$219,756.50, representing $73,265.50, which the trial court found to be the value of the
tree, trebled pursuant to Civil Code section 3346.
The Mans appeal. They contend:
1. Civil Code section 3346 did not apply, because the Mans injured the tree while
on their own property, not while trespassing on the Russells’ property.
2. There was insufficient evidence that the Mans acted willfully and maliciously
to support an award of treble damages.
3. The trial court erred by finding that the value of the tree was $73,265.50.
We agree that under Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1094,
decided while this appeal was pending, Civil Code section 3346 did not apply. The Mans
remain liable, but only on a negligence theory, and only for untrebled damages.
Accordingly, we need not decide whether there was sufficient evidence of willful and
malicious conduct. Finally, we will hold that the trial court’s finding regarding the value
2
of the tree was erroneous and excessive; the only value supported by the evidence was
$37,000. We will direct the trial court to modify the judgment accordingly.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Russells own a home in Big Bear Lake. Sometime before February 2016, the
Mans bought the lot next door. At that time, the lot was vacant. Mr. Man is a general
contractor and has built several homes in the area.
A Jeffrey pine tree1 85 feet tall straddled the lot line between the two properties.
The tree was 80 percent on the Russells’ property and 20 percent on the Mans’ property.2
Under the Big Bear Development Code, it was forbidden to dig in a tree’s “critical
root zone.” This was defined as a circle around the tree with a radius of one foot for
every inch of the tree’s diameter at standard height (four and a half feet above the
ground). Here, the tree’s diameter at standard height was 40 inches, so its critical root
zone had a radius of 40 feet.
Mr. Man hired a draftsman who prepared the building plans and then submitted
them to the city. Those plans misrepresented the tree as being behind the proposed
1 The Russells repeatedly state that the Jeffrey pine is an endangered species. The record does not support this. It is actually a species of least concern. (<https://www.iucnredlist.org/fr/species/42371/2975870>, as of Nov. 9, 2020.) 2 Ms. Russell testified that the tree was entirely on her property. However, her testimony was based on a string the Mans set up during construction; she assumed it was a lot line marker. Mr. Man testified that the string was actually a foundation line marker. He also introduced a topographic survey showing that the tree was on the lot line. The Russells now concede that the tree was “on the . . . property line . . . .”
3
house, rather than to the side. Even according to the plans, however, the house was
within the tree’s critical root zone. In fact, there was no way to build on the property
without killing the tree. Nevertheless, the city inspected the site and issued a building
permit.
On February 16, 2016, construction began. There were already several dead
branches on the tree. After one of them fell, Mr. Man became concerned about the safety
of his workers. On March 1, 2016, he contacted Mr. Russell to discuss the tree. He
proposed that they split the cost of taking it down. Mr. Russell refused; he used “eff
words” and accused Mr. Man of “destroying everything.”
The Mans therefore cut three more dead branches off the tree. To accomplish this,
a worker had to enter the Russells’ property.3
During the construction, a worker entered the Russells’ property, drove a single
nail into the Russells’ house, and tied a string to it (probably as a guideline for the
foundations).4
Also during the construction, workers5 dug trenches within five feet of the tree. In
or about 2017, construction was complete and the Mans sold the house. Thereafter, the
tree died. At the direction of the fire department, the Russells removed the dead tree.
3 The third cause of action, for trespass, was based on this entry. 4 The fourth cause of action, also for trespass, was based on this entry. 5 All of the construction workers were employees of Mr. Man. The Mans have never disputed that they were vicariously liable for those workers’ acts and omissions.
4
Ruben Green, a consulting arborist, testified as an expert on “diagnos[ing] and
tak[ing] care of trees [on] residential properties.” He had inspected the tree in May 2016,
while construction was still going on. In his opinion, the tree died of dehydration due to
the cutting of its roots during construction.
Additional facts pertaining to the value of the tree will be stated in part V, post.
II
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2016, the Russells filed this action against the Mans, asserting causes of action
for wrongful cutting of timber (Civ. Code, § 3346), negligence, and trespass.
After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment awarding the Russells a total
of $222,767.23 against the Mans. On the first cause of action (wrongful cutting of
timber), it awarded $219,756.50; this represented $73,265.50, as the value of the tree,
trebled pursuant to Civil Code section 3346. It ruled that this necessarily included any
and all damages on the second cause of action (negligence). On the third and fourth
causes of action (trespass), it awarded $1 each, for a total of $2. Finally, it awarded
$2,968.73 in costs, for a grand total of $222,767.23.
5
III
THE EVIDENCE OF A TRESPASS
FOR PURPOSES OF DOUBLE OR TREBLE DAMAGES
The Mans contend that Civil Code section 3346 did not apply here. They argue
that it applies only when the defendant was trespassing when he or she injured a tree;
here, they injured the tree while they were on their own property.
wrongful injuries to . . . trees, . . . , the measure of damages is three times such sum as
would compensate for the actual detriment, except that where the trespass was casual or
involuntary, or that [sic] the defendant . . . had probable cause to believe that the land on
which the trespass was committed was his own or the land of the person in whose service
or by whose direction the act was done, the measure of damages shall be twice the sum as
would compensate for the actual detriment . . . .”
In addition, Civil Code section 3346, subdivision (c) provides: “Any action for
the damages specified by subdivision[] (a) . . . of this section must be commenced within
five years from the date of the trespass.”
While the trial court cited Civil Code section 3346, that is not the only statute on
this topic. Code of Civil Procedure section 733, as relevant here, provides: “Any person
who . . . injures any tree or timber on the land of another person, or on the street or
highway in front of any person’s house, village, or city lot, or cultivated grounds . . . is
liable to the owner of such land . . . for treble the amount of damages . . . .”
6
“As sections 733 of the Code of Civil Procedure and 3346 of the Civil Code relate
to the same subject matter they must be construed together. Under settled rules of
statutory construction they must, insofar as any reasonable construction will permit, be
construed to be consistent and not in conflict. Moreover, they must be construed so as to
give effect to the whole of each.” (Swall v. Anderson (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 825, 829.)
There is language in each statute that would seem to require a trespass. Civil Code
section 3346 provides for lesser damages when “the defendant . . . had probable cause to
believe that the land on which the trespass was committed was his own . . . .” Even more
significantly, it provides that the statute of limitations starts running on “the date of the
trespass.” Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 733 applies only to an injury to a
tree “on the land of another person” (or in front of the land of another person).
Accordingly, in Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co., supra, 8 Cal.5th 1094, our
Supreme Court held that Civil Code section 3346 and Code of Civil Procedure section
733 both require a trespass. (Id. at p. 1103.) It went on to hold, however, that not just
any common law trespass will do. (Id. at pp. 1104-1105, 1110-1112.) Rather, these
statutes “refer[] not to the common law action of trespass but rather the kind of acts long
thought of as ‘timber trespass’ or ‘timber misappropriation’ — essentially, intentionally
severing or removing timber from another’s land without the owner’s consent.
[Citations.] ” (Id. at p. 1104; see also id. at p. 1105.) Their “purpose . . . is ‘“‘to educate
blunderers (persons who mistake location of boundary lines) and to discourage rogues
(persons who ignore boundary lines), to protect timber from being cut by others than the
7
owner.’”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1110.) Thus, they “address[] situations where a person
intentionally enters the land in question, either personally or through some agent or
instrumentality, to cause direct, intentional injury to timber, trees, or underwood.” (Ibid.)
The facts here do not show an intentional entry across a boundary line. The tree
died as a result of acts by the Mans’ workers on the Mans’ own land. The Mans’ workers
did enter the Russells’ land twice, once to trim branches and once to drive a nail, but it is
undisputed that those trespasses did not kill the tree; they were not the timber trespasses
for which the Russells were seeking treble damages.
It could be argued that cutting the roots did constitute a trespass of a sort. Trees
are real property. (Civ. Code, §§ 658, 660; Morrissey v. Morrissey (1923) 191 Cal. 782,
783; Wolfe v. Wallace (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 523, 527.) Accordingly, tree roots are also
real property.
Ordinarily, when the roots of a tree on A’s land grow into the land of B, B has the
right to cut them. (Grandona v. Lovdal (1886) 70 Cal. 161, 162; Bonde v. Bishop (1952)
112 Cal.App.2d 1, 5-6; 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 17:9 at pp. 17-
28⸺17-30.) This is not treated as a trespass to the tree, because the tree itself is the
trespasser — it is an encroachment on B’s land. There is an exception, however, when
cutting the roots unnecessarily kills or injures the tree. Booska v. Patel (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1786 held that, under those circumstances, there is no absolute privilege to
cut the roots. (Id. at pp. 1791-1792.) Moreover, here, the tree was a “line tree” — a tree
on the boundary line between two pieces of property. “Trees whose trunks stand partly
8
on the land of two or more coterminous owners, belong to them in common.” (Civ.
Code, § 834.) “[N]either owner ‘is at liberty to cut the tree without the consent of the
other, nor to cut away the part which extends into his land, if he thereby injures the
common property in the tree.’ [Citation.]” (Kallis v. Sones (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
1274, 1278.)
Even assuming, however, that cutting the tree roots constituted a common law
trespass, Scholes requires more; it requires a timber trespass, which in turn requires an
intentional crossing of boundary lines into the land of another to injure timber.
Accordingly, the Mans cannot be liable for treble damages — or any damages at
all — on the first cause of action, for wrongful cutting of timber. The trial court,
however, also found them liable on the second cause of action, for negligence.
Accordingly, they are liable for the actual, untrebled damages.
“[W]hen the evidence is sufficient to sustain some, but not all, of a . . .
compensatory damages award, the appellate court may reduce the judgment to the
amount supported by the evidence and affirm as modified. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et
al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶ 11:56.1,
p. 11-19; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 43, 906.) In our disposition, we will reduce the
award to single damages.
9
IV
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
The Mans contend that the trial court erred by finding that the value of the tree
was $73,265.50.
A. Additional Factual and Procedural Background.
Green, the Russells’ expert witness, appraised the tree, using the trunk formula
method — a method that is standard in the industry for valuing a tree too large to be
purchased at a nursery.
The trunk formula method starts with the tree’s diameter at standard height. That
is used to calculate the tree’s cross-sectional area.
From that is subtracted a constant of 23.75 square inches, representing the cross-
sectional area of the largest replacement tree actually available from a nursery. The net
(excess) area is then multiplied by a constant unit cost per square inch. The cost of
buying and installing a nursery tree is then added back in.
The result is the “nondepreciated value” of the tree. Green likened the
nondepreciated value to the purchase price of a hypothetical tree of equivalent size from a
nursery, if one existed.
The nondepreciated value is then reduced according to the tree’s species,
condition, and location, resulting in the “depreciated value.” The depreciated value “is
the final value for the lost tree.”
Here, the relevant calculations were as shown on the next page:
10
Parameter Value How Calculated Diameter (ins.) 40 Appraisal Area (sq. ins.) 1,149 402 x 0.785[6] Standard area 23.75 Constant Net area 1,125.25 1,149 - 23.75 Unit cost $62.00 Constant Net area cost $69,765.50 1,125.25 x $62 Standard cost $3,500.00 Constant Nondepreciated value $73,265.50 $69,765.50 + $3,500 Species 90% Constant Value adjusted for $65,938.95 $73,265.50 x 0.90 species Condition 80% Appraisal Value adjusted for $52,751.16 $65,938.95 x 0.80 condition Location 70% Appraisal Value adjusted for $36,925.81 $52,751.16 x 0.70 location Depreciated value $37,000.00 $36,925.81 rounded to nearest $100
6 This calculation by Green would seem to be incorrect. The area of a circle 40 inches in diameter would be 202 x 𝜋 ≈ 1,257 square inches. Perhaps, however, the tree was elliptical rather than circular.
11
B. Discussion.
“‘“Whether a plaintiff ‘is entitled to a particular measure of damages is a question
of law subject to de novo review. [Citations.] The amount of damages, on the other
hand, is a fact question . . . [and] an award of damages will not be disturbed if it is
supported by substantial evidence.’”’ [Citation.]” (Markow v. Rosner (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1050.)
Here, it is undisputed that the value of the tree is an appropriate measure of
damages. “‘[I]f [the] restoration of the land to a reasonable approximation of its former
condition is impossible or impracticable, the landowner may recover the value of the
trees or shrubbery, either as timber or for their aesthetic qualities, again without regard to
the diminution in the value of the land. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Hassoldt v. Patrick
Media Group, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 153, 168.)
Green testified that he valued the tree using the trunk formula method. That
method involves a prescribed series of calculations. One of the intermediate calculations
in that series is the tree’s “nondepreciated value.” It represents the hypothetical purchase
price of a tree of the same size, if such a tree were available, even though it is not.
However, he also testified that the trunk formula method requires further adjustments to
the nondepreciated value, including adjustments for species, condition, and location, in
order to arrive at the “depreciated value.” Thus, his report stated that depreciated value
“is the final value for the lost tree.” It also stated, “[T]he tree is valued at $37,000.”
12
Consistently with his report, Green testified that $37,000 “is the valuation . . . .
Depreciated value.”
Thus, the trial court plainly erred by awarding the nondepreciated value. For
example, if it accepted the trunk formula method at all, it was required to accept the
species adjustment. On this evidence, the single most valuable species of tree, if it were
the same size as the tree in this case, could be worth as much as $73,265.50; however,
this tree was a Jeffrey pine, a less valuable species, so it was worth only 90 percent of
that. For similar reasons, the trial court was required to accept the condition and location
adjustments. Otherwise, it was awarding the value of some different tree.
We recognize that a trier of fact can reject the testimony of an expert, even when it
is uncontradicted — but only if “‘it does not do so arbitrarily . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. 6354 Figarden General Partnership (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 370,
392.) The trial court’s decision to rely on the nondepreciated value rather than the
depreciated value was wholly arbitrary.
We speculate that the root of the problem (if you will forgive the pun) may be that
arborists are not accountants. Accountants use depreciation to mean a “method of
allocating the cost of a tangible or physical asset over its useful life or life expectancy.”
(https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/depreciation.asp, as of Nov. 16, 2020.)
Arguably, if that were what it meant here, the trial court could reasonably award the
nondepreciated value of the tree, without taking into account a paper loss of value over
time. But arborists evidently use the word in a different way. Lowering a tree’s
13
estimated value based on its species or its location is hardly what an accountant would
call “depreciation.”
The trial court did have the option of awarding some compensation, beyond the
value of the tree, for lost aesthetic enjoyment. (See Rony v. Costa (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 746, 755-756.) Plainly, however, that is not what it did. Rather, it awarded
Green’s nondepreciated value, down to the penny.
In our disposition, we will modify the judgment accordingly.
V
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified as follows. On the first cause of action (wrongful
cutting of timber), the judgment is against the Russells and in favor of the Mans. On the
second cause of action (negligence), the judgment awards the Russells $37,000 against
the Mans. The judgment on the third and fourth causes of action (trespass) and the award
of costs remain the same. As thus modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is
directed to enter an amended judgment reflecting these modifications. The Mans are
awarded costs on appeal against the Russells.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS RAMIREZ P. J. We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
MENETREZ J.
14
Filed 12/11/20
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
RAYMOND RUSSELL et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents, E072266
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1612223)
CORNEL DORIN MAN et al., ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION Defendants and Appellants.
THE COURT
The opinion in the above-entitled matter, filed on November 17, 2020, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports.
A request has been made, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), for publication of the opinion. It appears that part of the opinion does meet the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).
We therefore GRANT the request, in part, and ORDER that the opinion is certified for publication, with the exception of part IV.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION RAMIREZ P. J. We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
MENETREZ J.
1
See attached mailing list MAILING LIST FOR CASE: E072266 Raymond Russell et al. v. Cornel Dorin Man et al.
Superior Court Clerk San Bernardino County 8303 N. Haven Ave Rancho Cucamonga, CA 91730
David J. Philipson Law Office of David Philipson P.O. Box 2950 42644 Moonridge Road Big Bear Lake, CA 92315-2950
Brandon Darel Howard Law Offices of David Philipson PO Box 2950 42644 Moonridge Road Big Bear Lake, CA 92315-2950
Margaret R. Miglietta Cummins & White, LLP 2424 S.E. Bristol Street, Suite 300 Newport Beach, CA 92660
Larry Millard Arnold Cummins & White LLP 2424 S.E. Bristol Street, Suite 300 Newport Beach, CA 92660
2
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. Civil Code section 3346 and Code of Civil Procedure section 733 require a 'timber trespass' involving an intentional entry onto another's land to injure trees, and therefore do not apply to injuries caused by a property owner to a tree on their own land. The court held that the defendants were liable for negligence but not for treble damages, and that the trial court erred by awarding the tree's nondepreciated value rather than the depreciated value supported by expert testimony.
Issues
Whether Civil Code section 3346 applies to tree injuries occurring on the defendant's own property.
Whether the trial court's valuation of the tree was supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co., supra, 8 Cal.5th 1094, our Supreme Court held that Civil Code section 3346 and Code of Civil Procedure section 733 both require a trespass.”
“The facts here do not show an intentional entry across a boundary line. The tree died as a result of acts by the Mans’ workers on the Mans’ own land.”
“The trial court’s decision to rely on the nondepreciated value rather than the depreciated value was wholly arbitrary.”