California Court of Appeal Feb 24, 2021 No. E073692Unpublished
Filed 2/24/21 P. v. Serrano CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E073692
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB17001202)
JULIO CESAR SERRANO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. J. David Mazurek,
Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon G. Wrubel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Annie
Featherman Fraser, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant and appellant Julio Cesar Serrano guilty as charged of the
first degree, willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of M. Garcia, on or about
March 25-26, 2017 (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189),1 and further found that defendant
personally used a knife in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). In a
subsequent, sanity phase of the trial, the jury found that defendant was not legally insane
at the time of the murder. In a bifurcated trial, the court found that defendant had two
prior strikes. (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Defendant was sentenced to 51 years to life in
prison: 25 years to life for the murder, doubled to 50 years to life based on the prior
strikes, plus one year for the personal use enhancement.
Regarding the guilt phase of the trial, defendant claims: (1) insufficient evidence
shows that the murder was deliberate and premeditated, and (2) the prosecutor erred by
speculating during closing argument that defendant premediated the murder by “taking
time” to retrieve the knife he used to kill Garcia. As we explain, substantial evidence
shows that the murder was deliberate and premeditated. We also conclude that the
challenged portion of the prosecutor’s argument was not based on speculation. Rather, it
was based on a reasonable inference that defendant premeditated the murder by reflecting
on it between the time that he physically beat Garcia, causing numerous bruises on her
face and body, to when he grabbed a knife and stabbed her multiple times, including
twice fatally.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Regarding the sanity phase of the trial, defendant claims the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the expert witnesses to be questioned concerning (1) whether they
considered defendant’s 2001 conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence in
investigating the case and in assessing defendant’s credibility; and (2) whether they relied
on information, contained in reports, that defendant may have perpetrated prior acts of
domestic violence against Garcia. Defendant further claims that the cumulative effect of
these two errors was prejudicial. We find no merit to any of these claims.
Thus, we affirm the judgment in all respects.
II. GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE
A. Events Preceding the Murder
In December 2016, defendant and his girlfriend, Garcia, began living together in a
trailer located behind a duplex in San Bernardino. Defendant and Garcia had worked
together. Garcia moved out of the trailer around March 8, 2017, stayed with a coworker
for nine days, then told her coworker that she was going to rent a room in a house. After
Garcia moved out of the trailer, a neighbor saw Garcia at the trailer from time to time,
including around March 23.
Defendant’s sister, Ms. P., was living in Los Angeles with her husband, Mr. P., her
mother, and other family members. Defendant would visit the P.’s home every weekend,
and Garcia would sometimes accompany defendant. Defendant did not have a car, and
Garcia would sometimes drive defendant to the P.’s home. Defendant was at the P.’s
home, without Garcia, on March 25, 2017, until Garcia arrived and picked him up in her
car. Ms. P. saw that defendant looked “agitated” and “bothered” during his March 25
3
visit, as if he did not “feel good” “mentally,” but he did not mention that he did not feel
well.
Defendant was on parole in 2017 and met with his parole officer at least once each
month. During a meeting with his parole officer before the murder, defendant said he
was “quite upset and not happy” because he had recently discovered that Garcia was
married to her first cousin in Mexico.2 As a result, he thought his marriage to Garcia3
was a sham and invalid.
During the meeting, defendant told his parole officer he was depressed about the
situation with Garcia and was concerned about how he was feeling. He said he had
kicked Garcia out of the trailer and no longer wanted anything to do with her, but she was
still coming to the trailer and talking to him. Because he was on parole and “knew” he
would go to jail “if something happened,” he wanted his parole officer to know that he
was no longer with Garcia. The parole officer advised defendant not to open the door
and to call the police if Garcia came to the trailer. The parole officer also had defendant
speak with a parole department social worker, and defendant was referred to the “parole
outpatient clinic” for an evaluation.
2 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that this meeting between defendant and his parole officer occurred three days before the murder. Although the guilt phase evidence indicates that the meeting occurred before the March 25-26, 2017 murder, and after Garcia move out of the trailer on March 8, the guilt phase evidence does not show that the meeting occurred three days before the murder. During the sanity phase, the parole officer testified that the meeting occurred on March 13, which was 12 or 13 days before the murder.
3 There was no evidence that defendant and Garcia were married.
4
As a “high risk” parolee, defendant wore a GPS ankle monitor to track his
movements. The ankle monitor showed that defendant arrived at his trailer at 8:19 p.m.
on March 25, 2017, and did not leave until 12:02 p.m. on March 26. Sometime during
that period, defendant beat Garcia and stabbed her to death with a large kitchen knife
inside the trailer. Neighbors did not see or hear any fighting or arguing coming from
inside or around the trailer on March 25 to 26, or any earlier time.
B. Defendant’s Actions, Statements, and Injuries Following the Murder
On March 26, 2017, defendant drove Garcia’s car to the P.’s home in Los Angeles
and, according to his ankle monitor, arrived at 1:21 p.m. His hands were wrapped in a
sack cloth, he was in a rush, and he asked to use the bathroom. He wanted to see his
mother, and when Mr. P. asked him, “What happened?” he said he had “messed up” and
“hit” Garcia. Mr. P. asked defendant “how bad” it was, and defendant said it was “pretty
bad.”
Defendant was “anxious,” in contrast to his usual demeanor, which was “more
mellow, more calm.” He did not want to talk to Mr. P. and said that he wanted to see his
mother. After defendant visited with his mother, Mr. P. asked defendant for more details
about Garcia. Defendant said that Garcia was “at home,” that he had stabbed her, he
wanted to hurt himself, and he wanted to go to the hospital. Mr. P. then drove defendant
to the hospital.
On the way to the hospital, defendant told Mr. P. that he did not know whether
Garcia was alive or dead. Mr. P. asked defendant whether he was sure he wanted to go
the hospital, rather than “flee somewhere else, maybe Mexico,” because he would be
5
arrested if he went to the hospital. Defendant said he knew he would be arrested, he did
not want to hurt anyone else, he wanted to hurt himself, and he wanted to go to the
hospital and turn himself into the police.
Defendant also told Mr. P. that he had asked Garcia to leave the trailer several
times, but she would not leave, and she “kept pressing” him. An altercation ensued. He
pushed Garcia to the floor, and she struck her head. Then he said he knew that Garcia
was dead because he had stabbed her in her neck and body, and there was a lot of blood.
After he took defendant to the hospital, Mr. P. called Ms. P. and told her to call
911 because Garcia might still be alive. Ms. P. called 911 and asked them to perform a
welfare check on Garcia at the trailer.
Two Los Angeles police officers responded to the hospital, spoke to defendant,
and recorded the conversation with a body camera. Defendant was “very calm” and
“cooperative.” He was not confused and appeared to understand the officers’ questions.
While defendant was speaking to the officers, the manager of the trailer called, and
defendant said that the manager was probably calling “because of what I did.”
Defendant was wearing his ankle monitor, told the officers that he was on parole,
and that he had been out of prison for 11 months. When asked what it was like being in
prison, defendant said, “I fuckin hated that place. Look at me now, I got to spend the rest
of my life in there. I told, I kept telling the people, hey look at, I’m hearing voices, I’m
fuckin, every psychologist, psychiatrist, psychologist, I’m hearing voices hurting, telling
me to hurt myself and kill, kill somebody. Oh, take this fucking medication and, and
6
you’ll feel better.” When asked whether the medication had helped, defendant
responded, “No, look what I did.”
Defendant had abrasions on each of his knuckles, and his fingers were swollen and
red. He received around six stitches for a cut on his hand that was about one-half inch
deep and one-half inch wide. The hand injury was consistent with being cut by a slippery
knife handle, which can occur if the handle is bloody. Defendant also had scratches on
his legs, and an abrasion and swelling on his knee. There was dried blood on his arm,
elbow, and shoes, and he complained of pain to his ankle.
C. The Murder Scene
Around 2:00 p.m., on March 26, 2017, San Bernardino police officers arrived at
defendant’s trailer. The door to the trailer was closed but unlocked. When the officers
opened the door, they immediately noticed large amounts of blood on the floor. Garcia’s
body was on the floor, covered by a blanket except for her feet. The blanket was
saturated with blood, but Garcia was not “active[ly] bleeding,” and some of the blood on
the floor was dry, indicating that Garcia had been dead for some time. A large kitchen
knife—a 12-inch butcher knife—was “sticking out” of, or impaled in, Garcia’s neck. The
handle of the knife was bent where it connected to the blade, indicating that it stopped
when it struck something hard.
Although there was a lot of blood inside the trailer, there was no blood on the
steps outside the trailer or outside the door. There was blood on the kitchen counter and
sink, bloody shoeprints on the floor throughout the trailer, a bloodstain on the bathroom
floor, a bloody washcloth on the back lid of the toilet, a bloody towel on the mattress in
7
the bedroom, and another bloody towel beneath the blanket covering Garcia. A pair of
flip-flop sandals found in the trailer matched the bloody footprints throughout the trailer.
A shirt and pair of men’s underwear were found near Garcia’s head. Defendant’s DNA
was found on the knife stuck in Garcia’s neck and on Garcia’s fingernails.
D. Garcia’s Injuries
Garcia had sharp and blunt force injuries all over her body. There were slashing
and stab wounds on her face, including on her cheeks, the bridge of her nose, on her
nostril, one that went through her lip, and one that went under her chin and through to her
tooth. Garcia also had defensive wounds, including sharp force injuries and bruises on
her arm, elbow, hand and fingertips, and a slashing stab wound on the web of her left
hand, between her index finger and thumb, which almost severed her thumb. The sharp
force injury on Garcia’s left hand was consistent with her reaching up to try to block
knife blows. Garcia had superficial sharp force injuries on her lower chest and abdomen.
Garcia also had bruises all over her body, some from blunt force trauma, including
bruising and swelling around her eyes, on the side of her face, and on her hands, arms,
and legs. She wore dentures, her front teeth were missing from her dentures, and her
acrylic fingernails were partially broken. Her autopsy revealed that she had internal
bruising, a hematoma, beneath her scalp and on the right side of her head, which could
have been caused from a fall or from being struck in the head.
Garcia’s fatal injuries consisted of two stab wounds from the knife left stuck in her
neck. One of the fatal stab wounds entered her back and pierced her lung, causing it to
8
collapse and causing internal bleeding in her chest cavity. The other fatal stab wound
was the neck wound, which was angled upward and cut her carotid artery.
According to the forensic pathologist who performed Garcia’s autopsy, Garcia
died in a “matter of minutes” from her two fatal stab wounds. Although the fatal stab
wound to her back must have been inflicted before her fatal neck wound, there was no
“major delay” between the two fatal injuries. There was “every reason to think” that all
of Garcia’s sharp force injuries happened close together in time, and that all of her
defensive injuries, including all of her sharp and blunt force defensive injuries, could
have been inflicted after she was stabbed in the back and lying on the floor. Her precise
time of death could not be determined.
III. DISCUSSION/GUILT PHASE ISSUES
A. Substantial Evidence Shows the Murder Was Deliberate and Premeditated
Defendant claims his first degree murder conviction must be reversed because
insufficient evidence shows that the murder was premeditated and deliberate. We
disagree. As we explain, substantial evidence shows, and the jury reasonably concluded,
that the murder was premeditated and deliberate.
1. Relevant Background
The prosecution’s sole theory in support of the first degree murder charge was that
the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) The jury
was instructed on homicide; first and second degree murder; willful, deliberate, and
premediated first degree murder; provocation possibly reducing a first degree murder to
9
second degree murder or to voluntary manslaughter; and voluntary manslaughter based
on a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (CALCRIM Nos. 500, 520, 521, 522, 570.)
During closing argument, the defense conceded that defendant killed Garcia and
that the homicide was willful. The defense argued, however, that defendant was only
guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder, because the evidence showed that he killed
Garcia in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. The defense alternatively argued that
defendant was at most guilty of second degree murder because insufficient evidence
showed that the homicide was deliberate or premeditated.
2. Standard of Review
In reviewing a claim that insufficient evidence supports a criminal conviction, we
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment in order to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-
578.) Substantial evidence has been defined as evidence that “maintains its credibility
and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly determined.”
(People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d. 141, 149.) It is the responsibility of the trier of fact
to resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. (People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253,
1262 (Boatman).) Thus, in reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we do not
resolve conflicts in the evidence or reweigh the evidence; rather, we presume in support
10
of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could have reasonably
deduced from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1036.)
The same standard of review applies when the criminal conviction rests primarily
on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124 (Perez).)
“Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial
evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
3. Applicable Legal Principles
“ ‘All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and
premediated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.’ ”
(Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1123.) Express malice exists when there is a deliberate
intention to unlawfully take away the life of another human being. (§ 188.) In the first
degree murder context, “willful” means intentional. (Perez, at p. 1123.) At trial,
defendant conceded that he intentionally and willfully killed Garcia. Thus, our
discussion is limited to whether substantial evidence shows that the murder was
premediated and deliberate.
In the first degree murder context, “ ‘ “premediated” ’ ” means “ ‘considered
beforehand,’ ” and “ ‘ “deliberate” ’ ” means “ ‘formed or arrived at or determined upon
11
as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed
course of action.’ ” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636 (Lee).) “Premeditation
and deliberation require ‘substantially more reflection; i.e., more understanding and
comprehension of the character of the act than the mere amount of thought necessary to
form the intent to kill.’ ” (People. v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 823.) But
the process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of
time. (Lee, at p. 636.) “ ‘ “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the
extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold,
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ” (Ibid.) A “preexisting reflection, of
any duration,” distinguishes first degree premediated and deliberate murder from second
criminal trespass conviction, and 2010 burglary conviction also did not change
Dr. Feldsher’s opinion or make him believe that defendant was lying to him. It was
“compelling” that defendant sought mental health treatment shortly before the murder
and reported having very similar symptoms before the murder that he reported having to
the police and to Dr. Feldsher.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Feldsher whether it would change
his opinion if he learned that three days before the murder,4 defendant told his parole
officer that he was depressed and angry over the situation with Garcia; he had kicked
her out; he was worried about getting in trouble; his parole officer told him not to be
around Garcia; and, if she showed up, defendant was to close the door and call the
police. Dr. Feldsher responded that this information “would be a factor to consider” and
would make him look very closely at whether there was evidence that, at the time of the
crime, defendant acted out of anger toward Garcia. But Dr. Feldsher noted that
defendant did not say anything negative about Garcia to the police when they
interviewed him shortly after the murder. Defendant appeared to be angry about his
symptoms but not angry with Garcia. Dr. Feldsher saw no evidence that defendant had
a nonpsychotic motive for the murder. Rather, defendant acted based on his command
auditory hallucinations.
4 The prosecutor’s question was mistaken to the extent it assumed that defendant met with his parole officer three days before the murder. The parole officer testified during the sanity phase that he met with defendant on March 13, 2017, which was 12 or 13 days before the March 25 to 26 murder.
33
When asked whether his opinion would change if he had information that there
may have been prior domestic violence between defendant and Garcia, Dr. Feldsher said
he believed that this information was in his report, but he did not investigate the
information. Dr. Feldsher also knew that defendant had a 2001 domestic violence
conviction, two felony convictions, including one for first degree burglary that occurred
in 2007, and a 2009 criminal trespass conviction. He considered defendant’s criminal
history, but he did not review the police reports concerning, or independently investigate
the circumstances surrounding, defendant’s prior convictions. Dr. Feldsher saw no
evidence that defendant was malingering, or feigning, his psychotic symptoms.
3. Dr. Cheng’s Testimony
Dr. Cheng agreed with Dr. Feldsher that defendant had symptoms of schizophrenia
and psychosis close in time to the murder, did not malinger or feign his symptoms, and
was legally insane at the time of the murder. Defendant did not understand the
wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the murder.
Dr. Cheng spoke with defendant about his criminal convictions, but the fact of the
convictions did not change Dr. Cheng’s opinion that the murder was psychosis driven.
On cross-examination, Dr. Cheng acknowledged that she considered whether there “may
have been” prior domestic violence between defendant and Garcia—in assessing
whether defendant may have been malingering his psychotic symptoms—but she
concluded defendant was not malingering. Dr. Cheng also asked defendant about his
relationship with Garcia, but she did not independently investigate whether there was
any domestic violence in the relationship.
34
4. Dr. Fisher’s Testimony
Dr. Fisher concluded, contrary to Drs. Feldsher and Cheng, that defendant did not
meet the legal criteria for being insane at the time of the murder, and that he was in fact
sane at the time of the murder. Dr. Fisher agreed that defendant had psychosis, not
otherwise specified, and she did not believe that defendant was malingering, but she did
not believe that defendant had schizophrenia.
Dr. Fisher noted that defendant was very angry with Garcia shortly before the
murder, and she considered this in concluding that defendant was sane. Defendant was
also “very, very stable, mental health wise” throughout his stay in prison from 2010 to
2016, although he “struggled with medication compliance” following his release. His
actions and statements following the murder—including his act of covering Garcia’s
body with a blanket and saying that he was contemplating suicide—showed he was
aware of the wrongfulness of his actions. Dr. Fisher explained that “insanity is kind of
the exception more than the rule. . . . [M]ost people, even those who are chronically
mentally ill, are not necessary insane.” In reviewing defendant’s criminal history and
the police reports concerning his criminal history, Dr. Fisher recalled seeing a “reference
to somebody saying that there may have been a history of domestic violence” between
defendant and Garcia. But Dr. Fisher did not independently investigate whether there
had been any domestic violence between defendant and Garcia.
35
C. Defendant’s 2001 Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Conviction Was a Proper Subject
of Inquiry for the Expert Witnesses
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution
to ask the experts whether they considered defendant’s 2001 domestic violence
conviction in formulating their opinions and in assessing the credibility of defendant’s
statements. Alternatively, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
sanitize the 2001 conviction. We find no merit to these claims.
“A witness testifying as an expert may be cross-examined to the same extent as
any other witness and, in addition, may be fully cross-examined as to (1) his or her
qualifications, (2) the subject to which his or her expert testimony relates, and (3) the
matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the reasons for his or her opinion.”
(Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).) Thus, “the scope of cross-examination of an expert
witness is especially broad.” (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 105
(Lancaster).) “A party ‘may cross-examine an expert witness more extensively and
searchingly than a lay witness, and the prosecution [is] entitled to attempt to discredit the
expert’s opinion. [Citation.] In cross-examining a psychiatric expert witness, the
prosecutor’s good faith questions are proper even when they are, of necessity, based on
facts not in evidence.’ ” (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 358 (Wilson).) “On
appeal, we review the trial court’s ruling on the scope of cross-examination for an abuse
of discretion. “ (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 123 (DeHoyos).)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the experts to be asked
whether they had considered defendant’s 2001 misdemeanor conviction for domestic
36
violence in forming their opinions concerning defendant’s legal insanity at the time of the
murder. As the trial court ruled, these questions were relevant to the thoroughness of the
experts’ investigations of defendant’s history and, accordingly, to the weight that the jury
could give to the experts’ opinions concerning defendant’s legal insanity at the time of
the murder. (See, e.g., People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 26-28 [no abuse of
discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged robbery and murder
to impeach expert testimony that the charged murders were unplanned product of
“intimate rage” rather than premeditated]; People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587,
646-647; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 641-642.)
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to “sanitize” the 2001
conviction by requiring counsel to refer to it solely as a misdemeanor conviction, rather
than as a misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence in questioning the experts. In
refusing to sanitize the conviction, the trial court implicitly ruled that the probative value
of the 2001 conviction for domestic violence outweighed its prejudicial effect, as such.
(Evid. Code, § 352.) This was proper.
Under Evidence Code section 352, evidence “ ‘should be excluded as unduly
prejudicial when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating
them to use the information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant,
but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In such a
circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the
jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.’ ” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390,
439.) Based on the entire record, including defendant’s entire criminal history and his
37
entire mental health history, the trial court reasonably determined that there was no
substantial likelihood that the jury would have an emotional reaction to defendant’s
2001 conviction. Nor would the jury use the conviction for an illegitimate purpose,
rather than for the legitimate purpose of evaluating the thoroughness of the experts’
investigations, the reasons for the experts’ opinions, and the credibility of defendant’s
statements to the experts.
Defendant focuses on the inadmissibility of his 2001 conviction for impeaching
his own testimony. He correctly points out that a witness’s misdemeanor conviction is
inadmissible to impeach the witness’s testimony; only the conduct underlying the
conviction is admissible for that purpose, subject to the trial court’s discretion. (People v.
Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297-300, superseded by statute on another ground, as
stated in People v. Duran (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1460; People v. Chatman (2006)
38 Cal.4th 344, 373.) But defendant did not testify, and his 2001 conviction was not
admitted to impeach his own testimony. Rather, the 2001 conviction was properly
admitted on question of the thoroughness of the experts’ investigations and the reasons
for the experts’ opinions, including the experts’ assessments of the credibility of
defendant’s statements, to the experts and others, that he was hearing voices around the
time of the murder, telling him to kill Garcia.
D. The Information That There May Have Been Prior Domestic Violence Between
Defendant and Garcia Was a Proper Subject of Inquiry for the Expert Witnesses
Defendant also claims that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing the
prosecutor to ask the experts whether, in forming their opinions, they considered reports
38
that there may have been domestic violence between defendant and Garcia. Defendant
complains that the prosecutor introduced no evidence that he had engaged in domestic
violence with Garcia, before the murder, and that the prosecutor did not ask the court for
permission to question the experts about any such “purported evidence.” He argues that
the prosecutor’s questions concerning his prior domestic violence with Garcia were based
on nothing more than speculation, and the trial court erred in failing to require the
prosecutor to establish that the questions had a “non-speculative foundation.” We find no
merit to this claim.
1. Relevant Background
When defendant objected to the prosecutor asking Dr. Feldsher, who was the first
expert to testify, whether his opinion would change if he had “information from someone
that there may have been prior domestic violence with [Garcia] herself,” Dr. Feldsher’s
response was, “ I believe I have that in my report.” The prosecutor then asked, “And
[were] there any steps you took, having heard that, there may have been prior domestic
violence between the two, to investigate that and look into the veracity and significance?”
Defense counsel objected, and the court held a bench conference. Defense counsel told
the court it was her understanding that the information the prosecutor was referring to
came from Garcia’s ex-husband, who reported that someone told him that Garcia may
have killed someone. The court ruled that the prosecutor could ask Dr. Feldsher whether
he had investigated “any of those claims,” without specifically saying what the claims
were. The prosecutor then asked Dr. Feldsher, “So having that information, did you do
any investigation pertaining to that?” and Dr. Feldsher responded, “I did not.”
39
The prosecutor later asked Dr. Cheng, “In your review of the police reports, do
you recall seeing some reference to the fact that there may have been a history of
domestic violence between the defendant and [Garcia]?” Dr. Cheng responded, “Yes.”
The prosecutor then asked Dr. Cheng, “Did you do anything to investigate or follow up
on that history of domestic violence between the two of them?” Dr. Cheng responded,
“In my inquiry with [defendant] in my evaluation, I asked about that, about their
relationship.” When asked whether she had independently investigated the matter by
“talking to law enforcement or anybody who may have had more information about that,”
Dr. Cheng responded that she did not, and it was not her practice to investigate matters
“beyond [the] documents” she received from the court.
On redirect examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Cheng about the “suggestion
at some point in discovery that there had been, potentially been, a prior domestic violence
situation” between defendant and Garcia, and whether Dr. Cheng took that information
into account in forming her opinion. Dr. Cheng said that she had considered the
information, and it did not change her opinion that defendant was legally insane at the
time of the murder, although it made her think about whether defendant may have been
malingering. She carefully analyzed whether he was malingering, however, and she
concluded that he was not malingering.
The prosecutor subsequently asked Dr. Fisher whether, in reviewing defendant’s
criminal history, and in forming her opinion that defendant was not legally insane at the
time of the murder, she recalled seeing a reference in a police report “to somebody saying
that there may have been a history of domestic violence between the defendant and
40
[Garcia].” Dr. Fisher responded, “Yes,” but she did not independently investigate the
matter, and it was not her practice to do so.
2. Analysis
As noted, a trial court’s ruling on the scope of cross-examination is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. (DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 123.) The scope of expert
cross-examination is “especially broad” (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 105) and,
“ ‘[i]n cross-examining a psychiatric expert witness, the prosecutor’s good faith questions
are proper even when they are, of necessity, based on facts not in evidence.’ ” (Wilson,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 358.)
Contrary to defendant’s claim that the questions were based on speculation, the
prosecutor had a good faith, nonspeculative basis for believing that one or more police
reports contained a reference to “someone saying that there may have been domestic
violence between defendant and [Garcia].” Although the prosecutor did not specifically
ask Dr. Feldsher whether he had seen such a reference, Drs. Cheng and Fisher confirmed
that they had seen such a reference in police reports concerning defendant’s criminal
history. Thus, the prosecutor had a good faith, “non-speculative basis” for asking the
experts whether they had considered the reference in forming their opinions about
defendant’s legal insanity.
E. There Was No Cumulative Sanity Phase Error
Defendant claims that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s sanity phase errors
prejudiced his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. But because we have found no
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individual error, there is no basis for finding any cumulative error. (People v. Jablonski
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 832.)
V. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of first-degree murder, concluding that the defendant's motive and the manner of the killing—specifically the escalation from a prolonged beating to a fatal stabbing—demonstrated premeditation and deliberation. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings regarding expert witness testimony during the sanity phase.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder.
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by speculating during closing argument regarding the defendant's premeditation.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing expert witnesses to be questioned about the defendant's prior domestic violence history during the sanity phase.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.”