People v. Naylor CA2/8

Filed 6/16/21 P. v. Naylor CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF B307457 CALIFORNIA, (Los Angeles County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. A196526)

v.

JERRY DEVIN NAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Edmund Willcox Clarke, Jr., Judge. Reversed.

Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Charles S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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In 1981, Appellant Jerry Devin Naylor was charged with murder, kidnapping, and robbery, to which he entered pleas of guilty. He also admitted that a principal was armed with a firearm during the crimes within the meaning of Penal Code1 section 12022, subdivision (a). For the murder he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison; sentences on the other counts were stayed. He was sentenced to an additional one year on the armed enhancement. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Naylor (Mar. 21, 1983, 2 Crim. 41676 [nonpub. opn.].) Thirty-eight years later, in 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, finding him ineligible for relief because he was a “direct aider and abettor under the facts available to me in the preliminary hearing transcript and the appellate record.” Appellant asks us to reverse the trial court’s order because the court’s factual finding was premature under the relevant statutory procedures set out in section 1170.95. The People concur. We agree as well and reverse.