Marriage of Karen and Jason H. CA4/2 (2021) · DecisionDepot
Marriage of Karen and Jason H. CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Oct 18, 2021 No. E075441Unpublished
Filed 10/18/21 Marriage of Karen and Jason H. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of KAREN AND JASON H.
KAREN H., E075441 Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. SWD1300287) v. OPINION JASON H.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. James T. Warren, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art.
VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Jason H., in pro. per., for Appellant.
Karen H., in pro. per., for Respondent.
1
In 2013, Karen H. brought this marital dissolution action against Jason H.1 The
trial court entered a partial judgment in July 2016 and a judgment on reserved issues in
December 2016. In June 2020, Jason moved to vacate all of the trial court’s “financial
orders.” The court denied the motion and imposed $2,500 in sanctions against Jason. He
appeals from the order denying the motion to vacate and the sanctions order. We affirm
the order denying the motion to vacate, but we reverse the sanctions order.
BACKGROUND
Jason moved to vacate the court’s orders under Code of Civil Procedure section
473 and Family Code sections 2121 and 2122. The motion sought relief from the court’s
“financial orders and judgments” but did not identify any challenged order with
specificity. Jason asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction to make the orders and that
Karen had procured the orders through fraud and perjury. The motion also alleged that
the superior court judge who had presided over this case, Judge James T. Warren (Ret.),
should have recused himself because of “strong potential conflicts of interest.” Jason
claimed that Karen had been in “constant and repeated direct professional association
with Judge Warren” in her capacity as a paralegal for a divorce lawyer.
1 A prior appeal in this matter involved proceedings under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), so we referred to the parties by first name and last initial to protect Karen H.’s privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1) & (11); In re Marriage of Karen and Jason H. (Aug. 21, 2019, E068153) [nonpub. opn.].) We continue to refer to the parties by first name and last initial here, and for ease of reading, we will omit the parties’ last initial in subsequent references. No disrespect is intended. 2
Jason filed the motion to vacate on June 30, 2020. On July 14, 2020, the court
held a hearing on a request to modify child support filed by Jason. At that hearing, Judge
Warren noted that he had reviewed Jason’s motion to vacate. The judge asked Karen’s
counsel whether he had reviewed the motion. Counsel responded that Jason had not yet
served the motion, but counsel had found the motion on the court’s website and had
reviewed it minutes earlier.
Judge Warren asked Jason whether he believed any of the claims in the motion
about the judge’s contacts with Karen. The judge stated that he had “[n]ever once” talked
to Karen outside of the courtroom. Jason replied that he believed his claims, and he
objected to Judge Warren hearing any further matters.
Karen’s counsel stated that once Jason served counsel with the motion to vacate,
Karen would be requesting sanctions under Family Code section 271. But counsel said
that he could also argue the motion then without filing a response, and he argued that the
motion was meritless. He noted that Jason had already moved to disqualify Judge
Warren, and another judge had heard and denied that motion.
The court denied Jason’s motion to vacate, reasoning that there was “absolutely no
factual basis for anything in this motion.” The court moved on to Jason’s request to
modify child support and denied that also. At the end of the hearing, the court stated that
Karen’s counsel was asking for sanctions, and the court imposed sanctions of $2,500
against Jason.
3
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Vacate
Jason argues that we should decide the motion to vacate de novo. He contends
that the court lacked jurisdiction and that Karen procured the challenged orders through
fraud and perjury. He further argues that Judge Warren erred by failing to recuse himself
because of his alleged contacts with Karen and that the judge could not hear the motion
without Jason’s consent because the case had been reassigned to another judge. Lastly,
Jason argues that the court erred by failing to give the parties notice of the hearing on the
motion. All of those arguments lack merit.
A. Claimed Fraud, Perjury, and Lack of Jurisdiction
Jason’s arguments about the merits of the motion to vacate are unavailing. The
trial court may set aside a void judgment or order under Code of Civil Procedure section
473, subdivision (d). (Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563.) When the court
“lack[s] fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party,” its
orders and judgment are void. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56.)
“The trial court’s determination whether an order is void is reviewed de novo; its decision
whether to set aside a void order is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Pittman v. Beck
Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020.)
Under the Family Code, the court may set aside a judgment on several grounds,
including actual fraud or perjury. (Fam. Code, §§ 2121, subd. (a), 2122, subds. (a)-(b).)
Actual fraud means that the defrauded party “was kept in ignorance or in some other
manner was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.” (Fam.
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Code, § 2122, subd. (a).) The provision for relief based on perjury applies to perjury in
specified filings, namely, “the preliminary or final declaration of disclosure, the waiver of
the final declaration of disclosure, or in the current income and expense statement.”
(Fam. Code, § 2122, subd. (b).) A motion based on fraud or perjury “shall be brought
within one year after the date on which the complaining party either did discover, or
should have discovered,” the fraud or perjury. (Fam Code, § 2122, subds. (a)-(b).) We
review the court’s ruling on such a motion for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of
Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 686.)
The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to vacate under
section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Jason argues that the court’s orders are void
because the parties were never married, and a valid marriage was required for the court
“to obtain jurisdiction over the matter of the dissolution.” But the claimed invalidity of
the marriage does not demonstrate that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The
superior court has jurisdiction in all proceedings under the Family Code. (Fam. Code,
§ 200.) In a dissolution proceeding, that includes “jurisdiction to inquire into and render
any judgment and make orders that are appropriate concerning” the “status of the
marriage.” (Fam. Code, § 2010, subd. (a).) Thus, far from lacking subject matter
jurisdiction, the superior court was the proper forum to resolve any claim that the parties’
marriage was invalid. Jason’s claim of invalidity does not render the court’s orders void
for lack of jurisdiction.
Further, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to vacate
under the Family Code. Jason argues that Karen committed fraud and perjury by making
5
inconsistent statements, and he makes the following allegations: In 2000, Karen obtained
a spousal support order against her former husband by claiming that she and Jason were
not married in 1998. And in Karen’s 2010 bankruptcy action, she stated that she had no
claim to Jason’s home, business, or separate property. But in this action, she claimed that
the parties were married in 1998. In Jason’s bankruptcy action, Karen “request[ed]
findings of spousal support.” And in 2018, Karen attempted to collect on the trial court’s
orders in Montana, where she again claimed to have been married to Jason.
Jason’s fraud and perjury argument fails for at least three reasons. First, as to
fraud, none of Jason’s claims demonstrates that he was “kept in ignorance or in some
other manner was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.”
(Fam. Code, § 2122, subd. (a).) Nor does Jason demonstrate that Karen committed
perjury in the documents specified by the Family Code. He does not even identify the
documents at issue, beyond cursory references to “perjured financial statements.”
Second, assuming that Jason’s allegations fell within the definition of fraud and perjury,
Jason does not cite any evidence to support the allegations. His motion referred to
numerous purported exhibits from the bankruptcy actions, the 2000 action involving
Karen’s former husband, and this action. His opening brief cites the same exhibits. But
no exhibits appear in the record. Third, Jason’s motion was untimely. If Karen
committed fraud by falsely claiming to be married, he should have been aware of that
false claim by 2013. That was when she initiated this action, claimed to be married, and
sought to dissolve the marriage. Jason fails to explain how his June 2020 motion fell
within the one-year limitations period of Family Code section 2122.
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For all of these reasons, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
motion to vacate.
B. Propriety of Judge Warren Hearing the Motion
Jason’s arguments regarding Judge Warren are also unavailing. If a party believes
that a judge should disqualify herself or himself for cause, and the judge refuses to do so,
that party may seek disqualification by filing a verified statement. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 170.3, subd. (c)(1).) The verified statement must set forth “the facts constituting the
grounds for disqualification of the judge. The statement shall be presented at the earliest
practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for
Here, the court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against Jason without
due process. The court did not give him notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue.
The register of actions does not reveal any pending request for sanctions in connection
with Jason’s request to modify child support or his motion to vacate. At the hearing,
Karen’s counsel stated that once Jason served the motion to vacate, Karen intended to
request sanctions under Family Code section 271.2 But there was no other discussion of
sanctions at the hearing. Jason thus had notice that Karen might request sanctions in the
future, but he had no notice that the court was considering sanctions at that time, and the
court did not give him a chance to show why sanctions should not be imposed.
In addition, the court’s order failed to specify the basis for imposing sanctions.
The entirety of the court’s ruling was as follows: “[Karen’s counsel] is asking for
sanctions. I am going to order sanctions in the amount of $2,500.” The minutes of the
hearing add no clarity, stating only that “[t]he Court awards sanctions of $2500.00
against [Jason].” Consequently, we do not know whether the court imposed sanctions
pursuant to Family Code section 271 or one of the other numerous statutes or court rules
2 Subdivision (a) of Family Code section 271 authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction,” so the sanctions must be tethered to the moving party’s attorney fees and costs. (Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 340, 351.) The court must consider “all evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities,” and the sanctions shall not impose “an unreasonable financial burden” on the sanctioned party. (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).) 11
frivolous actions or delaying tactics], 128.7 [sanctions for violating the certificate of
merit created by signing or presenting papers to the court], 177.5 [sanctions for violating
court orders], 575.2 [sanctions for violating local rules]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.14
[sanctions for violating rules of court in family law cases].) Nor do we know whether the
court imposed sanctions for the motion to vacate, the request to modify child support, or
both.
In short, the court failed to afford Jason due process when it imposed sanctions.
Accordingly, we must reverse the sanctions order.
III. Karen’s Requests
In her respondent’s brief, Karen requests that we dismiss this appeal under the
disentitlement doctrine. “The disentitlement doctrine enables an appellate court to stay or
to dismiss the appeal of a party who has refused to obey the superior court’s legal
orders.” (In re Marriage of Hofer (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 454, 459.) Karen urges us to
apply the doctrine on the basis of Jason’s failure to pay spousal support, child support,
and Karen’s attorney fees and costs as ordered by the court. We decline to exercise our
discretion to dismiss this appeal. Jason’s alleged violation of those orders does not
appear in the record on appeal. Moreover, we elect to address Jason’s arguments to make
clear that the motion to vacate had no merit.
Karen also requests that we impose sanctions against Jason for “[t]aking a
frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.276(a)(1).) Because Jason’s appeal from the sanctions order has merit, we cannot say
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that the appeal is wholly frivolous or intended solely to cause delay. In addition, a
request for sanctions on appeal must be presented by separate motion with a supporting
declaration, not in the respondent’s brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b); FEI
Enterprises, Inc. v. Yoon (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 790, 807.) Karen failed to comply with
that requirement. We therefore decline to impose sanctions.
Lastly, Karen requests judicial notice of five documents. We deny the request
because the documents are unnecessary to our resolution of the appeal. (County of San
Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 613, fn. 29.)
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to vacate is affirmed. The order imposing sanctions
of $2,500 against Jason is reversed. The parties shall bear their own costs of appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
FIELDS Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the denial of the appellant's motion to vacate financial orders, finding no merit in claims of fraud, perjury, or judicial bias, but reversed the sanctions order due to a lack of due process.
Issues
Did the trial court err in denying the motion to vacate financial orders based on claims of fraud, perjury, and lack of jurisdiction?
Did the trial court err in allowing the presiding judge to hear the motion to vacate?
Did the trial court violate due process by imposing sanctions without proper notice and a statement of the basis for the award?
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to vacate under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
“The trial court’s failure to comply with the due process requirements for imposing sanctions renders the sanctions order invalid and requires reversal.”
“The court did not give him notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue.”