California Court of Appeal Nov 10, 2020 No. E070910Unpublished
Filed 11/10/20 P. v. Frasco CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E070910
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1605314)
MIGUEL CORTES FRASCO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Samuel Diaz, Jr. Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions.
Julie Anne Swain and Julie Swain for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos and Kathryn
Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
I.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant, Miguel Frasco, Jr., appeals from judgment entered
following jury convictions for domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); counts 1
& 2); false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236; count 3); assault with a firearm (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 5 & 8); possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd.
a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422; count 9); stalking while under a restraining order
(Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (b); count 11); and intentional violation of a protective order 1 (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a); counts 12, 13, & 14). The jury also found true
allegations as to counts 3 and 9, that defendant personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, §§
12022.5, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). The trial court sentenced defendant to 12 years
in prison.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in permitting expert
testimony on intimate partner battering as propensity evidence. Defendant also argues
the trial court erred in excluding evidence of text messages from the victim to defendant,
and the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s request to present
surrebuttal evidence. Defendant further contends the court-ordered fines and fees must
be reversed and the matter remanded under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157 (Dueñas) for an ability to pay hearing.
1 Count 4 was dismissed by motion of the People.
2
We reject defendant’s evidentiary challenges but reverse the trial court’s order
imposing fines and fees, and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to
conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant is able to pay the court-ordered fines
and fees. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
II.
FACTS
Defendant and M.M. began dating in March 2015. They never married but had a
child together, born in June 2016. Defendant and M.M. lived together on and off.
Beginning in July 2015, they lived in a guesthouse on defendant’s parents’ property.
Defendant began physically abusing M.M. in September 2015, about the time M.M.
became pregnant with the couple’s daughter.
A. September 5, 2015 Incident (Count 1)
In September 2015, M.M. went out to dinner and to a few clubs with a girlfriend.
M.M. invited defendant to join them but he did not want to go. While M.M. was out,
defendant sent M.M. numerous texts insulting her, calling her a “whore,” and suggesting
she was going out to have sex with other men. When M.M. arrived home at 4:00 a.m. on
September 5, 2015, defendant was waiting for her at the front gate of her house. He
grabbed her by the arm and dragged her into the house. He then started yelling at M.M.,
punched her with a closed fist on the left side of her face, and hit her two more times,
causing M.M. to fall to the ground. Defendant dragged M.M. by her hair while
continuing to punch and kick her.
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Defendant’s parents heard M.M. screaming and yelled at defendant from outside
the house to stop. M.M. got up and ran out the door to defendant’s parents’ adjacent
house. M.M. screamed for defendant’s niece to help her. The niece took M.M. to her
bedroom and locked the door. Defendant followed M.M. into his parents’ home and
banged on the niece’s bedroom door. He demanded the niece open the door and
threatened to break it down. When the niece relented and unlocked the door, defendant
entered. He hit and repeatedly slapped M.M., pulled her hair, and spat in her face.
Defendant told his mother he was attacking M.M. because she was a whore for coming
home so late. Eventually defendant stopped and left his parents’ home. He went to the
guesthouse (M.M.’s home) and burned M.M.’s clothing and other belongings.
Later that day, defendant stopped by and apologized to M.M. M.M. sustained a
black eye and three bumps on her head from the incident. She did not report the incident
to the police until almost a year later, in August 2016.
B. January 6, 2016 Incident (Count 2)
On January 6, 2016, defendant and M.M. went to dinner at the Market Broiler
M.M. was about six weeks pregnant. During dinner, defendant argued with M.M. and
called her names. M.M. left the restaurant and went next door to Marie Callender’s.
Defendant followed her. M.M. went into the restroom to avoid defendant. While
banging on the restroom door, defendant told M.M. to come out and said he was waiting
for her. Scared, M.M. called her sister, Nora, and asked her to pick her up. Defendant
entered the restroom, kicked in M.M.’s stall door, and broke the stall door latch. When
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M.M. screamed, defendant grabbed her face and mouth, and pushed her up against the
wall. M.M. bit defendant’s hand. Defendant demanded M.M.’s phone, which M.M. gave
to him. Defendant then left. M.M.’s mouth and face were injured. M.M. took pictures
of her face injuries but did not report the incident until August 2016. Later, defendant
apologized.
C. March 2016 Incident (Counts 3, 5, & 6)
In March 2016, while M.M. was pregnant, M.M. and defendant argued, and M.M.
told defendant she was leaving him. Defendant told M.M. she could leave but their baby
had to stay with him. Defendant locked the front door and would not let her leave.
Defendant drafted an agreement stating that M.M. was giving up her rights to their child
and agreeing that the child would live with defendant. Defendant demanded M.M. sign
the agreement. M.M. refused to sign it. Defendant retrieved his gun from the nightstand,
held it to M.M.’s head, and pushed the gun into M.M.’s temple. M.M. began crying,
hyperventilating, and coughing, and then ran to the bathroom to throw up. Defendant
apologized and made M.M. a cup of tea.
Shortly after the March incident, M.M. moved in with her parents. She also went
to court to obtain a restraining order but did not follow through with it because defendant
told her things would change.
D. June 12, 2016 Incident (Count 7)
On June 12, 2016, M.M. and defendant went to a prenatal doctor appointment.
M.M. went by herself because defendant was not ready to leave on time, and defendant
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showed up late, after the appointment was over. Defendant and M.M. argued outside the
doctor’s office and as they went to the parking lot. Defendant asked for the keys to his
car. M.M. threw the keys on the ground. Defendant grabbed M.M. She told him to
leave her alone. As M.M. walked away, defendant grabbed M.M.’s cup of iced coffee
and threw her drink on her back. M.M. ran away. Defendant chased her and placed her
in a headlock and yelled in her ear. A woman driving by stopped, got out of her car,
yelled at defendant to leave M.M. alone, and offered to give M.M. a ride. M.M. got in
the woman’s car and was dropped off at M.M.’s sister’s workplace.
E. June 19, 2016 Incident (Counts 8, 9, & 10)
While M.M. was hospitalized for a couple of days after the birth of defendant and
M.M.’s child in June 2016, defendant and M.M. began arguing when M.M. was about to
be discharged. M.M. told defendant she wanted to take the baby to her parents’ house so
they could help her with the baby. Defendant wanted M.M. and the baby to go to his
house. Defendant threw a water bottle at M.M. M.M. started to cry. Defendant and
M.M. went with the baby to defendant’s house but M.M. then took the baby to her
parents’ (MGPs) house. She told defendant she and the baby would return in a few
hours.
When defendant thought M.M. and the baby had not returned quickly enough, he
went to MGPs’ house and grabbed the baby from M.M. Defendant pulled up his shirt to
show M.M. his gun in his belt. M.M. tried to call the police but got a busy signal. M.M.
feared defendant would shoot someone. M.M.’s mother (MGM) pleaded with defendant
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to return the baby and M.M.’s father (MGF) told M.M. to call the police again. When
M.M. called again and defendant heard M.M. speaking to the 911 operator, he handed the
baby to MGM. Defendant then pulled out his gun, cocked it, pointed it at M.M., and told
her she was going to “pay for this.”
By the time the police arrived, defendant had left. M.M. reported the incident to
the police but said she did not want to press charges because she feared it would make
him angrier with her. A few days later defendant sent M.M. flowers and chocolates and
apologized. M.M. was hopeful defendant would change and continued living with him
on and off.
F. September 12, 2016 Incident (Counts 12, 13, & 14)
In August 2016, M.M. filed for a restraining order, during which M.M. reported
defendant’s acts of physical abuse summarized above. Defendant repeatedly violated the
restraining order, which prohibited defendant from any contact with M.M., directly or
indirectly.
On September 12, 2016, M.M. took her daughter to Walmart with her two sisters,
Nora and Sally. On their way there, M.M. thought she saw defendant following them but
was not sure. As M.M. and her sisters were leaving the Walmart parking lot in Nora’s
car, another car drove in front of Nora’s car and cut her off. M.M. noticed the car was
defendant’s car and defendant was in the car. M.M. told her sisters the car was
defendant’s car. While defendant was stopped in front of Walmart, Nora drove up to
defendant’s car and Sally told defendant, “‘Stop following us.’” M.M. and her sisters
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then drove away. Defendant called Nora, who had Bluetooth in the car. M.M. heard
defendant say, “‘What the f*** you mean I’m following you guys? You’re not that
f****ing important.’” Nora told him not to call again and hung up. Defendant continued
to call back but Nora did not answer his calls. He then started texting Nora five minutes
later.
G. November 2016 Incidents (Count 11)
On November 2, 2016, M.M. reported to the police that defendant had been
repeatedly calling her and leaving voicemail messages, in violation of the restraining
order. During one call, defendant said, “‘You f***ing bitch.’” During another call, he
left a message stating, “‘You’ll see what’s going to happen bitch.’”
On November 11, 2016, M.M. again reported to the police that defendant had been
sending her text messages, in violation of the restraining order. One such text stated,
“‘We’ll see who is going to laugh last. See what happens to who.’” M.M. testified the
text messages made her feel harassed, threatened, and fearful.
H. Expert Testimony on Domestic Violence
Police Detective Christian Vaughn, who trained officers and professionals in the
field of domestic violence, testified as an expert for the prosecution. He testified
regarding the Power and Control Wheel, which he stated is based on a study of domestic
violence victims. He also testified regarding the Cycle of Violence, which he explained
represents the various stages commonly occurring in domestic violence cases. Detective
Vaughn stated he was familiar with the common characteristics of domestic violence
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abusers described in the Power and Control Wheel. Those behaviors of abusers include
“‘Using Coercion and Threats,’” “‘Using Intimidation,’” “‘Using Emotional Abuse,’”
“‘Using Isolation,’” “‘Using Children,’” and “‘Using Male Privilege.’”
Detective Vaughn further explained that victims of domestic violence do not
always report to the police every incident, and there are no common characteristics of a
domestic violence victim. Detective Vaughn acknowledged that, as an expert witness, he
could not comment on the dynamics of the instant case. He could only provide generic or
general testimony regarding domestic violence.
I. Defense Testimony
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied all of M.M.’s accusations that
he had committed acts of violence against her. He also denied ever keeping M.M. from
her family. Defendant testified the incident M.M. described happening at Marie
Callender’s never happened, and he never had a gun. Defendant denied ever requesting
M.M. to sign any documents at gunpoint. As to the doctor appointment incident, M.M.
threw keys at him, the coffee spilled on both of them, and he followed M.M. in an
attempt to return the keys to M.M. Defendant denied ever putting M.M. in a headlock.
As to the incident two days after their child’s birth, defendant went to MGPs’ home to
take the baby so his family could visit with the child. Defendant stated that, because
M.M. and her family accused him of kidnapping the baby when he tried to take the baby,
he handed the baby to MGM and left. Defendant testified he was not following M.M.
and her sisters to the Walmart and never texted Nora. However, Sheriff’s Deputy
9
Cunanan testified that in September 2016, defendant admitted he had called Nora and
told her he wasn’t following her, and then texted Nora.
Defendant further testified that M.M. threatened to keep their child from him, and
sent him e-mails and texts calling him names, telling him people would always believe a
woman, and telling him he would not be able to see his daughter. Defendant testified
M.M. sent an email stating that she was going to report he hit her and threatened to kill
her and the baby, and she would be happy to see him in prison. In response, M.M. denied
sending defendant the e-mails and texts.
Defendant acknowledged being arrested and convicted in 2005 of possessing
narcotics while in possession of a firearm. M.M. acknowledged being convicted in 2009
of selling methamphetamine and lying to the police about her driver’s license, which had
been suspended. M.M. also admitted that while dating defendant, she had used
methamphetamine but it did not prevent her from remembering the incidents that
occurred during that time.
III.
EVIDENCE OF INTIMATE PARTNER BATTERING
Defendant contends The trial court erred in allowing expert testimony on domestic
violence. We disagree.
A. Procedural Background
The People filed a motion in limine requesting the trial court to permit Detective
Vaughn to testify as an expert on domestic violence. The People stated in their written
10
motion that they intended to use his testimony to educate the jury regarding the Power
and Control Wheel, Cycle of Violence, and domestic violence victims’ common
behaviors, such as victims avoiding or delaying reporting abuse to law enforcement and
victims recanting their initial statements in order to protect the abuser. It was undisputed
Detective Vaughn qualified as a domestic violence expert.
The trial court stated that Detective Vaughn could educate the jury on domestic
violence but could not provide any opinion testimony on whether defendant committed
the charged crimes. The prosecutor agreed and noted Detective Vaughn had not been
involved in the investigation of defendant’s crimes and did not know the parties. The
prosecutor stated that Detective Vaughn’s testimony would assist the jury in determining
M.M.’s credibility and why she delayed reporting most of the incidents right after they
occurred. Defense counsel objected to Detective Vaughn testifying because domestic
violence is not a recognized science and is “just science at best.” Defense counsel
asserted that Detective Vaughn’s testimony would be of de minimis probative value and
prejudicially impugn defendant’s character. After reviewing case law on the subject, the
trial court stated it would review Detective Vaughn’s CV, and assuming it showed he
qualified as an expert, the court would allow his testimony under Evidence Code section
1107, subdivision (a).
At trial, Detective Vaughn testified regarding intimate partner battering, including
discussing common misconceptions and myths about batterers and victims. He stated
that, based on his experience, it is common for domestic violence victims to remain in
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situations they know are bad and it is also common for victims not to report abuse to the
police. Detective Vaughn further discussed the power and control wheel, the cycle of
violence in abusive relationships, and dynamics of power and control. Detective Vaughn
stated typical behaviors used by abusers, including threatening and isolating victims from
their friends and family. Detective Vaughn explained that victims typically attempt to
“keep the peace” to avoid upsetting the abuser. Victims often stay with an abuser out of
love or hope the abuser will change, or because the victim does not want to be
responsible for breaking up their family. Detective Vaughn stated that he did not
investigate or have anything to do with defendant’s case.
B. Law on Admissibility of Domestic Violence Expert Testimony
“‘[T]he scope of rebuttal must be specific.’” (People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691,
715.) Surrebuttal evidence may be presented by the defendant in response to rebuttal
evidence presented by the prosecution. (See People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 504.)
But surrebuttal by a defendant is proper “to rebut only new matter educed by the People.”
(People v. Remington (1925) 74 Cal.App. 371, 376.) And the scope of surrebuttal
evidence may be restricted by the trial court to prevent introduction of repetitive matter
that should have been presented by the defendant in his or her case-in-chief. (Lamb,
supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.)
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C. Analysis
Here, defendant presented his defense case, which included lengthy testimony by
defendant on direct, cross-examination, re-direct, and recross-examination. The trial
court reasonably concluded that the prosecution did not present any new information
during rebuttal that entitled defendant to surrebuttal. Further, defendant has not
demonstrated that any additional surrebuttal testimony or evidence would have
established that his witnesses and theories were more credible than those of the
prosecution. The trial court also reasonably concluded surrebuttal would have been
repetitive, time consuming, and of minimal benefit to the defense. Defendant was given
an opportunity to fully present his defense and received a fair trial. Under such
circumstances, the trial court appropriately avoided unnecessarily prolonging the trial by
denying defendant’s request for surrebuttal.
VI.
FINES AND FEES
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing various fines,
fees, and assessments. Defendant argues the court-ordered fines and fees were improper
because there was no hearing on his ability to pay them and he is unable to pay the court-
ordered fines and fees.
A. Procedural Background
During defendant’s sentencing hearing on July 13, 2018, the court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 12 years in prison. The court followed the probation
30
officer’s recommendations regarding imposing fines and fees, with the exception the 2 court did not order a $10,000 restitution fine or pre-sentence probation report fee.
The trial court ordered defendant to pay the following fines and fees: $1,000
pre-sentence incarceration fee for 41 days of incarceration. The court also ordered
defendant to pay $4,600 in victim restitution and possible future victim restitution claims
related to the case. Defendant did not object during the sentencing hearing to these fines
and fees. There was also no discussion of defendant’s ability to pay the fines and fees.
At the end of the sentencing hearing, defendant’s trial attorney informed the trial court
that defendant’s family would be retaining an attorney to file an appeal on defendant’s
behalf.
On January 8, 2019, Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, was decided. Relying
on Dueñas, on September 9, 2019, defendant filed in the trial court a letter brief
requesting the trial court to vacate its July 13, 2018, fines and fees order under Dueñas.
Defendant argued that the trial court did not consider his ability to pay the fines and fees.
2 Although the minute order for the sentencing hearing states defendant was ordered to pay a pre-sentence probation report fee not to exceed $1,095, the reporter’s transcript shows that the trial court did not order the fee. “Conflicts between the [court] reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be clerical in nature and are resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise.” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 249.) Reconciling the conflict in favor of the reporter’s transcript, we find that the trial court did not order defendant to pay a pre-sentence probation report fee.
31
On September 9, 2019, the trial court ruled that it could not take action on defendant’s
request to vacate the fines and fees order because the trial court had no jurisdiction to
consider the order, because the case was on appeal.
C. Applicable Law
With regard to imposing a restitution fine, the court in People v. Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th 1157, held that, “although Penal Code section 1202.4 bars consideration of a
defendant’s ability to pay unless the judge is considering increasing the fee over the
statutory minimum, the execution of any restitution fine imposed under this statute must
be stayed unless and until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that
the defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.” (Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 1164; but see People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320 [disagreeing
with Dueñas], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Kopp (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 47, 96, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 [“To the extent the Dueñas
court implies that it is the prosecution’s burden to prove that a defendant can pay an
assessment (see id. at p. 1172), we disagree. It is the defendant who bears the burden of
proving an inability to pay.”].)
As to imposing court fees, the court in Dueñas concluded that “due process of law
requires the trial court to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s
present ability to pay before it imposes court facilities and court operations assessments
under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373.” (Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164; but see People v. Hicks, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 329
32
[disagreeing with Dueñas], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Kopp,
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 96-97, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 [“there is no
due process requirement that the court hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing a
punitive fine and only impose the fine if it determines the defendant can afford to pay
it.”].)
D. Analysis
The People argue defendant forfeited his objection to the fines and fees by failing
to raise his objection in the trial court. As to the various court-ordered fees, under
Dueñas the issue was not forfeited by defendant’s failure to object. (See People v.
Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134; but see People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
1126, 1153.) This is because the decision in Dueñas broke with longstanding precedent
in requiring the court to consider ability to pay before imposing statutory minimum
restitution fines and fees, and permitting an appellate challenge absent an objection in the
trial court.
The issue of forfeiture is not as clear cut as to defendant’s $1,000 restitution fine,
because the court-ordered restitution fine exceeded the statutory minimum of $300 for
restitution and parole revocation restitution fines. (Pen. Code, §§ 1202.4, subd. (b),
1202.45.) Therefore, even before Dueñas was decided, there was reason for defendant to
object in the trial court to the $1,000 fine based on inability to pay. Under Penal Code
section 1202.4, subdivision (d), a defendant shall bear the burden of demonstrating his or
her inability to pay a restitution fine exceeding the statutory minimum.
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Unlike the defendant in Dueñas, defendant here had the statutory right to object to
$700 of the $1,000 restitution fine imposed by the court, but did not do so. As such, he
forfeited this claim of error on appeal. (People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027,
1033 (Gutierrez) [noting that “even before Dueñas a defendant had every incentive to
object to imposition of a maximum restitution fine based on inability to pay because
governing law as reflected in the statute (§ 1202.4, subd[s]. (c) [& (d) ] ) expressly
permitted such a challenge”]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154
[noting before Dueñas, an objection to a fine above the statutory minimum would not
have been futile]; People v. Jenkins (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 30, 40.) Nevertheless,
because the court in Dueñas indicates that this matter should be remanded to provide
defendant with an opportunity to address whether he has the ability to pay the court-
ordered fees, the trial court may also consider defendant’s ability to pay the $1,000
restitution fines.
The People argue that any failure to address defendant’s ability to pay the fines
and fees is harmless error because the record demonstrates he has the ability to pay the
fines and fees from his prison earnings and after he completes his 12 year sentence. We
recognize that this court may consider defendant’s prison earnings, in addition to his
ability to work after his release from prison. (People v. Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
1028, 1035; People v. Hennessey (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1830, 1837 [ability to pay
includes a defendant’s ability to obtain prison wages]; Pen. Code, § 2085.5 [outlining
how a restitution fine balance may be collected from prison wages].) However, because
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the issue of ability to pay was not addressed in the trial court, it is not clear from the
record whether defendant will be able to pay the fines and fees from his prison earnings
and post-release employment.
According to the sentencing report, defendant is 38 years old; has a high school
diploma; was unemployed at the time of the charged offenses; previously worked in
construction and as a caretaker for a relative; had a monthly income of $1,200; paid $500
in rent; had a leg injury; and has a four year old daughter. Defendant is required to pay
the $4,600 victim restitution fine and any additional future victim restitution claims,
regardless of his ability to pay, which must be paid before paying the additional court-
ordered fines and fees totaling $3,924.58 ($514.58 + $1,500 + $1,000 + $390 + $520).
We conclude the record does not sufficiently demonstrate that defendant will be
able to pay the court-ordered fines and fees from prison wages or after his release.
Therefore, under Dueñas, defendant is entitled to an ability to pay hearing. Thus, remand
is necessary.
VII.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court order imposing the following fines and fees: $1,000
pre-sentence incarceration cost for 41 days of incarceration. We remand the case to the
trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant is able to
35
pay the court-ordered fines and fees, and also stay execution of the restitution fine unless
and until the People prove that defendant has the present ability to pay it. (Duenas,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1172-1173.) The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In the event the trial court reinstates the same previously ordered fines and fees,
the trial court is directed to amend the July 13, 2018, sentencing minute order and
abstract of judgment to reflect that, according to the reporter’s transcript, the trial court
did not order defendant to pay a pre-sentence probation report fee, not to exceed $1,095.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON Acting P. J.
We concur:
SLOUGH J.
FIELDS J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on intimate partner battering, as it was limited to general, informative discussion and did not constitute improper propensity evidence. However, the court reversed the imposition of fines and fees, remanding for an ability-to-pay hearing pursuant to People v. Dueñas.
Issues
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony on intimate partner battering?
Must the court-ordered fines and fees be reversed and remanded for an ability-to-pay hearing under People v. Dueñas?
Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We reject defendant’s evidentiary challenges but reverse the trial court’s order imposing fines and fees, and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a hearing to determine whether defendant is able to pay the court-ordered fines and fees.”
“Detective Vaughn’s testimony did not address the facts in defendant’s case. Detective Vaughn acknowledged that he could not comment on the dynamics of the case. He noted he could only provide generic or general testimony regarding domestic violence.”