People v. Dupart CA2/1

Filed 12/16/20 P. v. Dupart CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B304863

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SA081016) v.

ERIC MICHAEL DUPART,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Leslie E. Brown, Judge. Affirmed. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles Lee and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________

Eric M. Dupart challenges the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing relating to a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.1 We affirm the trial court’s denial. BACKGROUND In 2015, an information charged Dupart with two counts of murder, robbery, and first degree burglary, and the information alleged that he committed multiple murders and intentionally discharged a firearm. As part of a plea agreement, Dupart pleaded guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to 22 years in state prison. On April 24, 2019, Dupart filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. After appointing counsel and considering a round of briefing, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that Dupart was ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. DISCUSSION Pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), the Legislature enacted section 1170.95, which permits “[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of