California Court of Appeal May 19, 2021 No. E076125Unpublished
Filed 5/19/21 P. v. Worthy CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E076125
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV17003997)
CARMEN NICOLE WORTHY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Affirmed.
Allison H. Ting, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Britton B.
Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Carmen Nicole Worthy and codefendant
John Corey Broyles of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) for killing
Worthy’s cousin, Timothy Morris, 18 years earlier. Worthy was sentenced to 25 years to
life in prison. Worthy subsequently brought a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.95, which was enacted by the Legislature through its passage of Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). The trial
court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing based on the record of
conviction. Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order, arguing she stated a prima
facie case for relief, and thus the court erred and violated her due process rights by failing
to appoint counsel before denying her petition. We reject these contentions and affirm
the trial court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 2000, Worthy was living with her cousin, Timothy Morris. Worthy
called Morris’s mother (Worthy’s aunt) and complained that Morris was “cutting the
weed” and had not been “bringing what he’s supposed to be bringing.” Worthy sounded
“[a]gitated” and “aggressive.” Worthy’s aunt thought the call was “very unusual”
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The factual background is taken verbatim from this court’s nonpublished opinion from Worthy’s direct appeal in case No. E071002. (People v. Broyles (Apr. 7, 2020, E071002) [nonpub. opn.] (Broyles I).) We granted the People’s request to take judicial notice of the record in Worthy’s prior appeal in case No. E071002, including the nonpublished opinion filed April 7, 2020.
2
because she had not heard from Worthy “in a long time.” Worthy’s aunt “cut [the
conversation] real short” because she did not like Worthy’s “attitude and her way of
talking” and told Worthy that she would talk to Morris.
Around the same time, C.D., who was 15 years old at the time, overheard Worthy
say to Broyles something to the effect that she knew someone with “some money coming
in” and that she “wanted him dead” and “wanted somebody to do it.”
Sometime in the next few days, Broyles left Worthy’s apartment with Morris.
Later that evening, Broyles entered Worthy’s apartment and said he “did it.” Worthy
responded, “ ‘Are you for real?’ ” “ ‘Oh, my God.’ ”
Worthy, C.D., and Broyles went outside to Morris’s car. Broyles opened the
trunk, and Morris was inside. Broyles said he shot Morris in the head using a shampoo
bottle as a silencer. Broyles and Worthy’s boyfriend also “had to beat [Morris] up to put
him in the trunk” because “he didn’t die right off the bat.” Morris then made a “loud
snoring noise,” so Broyles told Worthy to go get knives. Worthy returned with two
knives and handed one to Broyles. Broyles stabbed Morris several times, including once
in the neck like he was trying to “cut off [Morris’s] air circulation.” C.D. saw Worthy
“thrusting” the knife at Morris, but he was not sure whether she stabbed Morris. Morris
stopped making noises. Worthy and Broyles then discussed “what they were going to do
with the body and how they were . . . going to do it.”
Broyles, his brother, and C.D. drove to the mountains to dispose of Morris’s body.
Broyles parked the car on a dirt road. C.D. tried to help Broyles lift Morris’s body from
3
the trunk, but they could not lift it. Broyles and his brother successfully lifted Morris’s
body from the trunk and threw it down a hill. Broyles asked C.D. to hit Morris’s teeth
out with a hammer, but C.D. refused. Broyles poured gas on the body and set it on fire.
They then left the scene.
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Over 18 years later, in May 2018, a first amended information was filed, charging
Broyles and Worthy with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) for killing Morris. It was
also alleged that Broyles personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (c)) in the commission of the murder. A jury convicted Broyles and Worthy as
charged and also found true the firearm allegation. The trial court sentenced Worthy to
an indeterminate term of 25 years to life for Morris’s murder.3
While her direct appeal was pending, Worthy filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1170.95, requesting that her murder conviction be vacated based on
changes to sections 188 and 189, as amended by Senate Bill 1437, and asking to be
resentenced. Worthy requested the appointment of counsel.
3Broyles was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and a determinate term of 20 years for the firearm enhancement. (Broyles I, supra, E071002, at p. 4.)
4
At a hearing held on September 20, 2019, with the prosecutor and trial counsel on
behalf of Worthy present,4 the trial court found Worthy was ineligible for relief. The trial
court⸺the same court that had presided over the murder trial⸺recalled that “this was not
an issue of felony murder or natural and probable consequences,” and highlighted that
“[t]he actual verdict was based on the fact that [Worthy] aided and abetted in the
commission of first-degree murder.” The court further added, “Those were the jury
instructions, as well.” The court later reaffirmed, “based on the Court’s recollection of
the evidence, [Worthy] was convicted as an aider and abetter [sic] in the commission of
first-degree murder.”
After conferring with counsel, the court ultimately determined that Worthy was
not eligible for relief under section 1170.95 for two reasons. The court explained,
“[Worthy’s] case is still pending appeal and the fact that she was convicted as an aider
and abetter [sic] in the commission of first-degree murder, that this was not felony
murder nor a natural probable consequence issue. In review of the jury instructions, the
Court did determine that the only jury instruction given to the jurors was that she, in fact,
did aid and abet first-degree murder.”
4 The court’s minute order indicates that Worthy’s codefendant’s trial counsel was present on behalf of Worthy’s trial counsel. In addition, at the September 20, 2019 hearing, the court noted that the defense attorney who was present at the hearing was “standing in for [Worthy’s trial counsel], the attorney of record.” It is unclear whether Worthy’s trial counsel was reappointed or had simply continued to represent Worthy and appear on her behalf given that she was in prison at the time.
5
On April 7, 2020, we affirmed the judgment in its entirety from Worthy’s direct
appeal. (See Broyles I, supra, E071002, at pp. 2, 5-29.)
On September 29, 2020, Worthy filed another petition for resentencing under
section 1170.95. The following day, without another hearing, the trial court⸺again, the
same court that had presided over Worthy’s murder trial⸺denied the petition. The
court’s minute order explains the denial as follows: “[Worthy] is not eligible for
resentencing pursuant to PC1170.95 because [Worthy] was found guilty of aiding and
abetting and/or part of a conspiracy to commit First Degree premeditated and deliberate
murder. Felony murder and the natural probable consequence doctrine did not apply nor
was it instructed. This is the second time resentencing Petition has been denied.” When
the court denied Worthy’s section 1170.95 petitions, both Worthy and her trial counsel
were notified.
Defendant timely appealed from the court’s order denying her second
section 1170.95 petition.
DISCUSSION
Worthy contends the trial court erred and violated her due process rights when it
summarily denied her petition without appointing counsel because her petition stated a
prima facie case for relief, and thus her facially compliant petition necessitated the
appointment of counsel under the provisions of section 1170.95. Worthy also argues that
this court should reverse and remand the matter because the trial court’s fundamentally
unfair denial of her request for counsel is not amenable to harmless error analysis.
6
A. SENATE BILL 1437 GENERALLY
Senate Bill 1437, which became effective on January 1, 2019, addresses certain
aspects of California law regarding felony murder and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine by amending sections 188 and 189. (People v. Martinez (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 719, 722.) By amending sections 188 (defining malice) and 189 (defining
the degrees of murder), Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder (People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and significantly limited the felony-
murder exception to the malice requirement for murder. (See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 227, 236; People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1086
(Bascomb), review granted Mar. 10, 2021, S266652.)
New section 189, subdivision (e), provides that a participant in the perpetration of
qualifying felonies is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual
killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and
abettor; or (3) the person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d). (See
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842.) New section 188 amended the natural and probable
consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that
“ ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.’ ” (See Gentile, at p. 843.)
7
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1170.95, which created a procedure whereby
persons convicted of murder under a now invalid felony-murder or natural and probable
consequences theory may petition for vacation of their convictions and resentencing.
(See Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 858-859.) The petition must include a declaration
the petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1170.95 and a statement whether the
petitioner requests the appointment of counsel. (§ 1170.95, subd. (b)(1); see People v.
S260493;5 People v. Lewis (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1139-1140 (Lewis), review
granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260598.)
A defendant is eligible for relief under section 1170.95 if he or she meets three
conditions: (1) he or she must have been charged with murder by means of a charging
document that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, (2) must have been
convicted of first or second degree murder, and (3) he or she could no longer be
convicted of first or second degree murder due to changes to sections 188 and 189
effectuated by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) A person may be
convicted of murder, even after the 2019 changes to sections 188 and 189, if he or she
“was the actual killer” or “directly aided [and] abetted” the actual killer, and who acted
with the “intent to kill.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
5 Under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, we may rely on appellate cases while review is pending as persuasive authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1), eff. July 1, 2016.)
8
Courts of Appeal have interpreted section 1170.95 to provide for a multi-step
review process of a petition by the trial court: an initial review to determine the petition’s
facial sufficiency; a prebriefing, “ ‘first prima facie review’ ” to preliminarily determine
whether the petitioner is statutorily eligible for relief as a matter of law; and a second,
postbriefing prima facie review to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case that he or she is entitled to relief. (People v. Tarkington (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th
892, 897-898 (Tarkington), review granted Aug. 12, 2020, S263219; People v. Cornelius
Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326-328; People v. Drayton (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 965, 974-975 (Drayton).) A “ ‘prima facie showing is one that is sufficient
to support the position of the party in question.’ [Citation.]” (Lewis, supra, 43
Cal.App.5th at p. 1137.)
When conducting the first prima facie review, the trial court must determine,
based upon its review of readily ascertainable information in the record of conviction and
the court file, whether the petitioner is statutorily eligible for relief as a matter of law, i.e.,
whether he or she was convicted of a qualifying crime, pursuant to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or a felony-murder theory. (Tarkington, supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at pp. at pp. 897-898; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 329-330.) If it
is clear from the record of conviction that the petitioner cannot establish eligibility as a
matter of law, the trial court may summarily deny the petition without appointing
counsel. (Tarkington, at pp. 898, 900-902; People v. Torres (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1168,
9
1173 (Torres), review granted June 24, 2020, S262011; Verdugo, at pp. 332-333; Lewis,
supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1139-1140.) The court may review the complaint, the
information or indictment, the verdict form or the documentation for a negotiated plea,
and the abstract of judgment. (Verdugo, at pp. 329-330.) A Court of Appeal opinion is
part of the defendant’s record of conviction (id. at p. 333; Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1137-1138 [in determining the sufficiency of a section 1170.95 petition, the court
may review the record of conviction, which includes the opinion in a defendant’s direct
appeal]; Bascomb, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 1080-1081, 1086 [same]; People v. Law (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 811, 820-821 (Law) [same], review granted July 8, 2020, S262490), as
are jury instructions (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055 (Soto), review
granted Sept. 23, 2020, S263939).
If, however, the petitioner’s ineligibility is not established as a matter of law, the
court must appoint counsel and permit briefing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (Verdugo, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at p. 330; Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.) If the petitioner
makes such a showing, the court must issue an order to show cause and conduct a hearing
to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on
any remaining counts. (§ 1170.95, subds. (c), (d); People v. Nguyen (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 1154, 1166 (Nguyen).) At that hearing, the prosecution has the burden to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is ineligible for resentencing.
(§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).)
10
B. ANALYSIS
Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Worthy was statutorily ineligible for
relief as a matter of law based on the record of conviction. To be eligible for
resentencing, Worthy was required to show that she “could not be convicted of first or
second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill
1437. (§ 1170.95, subd. (a)(3).) The record of conviction conclusively demonstrates that
Worthy cannot make such a showing. “[P]otential relief under section 1170.95 extends
only to those convicted of murder by operation of the natural and probable consequence
doctrine or of felony murder. [Citation.]” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1056; see
People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 263-265, review granted July 15, 2020,
S262459.) Worthy’s jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule. Therefore, she could not have been
convicted based on either of these theories. (Soto, at p. 1055 [trial court may rely on jury
instructions when determining whether petitioner has made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief]; People v. Edwards (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 666, 674 (Edwards),
review granted July 8, 2020, S262481 [where jury instructions showed petitioner was not
convicted under felony-murder rule or natural and probable consequences theory, he
could not meet the statutory prerequisites for filing a § 1170.95 petition]; Lewis, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1138 [where court file shows petitioner was convicted of murder
without instruction or argument on the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, summary denial would be appropriate].)
11
Worthy contends that trial court was required to accept the petition’s allegations as
true during the prima facie stage, including her declaration in the petition that she was
convicted under applicable theories of murder. We agree: as Verdugo explained, at the
eligibility stage, the court must make all factual inferences in the petitioner’s favor.
(Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 329; Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 898.)
But here, Worthy’s ineligibility is apparent as a matter of law, based on the record of
conviction, including the jury instructions and the verdict, and does not turn on the
resolution of disputed facts.
Nor are we persuaded that the trial court was required to appoint counsel as soon
as Worthy filed a facially sufficient petition. Courts of Appeal have held that a trial court
may summarily deny a petition without appointing counsel if the record shows the
defendant is ineligible as a matter of law. (See Tarkington, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 901-902; Torres, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173; Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 332-333; Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1139-1140; Cornelius, supra, 44
Cal.App.5th at p. 58.) Such was the case here.
Relying on People v. Cooper (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 106 (Cooper), review granted
November 10, 2020, S264684, Worthy argues that because her petition was facially
compliant, section 1170.95, subdivision (c), required the court to appoint counsel for her.
The court in Cooper disagreed with Verdugo and Lewis that section 1170.95,
subdivision (c), contemplates two separate steps and held a petitioner is entitled to
counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition for relief that requests counsel be
12
appointed. (Cooper, at pp. 121-123.) In the Cooper court’s view, section 1170.95,
subdivision (c)’s first sentence is simply “a topic sentence summarizing the trial court’s
task before issuing an order to show cause, and the following sentences . . . specify the
procedure in undertaking that task,” meaning there is only one prima facie review before
an order to show cause issues. (Cooper, at p. 118.) Thus, once a petitioner files a
facially sufficient petition requesting counsel, the trial court must appoint counsel before
performing any review under section 1170.95, subdivision (c). (Cooper, at p. 123.)
We do not find persuasive the Cooper court’s interpretation of section 1170.95,
subdivision (c). Unless we receive different instructions from the Supreme Court, we
adhere to the analysis set forth in Verdugo and the cases that have followed it.6
The statutory right to counsel is not triggered merely by the filing of a petition that
checks the correct boxes, where the petition’s assertions are conclusively refuted by the
record. Worthy’s petition averred that she was convicted of murder pursuant to the
felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine. As explained,
this assertion is demonstrably incorrect. She also averred that she did not, with the intent
to kill, aid and abet the actual killer in the commission of the murder. Again, the
record—i.e., the instructions and the verdicts—belies this assertion as a matter of law.
The trial court was not obliged to credit averments in the petition that are conclusively
6 The Supreme Court will likely resolve this disagreement in Lewis, in which briefing and argument have been limited to the following issues: “(1) May superior courts consider the record of conviction in determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under Penal Code section 1170.95? (2) When does the right to appointed counsel arise under Penal Code section 1170.95, subdivision (c)?” (People v. Lewis (Mar. 18, 2020, S260598) [2020 Cal.Lexis 1946].)
13
refuted by the record of conviction. (See, e.g., Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 968
[in assessing whether a petitioner has established a prima facie case, trial court “should
accept the assertions in the petition as true unless facts in the record conclusively refute
them as a matter of law”]; Nguyen, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1165-1166.)
Even under Cooper, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 106, review of the record of conviction
is proper on appeal to determine whether a petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. The Cooper court held, although a petitioner has a statutory right to counsel upon
filing a facially sufficient section 1170.95 petition, the violation of that right is not
structural error, and thus not reversible per se. As the same panel that decided Cooper
explained in People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 675, “[T]he failure to appoint
counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition under section 1170.95 is
susceptible to review for prejudice. [Citation.] And harmlessness is established if the
record ‘conclusively demonstrate[s] that [the petitioner] was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law.’ ”7 (Accord, Law, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 826 [any error in failing to
appoint counsel was harmless because counsel would not have been able to demonstrate
7 The Daniel court held, to demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner has the burden of establishing it is reasonably probable that, if he or she had been afforded assistance of counsel, the petition would not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing, the standard for state law error established in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Daniel, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 676.) There is no federal constitutional right to counsel under section 1170.95, subdivision (c). (Daniel, at p. 675 [“legislation ‘intended to give inmates serving otherwise final sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to applicable sentencing laws,’ including Senate Bill No. 1437, does not implicate the Sixth Amendment”]; accord, People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1114-1115, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175 [the retroactive relief afforded by Senate Bill 1437 “ ‘is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis’ ”]; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1063-1064 (Perez).)
14
petitioner was eligible for resentencing]; Edwards, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 674 [any
error in failing to appoint counsel was harmless because petitioner did not fall within the
provisions of section 1170.95 as a matter of law].) We reject Worthy’s attempts to
persuade us that the harmless error analysis should not apply to section 1170.95 petitions.
In this case, as previously explained, presuming the trial court erred in failing to
appoint counsel to represent her, any error was harmless because counsel would not have
been able to demonstrate petitioner was eligible for resentencing. (Law, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 826.)
We also reject Worthy’s due process claim. Where legislation gives inmates
serving otherwise final sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to applicable
sentencing laws, the Sixth Amendment is not necessarily implicated. (See Perez, supra,
4 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727, 740 [“The
retroactive relief provided by section 1170.95 reflects an act of lenity by the Legislature”
and does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights]; People v. Anthony (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156-1157 [“the retroactive relief . . . afforded by Senate Bill 1437
is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis” and defendants had no right to a jury trial on
petition].)
We acknowledge that “if a postconviction petition by an incarcerated defendant
‘attacking the validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to issuance of an
order to show cause, the appointment of counsel is demanded by due process concerns.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292, 300; People v. Fryhaat
15
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 969, 980-981.) “That right is a limited one, however, and only
kicks in once the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement of postconviction
S264278.) Here, Worthy has not moved past the initial eligibility stage; she has not made
a prima facie case requiring issuance of an order to show cause. Accordingly, she had no
due process right to counsel. And, because Worthy is categorically ineligible for relief,
she could have had no liberty interest in the appointment of counsel. (See Tarkington,
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at pp. 907-908.)
Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude the petition was properly denied
without appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing. (See, e.g., Lewis, supra, 43
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1138-1139 [it would be a “ ‘gross misuse of judicial resources’ ” to
issue an order to show cause or appoint counsel where a review of the court record
established ineligibility as a matter of law].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Worthy’s resentencing petition under section 1170.95 is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS MILLER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
SLOUGH J.
16
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court properly denied the defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 without appointing counsel because the record of conviction conclusively established that the defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred by summarily denying a section 1170.95 petition without appointing counsel.
Whether the defendant's due process rights were violated by the summary denial of her petition.
Whether the trial court may rely on the record of conviction to determine statutory eligibility for resentencing.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court correctly concluded that Worthy was statutorily ineligible for relief as a matter of law based on the record of conviction.”
“Worthy’s jury was not instructed on either the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule. Therefore, she could not have been convicted based on either of these theories.”
“The statutory right to counsel is not triggered merely by the filing of a petition that checks the correct boxes, where the petition’s assertions are conclusively refuted by the record.”