American Express Bank FSB v. Singh CA4/2 (2020) · DecisionDepot
American Express Bank FSB v. Singh CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Dec 30, 2020 No. E074042Unpublished
Filed 12/30/20 American Express Bank FSB v. Singh CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK FSB,
Plaintiff, E074042
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1714416)
SUKHDEV L. SINGH et al., OPINION
Defendants;
EYAD YASER ABDELJAWAD,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Craig Riemer, Judge.
Reversed.
Bridgepoint Law Group and Eyad Yaser Abdeljawad, for Objector and Appellant.
Objector and appellant Eyad Yaser Abdeljawad’s law firm was counsel of record
for defendant Sukhdev L. Singh in this matter. Abdeljawad challenges the trial court’s
order imposing a $1,000 sanction against the firm. In our view, the record reveals ample
cause for imposing sanctions. The trial court’s order, however, does not specify the
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statutory basis for the sanction, nor does it describe the conduct or circumstances
justifying it. We therefore are required to reverse. On remand, the trial court may enter a
new order that articulates the conduct or circumstances the court viewed as justifying
On July 31, 2019, a substitution of attorney was filed to remove Route 66 Law
APC as counsel of record for Singh. Abdeljawad is the sole owner of that law firm. On
August 9, 2019, however, Singh appeared for the scheduled court trial and testified under
oath that he was not aware a substitution of attorney had been filed, nor did he ever sign 1 one. The trial court compared the signature on Singh’s driver’s license and discovery
documents to the signature on the substitution of attorney, and found that they did not
match. The court issued an order to show cause (OSC) “re Striking the Substitution of
Attorney filed on July 31 2019 for Forgery of Signature of Defendant,” setting a hearing
on the matter for September 3, 2019. It ordered that Abdeljawad appear in person for the 2 hearing.
1 Neither a transcript of the August 9 proceedings, nor the court’s written order to show cause, is included in our record. Our description is taken from notes included on the court’s register of actions. 2 The register of actions states that Abdeljawad was ordered “to personally appear on September 3 2019.” Abdeljawad has never asserted that the phrase “personally appear” permitted a telephonic appearance. The order setting the September 3 hearing was not included in our record. It is possible that its language is more express about a courtroom presence than its summary in the register of actions. In any case, there is no question that the trial court intended to order Abdeljawad appear in person, not telephonically, and that Abdeljawad so understood the trial court’s order.
2
At the September 3 hearing, Abdeljawad appeared, but he did so telephonically,
rather than in person. Our record does not include a transcript of those proceedings. The
trial court’s minutes reflect that the court “inquire[d] of attorney, Mr. Abdeljawad, as to
why he is not personally present in Court today as ordered.” The minutes also reflect that
the court and counsel “confer[red]” regarding the contested signature on the substitution 3 of attorney. The court found that the signature on the document was not Singh’s, and it
ordered the substitution of attorney stricken and Abdeljawad’s firm reinstated as Singh’s 4 counsel of record. The court also set a new hearing for October 8, 2019, ordering that
“SUKHDEV L SINGH/ ROUTE 66 LAW APC […] appear and show cause, if any, why
sanctions not to exceed $1500.00 . . . should not be imposed for failure to comply with
8/9/19 Court Order.” The order was not specific as to the contemplated statutory basis
for imposing sanctions, stating: “‘Sanctions’ (as that term is used herein) includes but is
not limited to all remedies available to the court pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure]
3 The trial court later characterized Abdeljawad as stating the following regarding the signature: “[At the] last hearing that you had in front of me . . . first you represented that [Singh] had signed the substitution of attorney. And then you admitted that you had not witnessed him sign the substitution of attorney. You represented that you had had a conversation with him in which he asked . . . you to substitute out. Then you admitted that that conversation was not actually one that you had. I had no competent evidence to show me that . . . that his contention[] that the signature was a forgery was in fact false.” 4 The minutes state that “Abdeljawad” was reinstated as attorney of record. More precisely, Abdeljawad’s law firm had been listed as attorney of record, rather than him personally. As noted, however, Abdeljawad is the sole owner of his law firm. Subsequent docket entries reflect that Route 66 Law APC in fact was reinstated as counsel of record and, eventually, replaced by a different firm.
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secs. 128.6, 177.5, 575.2, the California Rules of Court and Riverside Local Rules of 5 court and/or other statute or existing case precedent.”
In response to the court’s inquiry at the September 3 hearing, as well as in
testimony and a declaration submitted in response to the second OSC, Abdeljawad
explained that he had failed to appear in person because he was in Chicago visiting
family from August 30 through September 3, 2019. He declared that he had received late
notice of the hearing, learning of it only on August 30 via a phone call from his assistant
that came while he and his wife were at the airport, already through security and waiting
to board their flight. The reason he had not received timely notice of the hearing was that
the notice was sent to the address the court had on file for his firm, which was out of date,
and forwarding took time.
Abdeljawad informed the trial court that his address on file had been out of date
because he moved his office in early August 2019, shortly after filing the substitution of
counsel and after he thought he had already “properly exited” from the case. He stated
that he had filed an updated change of address with the trial court once he “realized that
mail continued to go to [his] former address,” suggesting that he had previously thought
updating his information on the State Bar’s website would have been sufficient to
“apprise the Court of this matter where [his] office is located.” The trial court noted,
however, that as recently as October 2, 2019, Abdeljawad had continued to file
documents in the case using his former address.
5 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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Abdeljawad characterized his telephonic appearance on September 3 as “the best
option that [he] could have conceived at the time in light of the circumstances.” The trial
court observed that Abdeljawad had been “presented with a choice,” specifically, “I can
go to Chicago, but I know that if I do so, I will not be able to personally appear on the
date and time ordered, or I can not go to Chicago and comply with the Court’s order.”
Abdeljawad chose “to go to Chicago and thus prevent [himself] from personally
appearing.” The trial court asked how this decision was consistent with Abdeljawad’s
professions of “great respect” for the Court and its authority. Abdeljawad responded that
“it was more of a lapse of judgment . . . rather than something malicious.”
The trial court imposed sanctions of $1,000 on “Route 66 Law, a Professional
Corporation,” and confirmed with Abdeljawad that he is the “sole owner” of that firm.
The court rejected Abdeljawad’s request to reduce the sanctions, commenting that it
thought “the State Bar needs to know about what it is you were ordered to do and what it
is you failed to do.”
II. DISCUSSION
Abdeljawad contends that he had a “valid excuse for his inability to appear at the
September 3, 2019 hearing,” so the trial court’s decision to impose sanctions was an
abuse of discretion. He speculates that the trial court’s decision to issue sanctions was in
fact “completely retaliatory,” and a product of “animus” engendered by his application to
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6 this court for writ relief with respect to continuance of the trial date. We find no merit in
this argument.
Although the trial court did not specify the statutory basis for its sanctions order,
the language of the OSC and the trial court’s statements at the October 8, 2019 hearing 7 invoke section 177.5. That statute authorizes monetary sanctions, not to exceed $1,500,
“for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, done without good cause or
substantial justification.” (§ 177.5.) “The trial court has broad discretion to impose
sanctions for violations of court orders . . . subject to reversal only for arbitrary or
capricious action.” (In re Marriage of Eustice (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1309.)
We find nothing arbitrary or capricious about the trial court’s decision to sanction
Abdeljawad for violating its order that he appear in person at the September 3 hearing. It
is possible that the trial court found Abdeljawad’s claim that he received late notice of the
September 3 hearing not to be credible. In any case, it was Abdeljawad’s responsibility
to ensure that his change of address did not disrupt his law practice, including by
updating his address with the court or otherwise ensuring that important communications
6 On October 7, 2019, the day before the second OSC hearing, Abdeljawad filed a petition for writ relief in this court seeking a stay of the trial, which at that time was scheduled for October 11, 2019. (Case no. E073819.) 7 It is conceivable that the trial court considered sanctioning Abdeljawad for forging the signature of his client on the substitution of counsel by holding him in civil contempt pursuant to section 1218, subdivision (a). Failure to keep the court appraised of a current address could also have been a consideration. The court’s focus, however, appears to have been on Abdeljawad’s violation of its order that he appear in person at the September 3 hearing.
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would not be delayed. Moreover, Abdeljawad has offered no particular reason why, once
he received notice, it was impossible or impractical to either forego his trip to Chicago or
to return a day earlier than planned, rather than making himself unavailable for the
hearing. The trial court could have reasonably found Abdeljawad had no good cause or
substantial justification for disregarding its order that he appear in person to respond to
his client’s allegation that the client’s signature on the substitution of counsel form was
forged.
Nevertheless, Abdeljawad correctly asserts that section 177.5 requires that “[a]n
order imposing sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or
circumstances justifying the order.” (§ 177.5.) Our colleagues in the Sixth District Court
of Appeal have noted that this requirement’s “purpose ‘is to fulfill the “rudiments” of
due process required for governmental imposition of a penalty upon an attorney or
party—both for due process’ own, constitutional sake and to ensure that the power
conferred by the statute will not be abused. [Citations.] Moreover, in some cases the
court’s recitation will be an invaluable aid to a reviewing court determining whether the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions.’” (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 970, 977.) We would add that, in circumstances where sanctions
are imposed against an attorney and reported to the State Bar, the recitation may be
valuable in determining whether any additional discipline may be warranted. (See Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (o)(3) [requiring sanctions of $1,000 or more be reported to
the State Bar].) Even if the trial court’s motivation for imposing sanctions may be
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discernible from the record of oral proceedings, a written statement of reasons for the
sanctions is required. (See People v. Hundal (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 965, 970.)
Here, the only written sanctions order issued by the trial court was its minutes,
which reflect the following order: “Sanctions in amount of $1,000 imposed upon ROUTE
66 LAW APC payable to the Clerk of Court on or before 10/28/19.” The minutes do not
explain the conduct or circumstances justifying the order. We therefore must reverse it.
(See Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 977.) Nevertheless,
“[o]n remand, the court will be able to reenter its order with adequate justification . . . .”
(Id. at p. 979)
III. DISPOSITION
The sanctions order is reversed. On remand, the court may reenter its order with
the required statement of the “conduct or circumstances justifying the order.” (§ 177.5.)
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court's order imposing sanctions on an attorney must be reversed because it failed to comply with the statutory requirement to provide a written statement detailing the specific conduct or circumstances justifying the sanctions.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for an attorney's failure to appear in person at a hearing.
Whether a trial court's order imposing sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 is valid without a written recitation of the conduct justifying the order.