People v. Alexander CA2/3

Filed 12/16/20 P. v. Alexander CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B300927

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BH012563 v.

STEVEN ALEXANDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Dismissed. Sally Patrone Brajevich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Steven Alexander appeals from the denial of a habeas petition seeking correction of his custody credits. He argues that the court improperly reduced his credits outside his presence and without the assistance of counsel and asks us to remand the matter for the court to resentence him. We conclude we lack jurisdiction over the appeal and dismiss it.

BACKGROUND

In 2012, defendant was convicted, in case No. PA069032, of two counts of first degree burglary with a person present (Pen. Code,1 § 459), one count of second degree burglary (§ 459), three counts of resisting an executive officer (§ 69), and one count of battery with injury on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)). He was sentenced to a second-strike term of 25 years four months in state prison. The court classified defendant’s convictions as serious felonies and awarded him 20 percent conduct credit. In 2016, defendant asked the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) why he was receiving 15 percent conduct credit notwithstanding the court’s determination that he was entitled to 20 percent. A series of administrative appeals followed, all of which ratified CDCR’s actions. Nevertheless, CDCR eventually wrote to the court to ask for clarification as to whether defendant’s first degree burglary convictions were serious felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18) [“any burglary of the first degree” is a serious felony]) or violent felonies (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21) [“Any burglary of the first degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is charged