1 In support of their contention that Eynon was “ineligible for relief because the robbery murder special circumstance alleged a theory of felony murder that survived [Senate Bill] 1437’s amendments to section 189, subdivision (e),” the People cite People v Galvan (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1134, review granted October 14, 2020, S264284 (Galvan) and People v. Gomez (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1, review granted October 14, 2020, S264033 (Gomez). Both cases are inapposite because both involved special circumstance allegations that were found true by juries. (Galvan, supra, at p. 1139; Gomez, supra, at p. 3.) Neither case stands for the proposition that the mere allegation of a special circumstance, without an admission or finding of its truth, is sufficient to refute a defendant’s allegation of eligibility for relief under section 1170.95.
10
As the People point out, however, “‘“a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will
not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.”’” (People v.
Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) We therefore must affirm if the denial of Eynon’s
petition at the prima facie review stage was correct, even if the reason given by the trial
court was erroneous.
According to the People, the denial was correct for the following reason: The
record of conviction contains facts refuting Eynon’s allegation that he is eligible for relief
because “[a]s a factual basis for his plea, [Eynon] admitted he acted with a premeditated
and deliberate intent to kill the victim.” We conclude that the argument lacks merit
because it misunderstands the scope of Eynon’s factual admissions.
At his change of plea hearing, Eynon pled guilty to committing first degree murder
“willfully, unlawfully, and with deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought.”
As a factual basis for the guilty plea, Eynon admitted that he did “what Count 1 of th[e]
Information says [he] did, when it says [he] did it.” He further admitted “that this was a
first-degree murder by virtue of being a felony murder[,] that being murder that occurred
during the commission of a robbery.” Eynon made no other factual admissions. The
question is whether his factual admissions support the People’s argument or otherwise
refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief. We conclude that they do not.
Rivera addressed a similar issue, and we agree with its analysis. Rivera concerned
a section 1170.95 petition brought by a defendant who had pled guilty to second degree
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murder and who, like Eynon, was not alleged to be the actual killer.2 (Rivera, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at pp. 225-226.) In Rivera, the charging document alleged that the defendant
“‘did willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought murder’” the victim. (Id. at
pp. 224-225.) The defendant pled guilty, and his counsel “‘stipulate[d] to a factual basis’
for the plea” on the basis of “the transcript of the grand jury proceedings,” which was not
admitted or summarized. (Id. at pp. 225-226 & fn. 7.) On appeal from the denial of the
defendant’s subsequent petition under section 1170.95, the People argued that the
defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he “admitted to committing
murder with malice aforethought.” (Rivera, at p. 234.) The Court of Appeal disagreed.
(Ibid.)
The court reasoned that “[t]he generic manner in which murder was charged . . .
did not limit the People to prosecuting [the defendant] on any particular theories.”
(Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.) Rather, “it allowed the prosecution to proceed
on any theory of murder.” (Ibid.) By pleading guilty, the defendant admitted every
element of the charged offense, including malice. (Id. at p. 234.) But the defendant did
not admit facts supporting liability on any particular theory, and the generic pleading
encompassed theories—such as natural and probable consequences and felony murder—
2 In Rivera, only a codefendant was alleged to have discharged a firearm causing death. (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) Similarly here, Eynon’s codefendant was alleged to have discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, but Eynon was alleged only to have used a firearm, not to have discharged it or to have caused great bodily injury or death. The People’s opposition to Eynon’s section 1170.95 petition conceded that the victim “was shot to death” by Eynon’s codefendant during a robbery in which Eynon was an accomplice.
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that did not require the defendant to have acted with malice. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the
guilty plea did not constitute an admission that the defendant acted with malice. (Id. at
p. 235 [“there is no basis on which to infer that [the defendant] admitted to acting with
actual malice”].) Instead, it was an admission that a murder with malice was committed
and that the defendant committed an act with the necessary intent to render him liable for
that murder under then-existing law. The plea consequently did not refute the
defendant’s allegation that he was eligible for relief. (Id. at p. 234 [“given that the
allegation that a murder was committed ‘willfully, unlawfully, and with malice
aforethought’ is a generic charge permitting the prosecution to proceed on any theory of
murder, we cannot conclude that by admitting to the murder as charged [the defendant]
admitted that he acted with actual malice, not just that the element of malice was
satisfied”].)
Rivera’s analysis applies with equal force here. The information alleged
generically that Eynon and his codefendant “did wilfully, unlawfully, and with
deliberation, premeditation, and malice aforethought murder [the victim].” Eynon was
not alleged to be the actual killer, and the generic murder charge allowed the prosecution
to proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and probable consequences or
felony murder. Accordingly, by pleading guilty and admitting that he did “what Count 1
of th[e] Information says [he] did, when it says [he] did it,” Eynon did not admit that he
acted with malice. Rather, he admitted that the charged murder took place and that he
committed an act with the necessary intent to render him liable for that murder under
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then-existing law. Then-existing law did not require him to act with malice in order to be
liable for murder, so his plea and factual admissions did not encompass an admission that
he acted with malice.
Contrary to the People’s argument, Eynon’s guilty plea and admission that he
committed murder “with deliberation[ and] premeditation” do not change the analysis.
Eynon admitted that a deliberate and premeditated murder was committed and that he
committed an act with the necessary intent to incur liability for that murder, on some
unspecified theory. But he did not admit that he acted with deliberation and
premeditation, let alone that he acted with deliberate and premeditated intent to kill.
Nor does Eynon’s guilty plea and admission that he committed first degree
deliberate and premeditated murder exclude the possibility that his conviction was based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Eynon pled guilty in 2013, when the
natural and probable consequences doctrine was a legally valid theory of liability for first
degree premeditated murder. Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, in which the Supreme Court
held that defendants cannot be convicted of first degree premeditated murder on a natural
and probable consequences theory, was decided in 2014.
Finally, Eynon’s admission that the murder “was a first-degree murder by virtue of
being a felony murder[,] that being murder that occurred during the commission of a
robbery,” likewise does not refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief. When
Eynon pled guilty, a defendant could be liable for first degree felony murder without
being the actual killer, acting with intent to kill, or being a major participant in the
14
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The information
alleged all of those things, but Eynon never admitted them—he did not admit the truth of
the special circumstance allegation. He admitted only that the murder was a first degree
murder because it was committed in the course of a robbery, and that he had committed
an act with the necessary intent to render him liable for that murder under then-existing
law. That is not enough for first degree felony murder liability after Senate Bill 1437, so
his admission that the murder was a first degree felony murder does not refute his
allegation that he is eligible for relief—perhaps he did not act with intent to kill and was
not a major participant in the robbery or did not act with reckless indifference to human
life, as his section 1170.95 petition alleges.3
To summarize: When Eynon pled guilty, the law allowed him to be convicted of
first degree premeditated murder on a natural and probable consequences theory, and it
also allowed him to be convicted of first degree felony murder without being the actual
killer, acting with intent to kill, or being a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. The accusatory pleading did not exclude
3 In Rivera, the People argued that the defendant must have been prosecuted on a direct aiding and abetting theory, because the transcript of the grand jury proceedings contained no evidence of an underlying felony or other target offense that could have formed the basis for liability on a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory. (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 238.) Rivera rejected that argument on the ground that it would require the court to engage in impermissible factfinding at the prima facie stage. (Id. at pp. 238-239.) No such argument is possible in this case. Eynon admitted that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, so he admitted the existence of an underlying felony that could have formed the basis for liability on a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory. We accordingly express no opinion on that portion of Rivera’s analysis.
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either of those theories—the prosecution could have relied on natural and probable
consequence, felony murder, or both if the case had proceeded to trial. Eynon’s guilty
plea, his admission that he did what was charged in the murder count, and his admission
that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery consequently did not include
any factual admissions that refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief under
section 1170.95. Although he admitted that he was liable for a murder committed with
malice, deliberation, and premeditation, he did not admit that he acted with malice,
deliberation, or premeditation. And although he admitted that he was liable for a murder
committed in the course of a robbery, he did not admit that he was the actual killer, acted
with intent to kill, or was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
We conclude that Eynon’s petition states a prima facie case for relief and that the
record of conviction does not refute his allegation that he is eligible for relief. The trial
court therefore erred by denying the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Eynon’s section 1170.95 petition is reversed. The
case is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to show cause under
subdivision (c) of section 1170.95.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION MENETREZ J.
We concur:
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MILLER Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL J.
17
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A defendant's guilty plea to first-degree murder under a generic charging document does not preclude them from seeking resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, as such a plea does not constitute an admission to the specific elements of malice, intent to kill, or major participation required by current law. The trial court erred by denying the petition without an order to show cause, as the record of conviction did not contain facts refuting the petitioner's eligibility for relief.
Issues
Whether a defendant's guilty plea to first-degree murder under a generic information precludes a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95.
Whether being held to answer on a special circumstance allegation at a preliminary hearing constitutes a factual finding that refutes a petitioner's eligibility for relief under section 1170.95.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Eynon admitted that he was guilty, on an unspecified theory, of a premeditated and deliberate murder. But he did not admit that he acted with premeditation, deliberation, or intent to kill.”
“Being held to answer on an allegation does not constitute a factual finding that the allegation is true (and the allegation itself does not establish its own truth).”