California Court of Appeal Sep 29, 2021 No. E075587Unpublished
Filed 9/29/21 P. v. Minjarez CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E075587
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1901616)
MICHAEL OSCAR MINJAREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. James S. Hawkins, Judge.
(Retired judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
James M. Kehoe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Britton B.
Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant and appellant Michael Oscar Minjarez guilty as charged of
attempting to deter, or resisting, by force or violence, an executive officer in the
unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].’ ” (People v. Bolin (1988) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Defendant claims the evidence shows he did not know that he was deterring or
resisting peace officers, given that witnesses described him as “sweating profusely,” as
“ ‘not all there,’ ” and as appearing to be under the influence of a controlled substance.
He argues his “bizarre behavior clearly indicated that he was unaware of what was going
on.” Indeed, when he was in the garage, he did not appear to be listening to anyone, and
his behavior during the entire incident did not make sense. Officer P. believed that “there
was something wrong with him.”
Notwithstanding the evidence that defendant was “out of it” and did not know
what was going on around him, substantial evidence shows that defendant could see, was
coherent and, therefore, knew that the people he attempted to deter and resist, beginning
with Officer P., were peace officers. Defendant was able to control his movements and
communicate coherently during his struggle with the officers, indicating that he knew
that the officers whose commands he refused and fought with were peace officers.
As the People point out, multiple visual indicators showed that Officer P. was a
City of Desert Hot Springs police officer. G.R., testified that “you knew right away” as
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soon as Officer P. arrived, that Officer P. was a police officer. Although Officer P. did
not announce that he was a police officer, he was wearing a police officer’s uniform, and
he was driving a black and white police vehicle with the “Desert Hot Springs Police”
insignia on both sides. His Desert Hot Springs Police badge and his name were visible
on the front of his shirt; he was wearing Desert Hot Springs Police badges on his
shoulders; and he was visibly carrying a service pistol, a taser, pepper spray, and baton,
and handcuffs on his belt. Although it was dark outside, the garage was lighted, and
defendant turned toward Officer P. when Officer P. approached him near the garage and
told him to “turn around.” At this point, nothing was obstructing defendant’s view of
Officer P., and defendant began to back away from the officer almost as soon as he
turned toward the officer. This showed that defendant could see and, therefore, knew that
Officer P. was a police officer.
Substantial evidence also shows that defendant was coherent and knew what was
going on around him, including that he was attempting to deter, and was forcibly
resisting, peace officers. After he refused to comply with Officer P.’s commands to get
on the ground, and Sergeant C. arrived, defendant engaged in a struggle with Officer P.
and Sergeant C. Defendant first swatted at Officer P’s hands, then he tried to punch
Officer P. and Sergeant C., and he tried to grab Officer P.’s taser after the two other
officers arrived and joined the struggle. He was heard on Officer P.’s body-camera
video, saying things that showed he was coherent and knew that the officers he was
attempting to deter, and was forcibly resisting, were peace officers. Among other things,
he said, “This is a conspiracy,” “I’m not crazy,” “I see you,” and “I see exactly what . . .
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you’re doing.” Moreover, defendant’s statement, “You’re gonna make me look like I’m
crazy, fool,” demonstrates that he not only knew that he was deterring and resisting peace
officers, but he knew the officers were recording him.
All of this evidence showed that defendant could see, was coherent and, therefore,
knew that the officers whom he was deterring and resisting were peace officers. Thus,
substantial evidence supports the knowledge element of defendant’s conviction for
violating section 69. (Cf. People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-222, 237,
248-253 [erroneous admission of other crimes evidence prejudicial to conviction for
knowingly resisting peace officer (§ 69), where evidence the defendant knew he was
resisting a peace officer was “not overwhelming” in part because the defendant was
pepper sprayed before he resisted, was intoxicated, and spoke “incoherent gibberish”].)
B. Any Error in Admitting Sergeant C.’s Body-camera Video Was Harmless
Sergeant C. was unable to testify at trial due to illness, and he was therefore not
available to authenticate the video of his encounter with defendant, which was taken by
his body camera. Officer P. had a family emergency after he testified, and he was also
not available to authenticate Sergeant C.’s body-camera video. Over defendant’s
objection, the court admitted Sergeant C.’s body- camera video into evidence, based on
the testimony of another City of Desert Hot Springs Police Officer, Sergeant S., who was
not present during the incident.
Defendant claims that Sergeant C.’s body-camera video was erroneously admitted
because it was not sufficiently authenticated by Sergeant S.’s testimony or other
evidence. He specifically claims that Sergeant S.’s testimony did not show that Sergeant
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C’s body-camera video was what it purported to be: a recording of Sergeant C.’s
September 11, 2019 encounter with defendant. (Evid. Code, §§ 1400, 1401.) We
conclude that any error in admitting Sergeant C.’s body-camera video was harmless.
Thus, we do not address the merits of defendant’s claim that Sergeant C.’s body-camera
video was erroneously admitted because it was not authenticated.
Under the Evidence Code, a writing is required to be authenticated before it may
be received in evidence (Evid. Code, § 1401), and writings include photographs and
video recordings (Evid. Code, § 250; People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266).
“Authentication of a writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is or (b) the
establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.)
“A photograph or video recording is typically authenticated by showing it is a fair and
accurate representation of the scene depicted.” (People v. Goldsmith, at p. 267.)
If a writing, including a photograph video recording, is erroneously admitted due
to a failure to demonstrate its authenticity, we must determine whether it is reasonably
probable that the defendant would have realized a more favorable result had the writing
been excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see People v. Beckley
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509, 517.) Here, it is not reasonably probable that defendant
would have realized a more favorable result, including acquittal of the section 69 charge,
had the court not admitted Sergeant C.’s body-camera video.
The testimony of P.D., G.R., and Officer P. showed beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant violated section 69 by (1) attempting to deter or prevent Officer P. and the
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other officers in the performance of their lawful duties, and by (2) resisting, by force or
violence, Officer P. and the other officers, knowing that the officers were peace officers.
P.D. and G.R. witnessed defendant’s interactions with Officer P. and the other officers.
Their testimony, together with Officer P.’s testimony and body-camera video,
overwhelmingly showed that defendant would not obey the officers’ commands, tried to
punch Officer P. and Sergeant C., and kicked his feet as he struggled with the officers.
To be sure, Sergeant C.’s body-camera video was slightly longer than Officer P.’s
body-camera video and showed additional details of defendant’s actions from
Sergeant C.’s perspective. But all of defendant’s acts of deterrence and resistance, and
his knowledge that the people whom he was deterring and resisting were police officers,
were overwhelmingly shown by other evidence. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that
defendant would have realized a more favorable result, including acquittal of the section
69 charge or conviction of the lesser offense of violating section 148, had Sergeant C.’s
body-camera video been excluded.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Substantial evidence supports the defendant's conviction for resisting an executive officer, as the record demonstrates he was coherent and aware that the individuals he was resisting were police officers. Any potential error in the admission of an unauthenticated body-camera video was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the knowledge element of the defendant's conviction for violating Penal Code section 69.
Whether the trial court erred in admitting a body-camera video that was not properly authenticated.