California Court of Appeal Oct 8, 2021 No. E074012Unpublished
Filed 10/8/21 P. v. Reaza CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E074012
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF113648)
RONNIE CRUZ REAZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Affirmed.
Lynda A. Romero, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Quisteen S.
Shum and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant and appellant, Ronnie Cruz Reaza, filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95,1 which the superior court summarily denied. On
appeal, defendant contends the court erred in summarily denying his petition without
affording him the opportunity to file a reply to the People’s opposition. We affirm.
personally discharging a firearm from a moving vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (c), count 3),
personally discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246, count 4), and
being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), count 5). As to the count
1 offense, the People further alleged that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2By order dated December 31, 2019, we took judicial notice of the record in defendant’s appeal from the original judgment. (People v. Reaza (Oct. 11, 2006, E038773) [nonpub. opn.]; see Evid. Code, § 459.)
2
the discharge of a firearm at another person from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(21));
that defendant intentionally killed the victim to further the criminal activities of a
criminal street gang while an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(22)); and that a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)).
As to the count 2 offense, the People additionally alleged that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)) and that defendant committed the offense for the benefit
of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).
As to counts 1 through 4, the People alleged that defendant committed the offenses for
the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Finally, the People alleged defendant had suffered a prior strike
because defendant had been convicted of attempted murder in count 2, not murder.
Three courts have held that Senate Bill No. 1437 does apply to those convicted of
attempted murder but only on direct appeal from the judgment: “[W]e conclude Senate
Bill 1437 precludes any imposition of vicarious liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine if the charged offense requires malice aforethought. Because
malice cannot be imputed to a defendant who aids and abets a target offense without the
5As defendant notes, the issue of whether Senate Bill No. 1437 applies to attempted murder is currently pending before the California Supreme Court. (People v. Lopez, S258175 [2019 Cal. Lexis 8414].)
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intent to kill, the natural and probable consequences doctrine is no longer a viable theory
of accomplice liability for attempted murder.” (People v. Medrano, supra,
42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013; accord, People v. Larios, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 968
[“Senate Bill 1437’s abrogation of the natural and probable consequences doctrine as
stated in section 188, subdivision (a)(3) necessarily applies to attempted murder.”];
accord, People v. Sanchez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 637, 644, review granted June 10,
2020, S261768 [“[W]e conclude Senate Bill No. 1437 abrogates the natural and probable
consequences doctrine in attempted murder prosecutions.”].) However, “the section
1170.95 petitioning procedure does not apply to defendants for their convictions of
attempted murder . . . .” (People v. Medrano, at p. 1008; accord, People v. Larios, at
p. 961 [“[S]ection 1170.95 provides no relief for the crime of attempted murder.”];
accord, People v. Sanchez, at p. 644 [The conclusion that “Senate Bill No. 1437
abrogates the natural and probable consequences doctrine in attempted murder
prosecutions . . . applies retroactively on direct appeal.”].) Thus, even if we assumed that
Senate Bill No. 1437 applied to convictions for attempted murder, the petitioning and
resentencing procedures of section 1170.95 do not. Therefore, because defendant’s
appeal is from the denial of a section 1170.95 petition and not from the judgment, he is
not entitled to any relief. The court properly denied his section 1170.95 petition.
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III. DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court's summary denial of the defendant's Penal Code section 1170.95 petition was harmless error because the jury's special circumstance findings established the defendant's intent to kill, rendering him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Furthermore, the court held that section 1170.95 relief is unavailable for attempted murder convictions.
Issues
Did the trial court err by summarily denying the section 1170.95 petition without allowing the defendant to file a reply?
Does Penal Code section 1170.95 provide relief for convictions of attempted murder?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the jury’s verdict and special finding required that the jury conclude that, although defendant was not the actual killer, he intended the death of the victim.”