Navarrete (Adrian), said Navarrete told them her father sexually assaulted and raped her
and she fears her father. Father testified and denied the accusations. The trial court
interviewed Navarrete, but concluded she wasn’t a competent witness before eliciting any
testimony from her about the assaults. In the end, though the court expressed uncertainty
about what had happened, it found mother hadn’t proven the accusations of sexual assault
by a preponderance of the evidence, but also found Navarrete had genuine fear of her
father and didn’t want to see him.
The trial court appointed mother as Navarrete’s probate conservator and denied
the brother’s petition. Later, after further hearings, the trial court granted father visitation
and ordered Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father. The court
2
concluded, over the objection of Navarrete, her conservator, and her attorney, that such
visits were in her best interest because it would allow reconciliation in the event the
accusations of sexual assault weren’t true.
The visitation order is the only part of the case challenged on appeal. Navarrete
attacks the order in several ways. First, she argues the conservatorship statute reserves to
her as an adult conservatee the choice to refuse visitors. Second, she says the court order
violates her constitutional right to privacy and autonomy under the California
Constitution. Third, she says the court abused its discretion by determining visitation with
her father was in her best interest despite her accusations and her genuine fear of him. In
the alternative, she argues the trial court was wrong to bar her testimony, which would
have established her father abused her and made plain that visits are not in her best
interest. Father and the older brother have not filed briefs.
We hold the court did not have the authority to order Navarrete to attend joint
counseling sessions with her father and therefore reverse the order.
I
FACTS
Anna Navarrete has cerebral palsy, a developmental speech and language disorder,
and an anxiety adjustment disorder. She had a kidney transplant as a teenager and takes
several medications to manage her condition. Her mother has always attended to her
medications.
3
Mother said Navarrete is able to help around the house by cooking and doing
laundry. She’s also able to work part-time outside the house. The details of her
employment didn’t come out at trial, but her mother said she had been working from 8:00
a.m. to 2:30 p.m. without supervision by a family member. She made friends at work,
including a boyfriend, who was also disabled. However, Navarrete stopped working after
an incident in April 2016, when she and her boyfriend were found engaged in sexual
conduct at the workplace. Though they don’t see each other often now, they’re still
friends and communicate by texting each other.
On July 29, 2016, Navarrete’s mother filed a petition to be appointed her probate
conservator. Navarrete’s older brother, Rodolfo Navarrete, Jr. (Rudy), filed an objection
to mother’s petition and later filed a petition asking that he be appointed as her
conservator. Navarrete’s father also filed an objection to naming mother as conservator,
and mother objected to Rudy’s petition. Navarrete’s father also asked the court to order
visitation between himself and Navarrete.
The trial court held a trial on the competing requests over several days from
February to June 2017. Mother, father, Rudy, Adrian, and Navarrete’s therapist testified
at trial, and the trial court interviewed Navarrete, but found her not competent to testify.
4
A. Accusations of Sexual Assault and Rape
The conflict within the family appears to have started, or at least escalated, shortly
after May 31, 2016, the night Navarrete accused her father of having molested and raped
her.
According to mother, she woke around 3:00 a.m. that morning when she heard
people talking. She said father had kicked her out of their shared bedroom and she was
sleeping alone in their guest room. She got out of bed and found Navarrete was awake
and in her bathroom, and father was awake and in his own bathroom. She said the fact
that both were up at the same time made her suspicious, so she asked Navarrete about it
the next morning. “I asked Anna, ‘Why were you awake in the morning and your father
was awake too?’ [¶] She goes, ‘Oh, he was in my room.’” Mother asked her what
happened in her room, and Navarrete said, “‘he went into bed. You know, he started
touching me,’ in [my] private.” Mother said her body language indicated she was “[k]ind
of, like scared to tell me what happened.”
Navarrete’s younger brother, Adrian, said she came to him around 7:30 a.m. that
morning after talking to her mother. He said she “was very distressed and emotional. She
was crying a lot, and while – she was shaking her hands a lot, as if she couldn’t control
herself. [¶] . . . [¶] She told me that her father had raped her.” Asked for her exact words,
he said, “She had told me that he had stuck his – well, she used the word ‘dick’ inside her
private word, and she moved her hands towards her bottom to show that.” She also said,
“he had stuck his dick in her mouth and she pointed to her mouth” and “touched her in
5
her breasts and private word, down there, and she would move her hand, showing, you
know, how he had touched her.” Adrian also testified about Navarrete’s reaction when
she saw her father in the hallway during trial. “She was very shaken up. She was wanting
to cry and she couldn’t look at my father in the eyes. He would – she would look down.
She didn’t want to look at him, and she – when everyone would ask if she was okay, she
would kind of shudder whenever she would talk, speak.”
They didn’t call the police or confront father immediately. They said they wanted
to talk to Navarrete more and make sure what she was saying was true. However, mother
became angry about the abuse at dinner and pulled a knife on father and held it close to
his throat. She and Adrian said it was a butter knife, but father said it was something
much sharper. The confrontation ended without further violence, but became the basis for
father’s request for a domestic violence restraining order against mother.
The same night around 10:00 p.m., both mother and Adrian talked to Navarrete 1 again about what had happened the night before. According to mother, Navarrete used
simple words to say her father had gotten into bed with her naked, touched her breasts
and vagina, and had sexual intercourse with her. “Adrian and me were asking her, mostly
Adrian, and we would ask her what he had done to her and she would tell us that, you
know, he had touched her. We would ask her, where? [¶] She would say, ‘Down there.’
And we would go, ‘Where down there?’ [¶] She would point with her hand down there.
1 Counsel for father and the older brother objected to mother’s testimony about Navarrete’s accusations on hearsay grounds. The trial court recognized the hearsay issue but allowed the testimony for purposes other than the truth of the accusations.
6
‘What else did he do?’ [¶] ‘He would touch my boobs.’ She would say it like that. [¶]
‘Was there anything else that he had done?’ [¶] ‘Yeah. He would tell me to lick his dick
[¶] . . . [¶] [a]nd then he would put it in my mouth.” During this later conversation,
Navarrete said father had sexually assaulted and raped her on other occasions.
Mother and Adrian said they called police the next day, on June 1, after Navarrete
returned home from work. A police officer arrived and talked to mother and Adrian, but
didn’t question Navarrete. The officer told them to go to the police station, where police
spoke to mother, Adrian, and Navarrete. They then went to a hospital for a rape kit test.
Later that evening the police searched the home, and at some point that day they arrested
Navarrete’s father.
Navarrete began counselling with Valerie Fluker around June 26, 2016 because of
anxiety related to the sexual abuse. Fluker was at the time a professional clinical
counselor intern at Central Counseling Services in Riverside. Fluker said Navarrete has
difficulties communicating, but she understands Navarrete’s speaking and Navarrete is
also able to communicate by writing on a whiteboard.
Navarrete told Fluker she was sexually assaulted by her father. She said her father
kissed her inappropriately, indicating her breasts and vaginal area by marking the body
parts on a drawing of a human figure. She also told Fluker she was raped by writing “Dad
raped me” and “in both bedrooms” on a whiteboard. She told Fluker she didn’t want to
see her father because she was afraid of him. Though the trial court permitted this
testimony to show state of mind, it didn’t admit the testimony for the truth of the matter
7
asserted and refused to recognize Fluker as an expert, decisions Navarrete doesn’t
challenge on appeal. Fluker said Navarrete was still having weekly counseling sessions.
B. Father’s Denial of the Accusations
Father categorically denied the accusations against him. He said he never abused
Navarrete and never sexually abused her. He said he first learned of the accusations on
June 1, the day police arrested him. Police took him to the police station and detained him
for several hours. He said they released him and hadn’t charged him as of the date of
trial, more than a year later.
C. Navarrete’s Interview with the Court
Late in the trial, Navarrete proposed to testify herself, and counsel for her father
and older brother asked the court to inquire about her capacity to testify before allowing
her to discuss the allegations against father. The court agreed it would interview
Navarrete and evaluate whether she was qualified to testify under Evidence Code section
701. “[T]he Court will ask questions of Anna Navarrete, and give the answers the weight
to which they are entitled, if any, pursuant to Section 701 of the Evidence Code and the
case law construing that statute.”
Section 701 of the Evidence Code allows disqualification of a witness only if the
witness is “[i]ncapable of expressing himself or herself concerning the matter so as to be
understood, either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him; or
[¶] . . . [i]ncapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” (Evid. Code,
§ 701, subd. (a).) The statute allows the court in a bench trial to “reserve challenges to the
8
competency of a witness until the conclusion of the direct examination of that witness.”
(Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (b).)
With the help of her attorney and family members, Navarrete was able to make
herself understood to the court. She gave basic one or two word answers to questions
about her day-to-day life on topics that had already come up through the testimony of
other witnesses. For example, the court asked, “Your mother has her room, and Adrian
has his room, and you have yours, or do you share a room?” Navarrete responded,
“Share, no.” The court asked, “You don’t share a room, you have your own room; right?”
and she responded, “Uh-huh.” The court then tried suggesting otherwise, asking, “Do you
have your own room where you have it to yourself to sleep, or do you share a room with
your mother or your brother.” She responded, “No.” The court asked a similar series of
questions about the location of her bathroom, and Navarrete gave accurate answers.
The court then asked Navarrete a series of questions to see whether she could
distinguish truth from falsity and understood she was required to tell the truth in court.
The court asked, “At the courthouse, are we supposed to tell the truth to the judge, or
should we just say whatever the judge might want to hear? What do you think about
that?” She responded, “Say truth.” The court asked, “[I]f I were to say, look, there’s snow
on all of those chairs over there. Look at all the snow on those chairs. Would that be the
truth or a lie?” and she responded, “Lie.” The court asked, “[I]f I were to ask you how old
are you, and you said 65, would that be the truth or a lie?” She responded, “A lie.”
9
The court commented it was “struggling with whether to swear this witness. And I
will not do so at this time. And I’m going to ask more questions without swearing in the
witness.” The court then asked Navarrete about her family relationships. She said she
liked going out to eat and taking walks with her younger brother, Adrian. She resisted the
court’s suggestions that they took their dogs with them on their walks. She struggled to
make herself understood when asked about problems and disagreements among her
family members. With the assistance of Adrian, she managed to communicate that her
parents sometimes fought and her father would use the f-word and the b-word at those
times. The court asked her whether she’d “ever seen anybody grab a knife or a stick or a
gun, anything, and threaten anybody else?” She said she had seen her father with a gun.
The court then asked, “What do you remember about a gun? Huh? You remember seeing
a gun, or are you not sure about a gun?” She said she wasn’t sure about the gun, and then
said she’d seen her father grab a knife. She denied seeing anyone else wield a knife.
The court then asked a series of questions about who in her family she wanted to
live with and be with. She initially had trouble making herself understood on these
questions, but with the assistance of her attorney was able to say she needed help to do
certain things and preferred to keep living with her mother and for her mother to be the
one who helped her. She also said Adrian can be helpful. But she denied missing her
older brother, Rudy, or her father. The court said, “I’d like to see things patch up to
where you get a chance to see Rudy and your dad,” and asked “Would you like to do that
if Adrian is present?” She responded, “No.” The court then asked, “If the judge asked you
10
to see your dad and made sure that somebody nice was present, maybe Adrian, if he’s
willing to, would you do it. Would you see your dad?” She again responded, “No.”
Finally, the court asked Navarrete whether she was mad at anybody in her family.
She was able to say she was mad at her father and older brother, but had difficulty
communicating why. With the help of her attorney she was able to say she was mad at
her older brother because he yelled in her ear. But she wasn’t able to communicate why
she was mad at her father. The court called her younger brother up to assist the attorney,
but her answers were unintelligible other than to express that she was extremely mad at
her father.
At that point the court abruptly ended the examination.
D. Trial Court Rulings
At the end of Navarrete’s interview, the trial court ruled she would not be sworn as
a witness and was disqualified from giving testimony. Navarrete was then excused from
the courtroom. After a break, Navarrete’s attorney requested permission to have her
return to the courtroom to make a further attempt to qualify and provide testimony. The
court denied the request.
The court explained, “I think that what we should do now, and realizing that
perhaps both sides are unhappy with the way I’ve conducted the examination of Anna,
and recognizing that this Court was not comfortable swearing her as a witness. I think
[the judge in another case involving Navarrete] probably got it right that she might not be
a competent witness. It seemed like a close call to me. And I thought about swearing her
11
in once, and I thought about swearing her twice, and I didn’t do it. [¶] . . . [¶] I had more
than one reason for not swearing her. One reason was that it truly seemed like she was
subject to suggestion in terms of little things. I asked what she did during the day, she
didn’t tell me. I gave her three examples, and she told me those three things. People who
take suggestion as to little things perhaps would not take suggestion as to big things. [¶]
. . . I don’t want to imply that this person was simply a parrot in terms of giving back
whatever words I had spoken to her. No, it wasn’t that clear. It was more difficult than
that. And it’s too important not to be deceived by her speech impediment. Not an easy
assessment, folks. Not an easy assessment whether to swear her in or not. This Court
chose not to. Maybe a judge with greater skill at the examination would have made a
different choice. . . . My own view is to the extent that I have any ability to these things, I
gave her many a chance to say many a thing, and here we are.”
The court then granted mother’s petition to be Navarrete’s conservator and denied
Rudy’s petition. On June 21, 2017, the court entered an order appointing mother as
Navarrete’s conservator and issued her letters of conservatorship of the person. The court
granted father’s request for a domestic violence restraining order. No one challenges
these rulings on appeal.
On visitation, the court said its job was to assess ordering visitation from the
standpoint of Navarrete’s best interests. “[F]or an adult conservatee, the standard is
supposed to be what is in the best interest of the conservatee. And one thing I learned
from Anna in talking to her is she seems firm that she doesn’t want to visit with her dad
12
or her brother Rudy. . . . [¶] An adult has no right to visit an adult child. If my son ever
wanted to tell me, You’ll never see me again, it’s too horrible to imagine, but he would
have the right to say so. [¶] But the evidence of alienation . . . the apparent alienation by
[mother] of father and daughter, makes the person think that some amount of supervised
visitation should be granted because it would be in the best interest of Anna, because it’s
not in her best interest to be alienated from her father.”
The court acknowledged doubt as to whether her father had sexually assaulted her.
“The trouble is that I need to be honest and admit that I don’t know whether Rodolfo had
sex with his daughter. It seems more probable that he did not have sex with his daughter.
On a close call, I just don’t seem to have enough to find that he did.” The court continued
its explanation of its ruling, “So here I am not knowing if he had sex with his daughter,
but finding there’s not enough evidence to say that he did. And then if I have the
visitation forced, then in case I’m wrong and he did have sex with his daughter, then I’m
making her visit with her molester. I don’t like that very much, if that’s what it is. But I
don’t think that’s what it is. I think he probably didn’t have sex with his daughter.”
At bottom, the court indicated it thought it was in Navarrete’s best interest to have
a connection with her father, even if that would require considerable work to achieve.
The court explained, “It seems as if Maria has taken many steps to alienate Roldolfo from
Anna. That’s not in Anna’s best interest; therefore, it would seem like it’s in her best
interest to have some visitation forced by the Court, albeit supervised visitation.” The
court said ordering visitation would allow everyone to “[s]ee if maybe everybody can
13
calm down. If he really had sex with his daughter, she’ll never calm down. If he didn’t, at
some point she’ll realize she’s forgiven for implying or saying that he did, and maybe
things will get better. I don’t know.” Nevertheless, the court withheld ruling on visitation
immediately and asked the parties to try to reach an agreement.
They didn’t agree, as became clear at a review hearing on August 10, 2017.
Navarrete again opposed visitation, and her father requested one hour of visitation a week
in the presence of his own treating therapist. The court set a new hearing and had the
record reflect Navarrete “is crying and her brother and advocacy person are leading her
outside.” After a hearing on September 15, 2017, the court found “contact with Father in
a therapeutic setting is beneficial to Anna Navarrete, although conservator, conservatee
and conservatee’s therapist and conservatee’s attorney all disagree.” On March 8, 2018,
the court entered its findings and issued an order that Navarrete and her father attend joint
counseling sessions with a neutral therapist. The court ordered the sessions to be held
once or twice a month in the discretion of the therapist.
Navarrete filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the visitation order. Father
didn’t cross-appeal and failed to file a respondent’s brief after requesting an extension
and receiving a warning that we would decide the case based on Navarrete’s arguments
alone if he did not.
14
II
ANALYSIS
Navarrete challenges the visitation order on several grounds. She argues ordering
her to attend joint therapy sessions with her father was beyond its authority under the
conservatorship statute, violated her privacy rights under the United States and California
Constitutions and, even if the order was permissible, it was an abuse of discretion for the 2 trial court to determine forced visitation with her father was in her best interest.
We review for abuse of discretion trial court decisions affecting the scope of a
conservator’s powers. An abuse of discretion occurs only where the decision is outside of
what is allowed by the governing law or where there is no reasonable basis for the court’s
action. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th
747, 773.)
The Probate Code sets out when it’s appropriate for a trial court to appoint a
conservator of the person (conservator) as well as the general powers of such a
conservator. The trial court may appoint a conservator for someone “who is unable to
provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or
shelter.” (Prob. Code, § 1801, subd. (a).) Once appointed by the trial court, a conservator
“has the care, custody, and control of, and . . . charge of the education of . . . the
conservatee.” (Prob. Code, § 2351, subd. (a).)
2Navarrete also argues the trial court erred by not allowing her to testify. We don’t address this issue because we reverse the trial court visitation order on other grounds.
15
Though appointment invests a conservator with broad powers, the statute also
explicitly reserves certain rights to the conservatee. The conservator’s “control shall not
extend to personal rights retained by the conservatee, including, but not limited to, the
right to receive visitors, telephone calls, and personal mail.” (Prob. Code, § 2351, subd.
(a), italics added.) The designation of a person as a conservatee doesn’t divest them of
their autonomy. The purpose of the statute is to ensure the care and protection of people
who need it, while maintaining their personal agency as much as is practical.
These personal rights are so important the Legislature gave the courts the power to
intervene on a conservatee’s behalf to ensure they may exercise them. The statute
expressly allows the courts to enter an order that “grants the conservator the power to
enforce the conservatee’s rights to receive visitors . . . or that directs the conservator to
allow those visitors.” (Prob. Code, § 2351, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, the courts have
a role as a protector of a conservatee’s ability to exercise their rights to receive visitors. If
a conservator needs an express court order giving them the power to enable the
conservatee to see the visitors they choose, the court may issue such an order. And if a
conservator is interfering with the conservatee’s decision to receive visitors, the court
may direct the conservator to stand aside and let the conservatee make the decision for
themself. The court makes such determinations in the best interests of the conservatee.
The statute also gives the trial court the power to expressly limit the statutory
powers given a conservator over the conservatee at the outset of the conservatorship.
“Where the court determines that it is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular
16
conservatee, the court, in its discretion, may limit the powers and duties that the
conservator would otherwise have under subdivision (a) by an order stating either of the
following: [¶] (1) The specific powers that the conservator does not have with respect to
the conservatee’s person and reserving the powers so specified to the conservatee[, or] [¶]
(2) The specific powers and duties the conservator has with respect to the conservatee’s
person and reserving to the conservatee all other rights with respect to the conservatee’s
person that the conservator otherwise would have under subdivision (a).” (Prob. Code,
§ 2351, subd. (b).) Thus, the statute allows the court to narrow the conservator’s authority
with the purpose of expanding the conservatee’s personal rights.
The statute does not similarly suggest the court has the power to force an
unwanted visitor on the conservatee. We’re not asked to decide whether the court
properly could allow the conservator to stop Navarrete from seeing someone who was
exercising undue influence on her or engaging in unwanted or unsafe sexual contact.
We’re asked to decide whether the trial court’s statutory power to limit Navarrete’s
personal rights to receive visitors extends to allowing the court to require a conservatee
to receive a visitor she and her conservator insist she does not want to see.
We are aware of no case reading the statute to allow a conservator or a court to
require an adult conservatee to spend time with someone against their will, even a parent.
As the trial judge recognized, speaking of his own adult child, “An adult has no right to
visit an adult child. If my son ever wanted to tell me, ‘You’ll never see me again . . . he
would have the right to say so.” The statute distinguishes conservatees, who are adults,
17
from wards, who are children. The statute treads on the autonomy of conservatees only to
the extent required to assist them. The guardianship provisions allow for more court
intervention. For that reason, the courts may order a guardian to allow visits from the
child’s noncustodial relatives if it’s in their best interests. (Guardianship of Reynolds
It’s a different matter to require an adult to visit with an estranged parent.
Navarrete and conservatees like her are adults, and the statute treats them as such even
while investing a conservator and the court with certain powers to assist them where they
are unable to assist themselves. Critically, the statute explicitly preserves conservatees’
personal rights against invasion by the conservator. (Prob. Code, § 2351, subd. (a).) Such
rights, as Navarrete argues, include her right to refuse to visit someone, which implicates
the fundamental interest “of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law.” (Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford (1891) 141 U.S. 250,
251.)
An adult conservatee’s disability does not put them in the legal position of a
minor. For example, a conservatee retains the right to marry or enter a registered
domestic partnership. (Prob. Code, § 1900 [“The appointment of a conservator of the
person or estate or both does not affect the capacity of the conservatee to marry or to
enter into a registered domestic partnership”].) Though a conservator or other interested
person may petition the trial court for an order finding a conservatee doesn’t have the
18
capacity to enter a legal marriage, “‘[w]hether the conservatee has capacity to marry is
determined by the law that would be applicable had no conservatorship been
established.’” (In re Marriage of Greenway (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 628, 641.) A
conservatee may overcome a petition and retain the right to decide to enter or exit a
marriage as long as they have the capacity to express their preference on the matter. (Id.
at p. 643; see also In re Marriage of Higgason (1973) 10 Cal.3d 476, 479.)
In the context of family law orders, the trial courts have no authority to order adult
disabled children to visit with a parent. (In re Marriage of Jensen (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
587, 594.) As the Court of Appeal pointed out in Jensen, “[v]isitation is a form of
custody,” and the Family Code section allowing the trial court to impose visitation orders
does not reach a child who has attained the age of majority. (Ibid.) Navarrete is such a
person, notwithstanding her disability, and the trial court’s attempt to intervene in the
dispute between a disabled adult and her estranged father based on its own judgment
about her best interests overstepped its role.
We recognize the significant constitutional problems Navarrete raises with the trial
court’s order, including her suggestion that the trial court would have had to find
visitation in her best interest by clear and convincing evidence. (See generally,
Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519.) But we need not address those
questions in this case because we conclude the trial court exceeded its statutory authority
by ordering forced visitation against Navarrete’s will and against the judgment of her
conservator.
19
III
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order requiring Navarrete to attend joint therapy
sessions with her father. Navarrete is entitled to her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MENETREZ J.
20
Filed 12/21/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
ORDER
Conservatorship of the Person and E070210 Estate of ANNA NAVARRETE. ________________________________________ (Super.Ct.No. RIP1600752)
RODOLFO NAVARRETE, The County of Riverside Petitioner and Respondent, v. ANNA NAVARRETE, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION Objector and Appellant. AND GRANTING PUBLICATION
_______________________________________ [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT
We GRANT the request to publish the opinion filed in this matter, which meets the standard for publication in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The court ORDERS the opinion filed on December 4, 2020 certified for publication.
On our own motion, the Court ORDERS the opinion modified by removing the words “an Incompetent Person, etc.” from the caption to conform with current law and usage. (See, e.g., Prob. Code, §§ 1801, subd. (a) [The trial court may appoint a conservator for someone “who is unable to provide properly for his or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or shelter”]; 2351, subd. (a) [“the guardian or conservator . . . has the care, custody, and control of, and has charge of the education of, the ward or conservatee”].)
Except for the modification, which doesn’t affect the judgment, the opinion is unchanged.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
SLOUGH J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MENETREZ J.
cc: See attached list
1
MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E070210 Conservatorship of the Person and Estate of Anna Navarrete; Rodolfo Navarrete v. Anna Navarrete
Superior Court Clerk Riverside County P.O. Box 431 - Appeals Riverside, CA 92502
Daniel H. Cargnelutti 4212 Market Street, 2nd Floor Riverside, CA 92501
Mark J. Andrew Flory Brown White & Osborn, LLP 300 East State Street, Suite 300 Redlands, CA 92373
2
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court lacked the statutory authority to order an adult conservatee to attend joint counseling sessions with her father against her will, as the conservatorship statute reserves the right to receive visitors to the conservatee.
Issues
Whether the probate conservatorship statute authorizes a court to order an adult conservatee to attend joint counseling sessions with a parent against the conservatee's wishes.
Disposition. reversed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The conservator’s “control shall not extend to personal rights retained by the conservatee, including, but not limited to, the right to receive visitors, telephone calls, and personal mail.””
“We hold the court did not have the authority to order Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father and therefore reverse the order.”
“The statute does not similarly suggest the court has the power to force an unwanted visitor on the conservatee.”