kill. (See Jones, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 483 [special circumstance finding precluding relief under section
1170.95 could be challenged by filing a habeas petition].) Under these circumstances, we
decline to give the stricken special circumstance finding preclusive effect at the prima
facie review stage, and we conclude that it does not refute Jenkins’s allegation that he is
eligible for relief. (Barboza, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 965 [stricken special
circumstance finding that required the jury to find intent to kill was a “nullit[y]” and did
not “foreclose the possibility of relief under section 1170.95”].)
Second, the court’s instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine
contained an error under then-existing law, but the instruction as a whole still permitted
the jury to find Jenkins guilty under the theory. The erroneous portion of the instruction
incorrectly identified the target and nontarget offenses. Specifically, it stated that to
convict Jenkins of murder under the doctrine, the jurors had to find: “1. The crime of
murder was committed; [¶] 2. That the defendant aided and abetted that crime; [¶] 3. That
a co-principal in that crime committed the crime of kidnapping or felony false
imprisonment; and [¶] 4. The crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of
15
the commission of the crime of kidnapping or felony false imprisonment.” The first
element should have identified the target offense as kidnapping or felony false
imprisonment, not murder. Once the first element misidentified the target offense as
murder, the second element had the effect of requiring the jurors to find that Jenkins
directly aided and abetted murder.
The next paragraph of the instruction, however, contradicted that requirement by
telling the jury the following: “You are not required to unanimously agree as to which
originally contemplated crime the defendant aided and abetted, so long as you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agree that the defendant aided and
abetted the commission of an identified and defined target crime and that the crime of
murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of that target crime.”
This portion of the instruction told the jurors that they did not have to agree on the
identity of the particular target offense Jenkins aided and abetted, so long as they agreed
that he aided and abetted a target offense of which murder was a natural and probable
consequence.
If the instruction had omitted that additional paragraph, we might have been
forced to conclude that the jury necessarily found Jenkins aided and abetted murder,
under either the erroneous natural and probable consequences instruction or the direct
aiding and abetting instruction. But the instruction given does not permit that conclusion.
The jurors could have followed the portion of the instruction that removed the
(erroneous) requirement that, in order to convict on a natural and probable consequence
theory, they had to agree that Jenkins aided and abetted murder. Consequently, the
16
instruction does not show that Jenkins was convicted on a theory that remains valid after
enactment of Senate Bill 1437.
In sum, the People prosecuted Jenkins under several theories of accomplice
liability for murder, and the jurors convicted him of second degree murder. The jurors
could have relied on direct aiding and abetting principles or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and the record of conviction does not exclude the possibility that
they relied on natural and probable consequences. We conclude that Jenkins’s petition
states a prima facie case for relief and that the record does not refute his allegations of
eligibility. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the petition without issuing an
order to show cause.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Jenkins’s section 1170.95 petition is reversed. On remand, the
trial court shall issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95, subdivision (c).
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
SLOUGH J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant's section 1170.95 petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction did not conclusively refute his eligibility for relief. Specifically, prior sentencing findings made by a preponderance of the evidence and a stricken special circumstance finding do not preclude relief under the statute.
Issues
Did the trial court err by denying the section 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause?
Does a sentencing court's prior finding of intent to kill under a preponderance of the evidence standard preclude section 1170.95 relief?
Does a stricken special circumstance finding preclude section 1170.95 relief?
Does the record of conviction conclusively show the defendant was convicted under a theory of liability that remains valid after Senate Bill 1437?
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude that the implied finding does not, however, preclude relief under section 1170.95, because it was made by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.”
“We conclude that because the special circumstance finding was stricken, it too does not preclude relief under section 1170.95.”
“The jurors could have followed the portion of the instruction that removed the (erroneous) requirement that, in order to convict on a natural and probable consequence theory, they had to agree that Jenkins aided and abetted murder.”