People v. Cotton CA6

Filed 3/11/21 P. v. Cotton CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H048308 (Monterey County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SS012580A)

v.

TREANDOUS COTTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

I. INTRODUCTION In 2003, defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)1 and one count of escape by force or violence (§ 4532, subd. (a)(2)). The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life consecutive to four years. Defendant was 25 years old when he committed the murders. In 2013, section 3051 was enacted to provide “a youth offender parole hearing” for eligible youth offenders. (See Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) The California Supreme Court subsequently held in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 284 (Franklin) that an eligible youth offender shall have an opportunity to “make a record of information relevant to his [or her] eventual youth offender parole hearing.” In 2020, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing in the trial court. After appointing defendant counsel and receiving written opposition from the prosecution, the

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

court denied the motion, finding that too much time had elapsed since defendant committed his controlling offenses to effectuate Franklin’s evidence-preservation purpose. The parties agree that the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a Franklin hearing, and we concur. Because defendant is entitled to youth offender parole hearings under section 3051, he is eligible for Franklin’s evidence-preservation process and must be given an adequate opportunity for a Franklin hearing. (See In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 450, 459 (Cook).) Accordingly, we will reverse the order and remand the matter for Franklin proceedings consistent with Cook. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 In 2003, defendant was charged by amended information with two counts of murder (§ 187) committed on or about April 18 and May 25, 2000. Defendant was born in October 1974. Defendant pleaded no contest to two counts of first degree murder as well as escape by force or violence (§ 4532, subd. (a)(2)), as charged in a separate case. The court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 25 years to life for the murders plus a consecutive four years for the escape offense. Defendant’s initial parole suitability hearing is scheduled for May 2024. On April 6, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing. Citing Franklin, Cook, and section 1203.01, defendant requested the hearing “to establish a record of relevant ‘youth-related’ mitigating factors for later consideration by the Board of Parole at his youth offender parole hearing.” The prosecution filed written opposition urging the trial court to deny the motion because a hearing was “not likely to produce fruitful evidence considering the passage of over twenty years since the commission of the murders.” 2 We do not provide a factual summary of the offenses underlying defendant’s convictions because the facts are not relevant to the issue presented.