Mendez v. Iglesia de Cristo Ministerios Llamada Final, Inc. CA4/2 (2020) · DecisionDepot
Mendez v. Iglesia de Cristo Ministerios Llamada Final, Inc. CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Oct 2, 2020 No. E072536Unpublished
Filed 10/2/20 Mendez v. Iglesia de Cristo Ministerios Llamada Final, Inc. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CLARA MENDEZ et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, E072536
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1827685)
IGLESIA DE CRISTO MINISTERIOS OPINION LLAMADA FINAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S.
McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
Brown Associates and Victor H. Jaime for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
McKay, De Lorimier & Acain and Paul A. De Lorimier for Defendants and
Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 2018, Clara Mendez, Esther Buzo De Ramirez, Rosio Favela, Ana
Lemus, and Cristina Madrigal (plaintiffs) filed a civil complaint seeking recovery for
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personal injuries incurred in a motor vehicle accident on May 22, 2016. Defendants,
Iglesia de Cristo Ministerios Llamada Final, Inc., and Teresa Dejesus Benitez
(defendants) demurred to the pleading on the ground that plaintiffs’ claims were time-
barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure1
section 335.1. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and
plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, plaintiffs assert the trial court erred because they alleged defendants’
actions violated Vehicle Code sections 26453 and 26454 as well as Civil Code
section 2100 and as such, their action is governed by the three-year statute of limitations
for liabilities created by statute set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338. After
conducting our independent review of the complaint, we find no error and affirm the
judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 24, 2018, plaintiffs filed a civil complaint. The complaint alleged that
on May 22, 2016, plaintiffs were passengers in a church bus owned, operated, or
managed by defendants. Plaintiffs incurred personal injuries when the bus collided with
another vehicle while in operation. The complaint purported to state causes of action for
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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(1) “Violation of Vehicle Code §26453 and §26454(a)”2 and (2) “Violation of Civil Code
§2100”3 arising out of the incident.
On December 10, 2018, defendants filed a demurrer to the complaint and argued
that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred under section 335.1, which provides a two-year
statute of limitations for an action for injury to, or for the death of, an individual by the
wrongful act or neglect of another.
On January 2, 2019, plaintiffs filed an opposition to the demurrer arguing that
their claims were not time-barred because the claims are governed by section 338,
subdivision (a), which provides a three-year statute of limitations for liabilities created by
statute. Plaintiffs further argued that the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense
that cannot be raised on demurrer.
On January 15, 2019, the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the
complaint without leave to amend following hearing and oral argument. A judgment of
dismissal was subsequently entered on March 14, 2019. On April 15, 2019, plaintiffs
appealed from that judgment.
2 Vehicle Code section 26453 provides: “All brakes and component parts [of a vehicle] shall be maintained in good condition and in good working order. The brakes shall be so adjusted as to operate as equally as practicable with respect to the wheels on opposite sides of the vehicle.” Vehicle Code section 26454, subdivision (a), provides: “The service brakes of every motor vehicle or combination of vehicles shall be adequate to control the movement of and to stop and hold the vehicle or combination of vehicles under all conditions of loading.”
3 Civil Code section 2100 provides: “A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”
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III. DISCUSSION
There is no dispute that the complaint alleges defendants’ actions caused plaintiffs
to incur injury on May 22, 2016. Nor do plaintiffs claim any grounds for the tolling of
the statute of limitations in this case. Instead, the sole issue raised on appeal is which
statute of limitations applies to the claims asserted in the complaint. We agree with
respondents that the applicable statute of limitations is two years as set forth in
section 335.1, and therefore affirm the judgment.
A. General Legal Principles & Standard of Review
“ ‘Because a demurrer both tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and
involves the trial court’s discretion, an appellate court employs two separate standards of
review on appeal. [Citation.] . . . Appellate courts first review the complaint de novo to
determine whether or not the [] complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action
under any legal theory, [citation], or in other words, to determine whether or not the trial
court erroneously sustained the demurrer as a matter of law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘Second, if a trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend, appellate courts
determine whether or not the plaintiff could amend the complaint to state a cause of
action. [Citation.]’ ” (Total Call Internat. Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co. (2010) 181
Here, the complaint on its face alleged that plaintiffs incurred personal injuries on
May 22, 2016, as the result of a motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs alleged defendants
were liable for these injuries “as a result of improper maintenance and multiple
mechanical deficiencies and due to driver negligence.” Thus, the complaint on its face
alleges personal injury arising from the wrongful act or negligence of defendants. A
claim for injury to an individual “caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must
be brought within two years. (§ 335.1.) Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until
October 24, 2018, and as such, the complaint shows on its face that the claims are
untimely. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to sustain
defendants’ demurrer.
C. The Statutory Violations Alleged Do Not Transform the Claim into a Liability
Created by Statute
Plaintiffs argue that the applicable statute of limitations should be three years
under section 338 because they alleged defendants’ actions violated various statutory
provisions of the Vehicle Code and Civil Code. We disagree.
“ ‘To determine the statute of limitations which applies to a cause of action it is
necessary to identify the nature of the cause of action, i.e., the “gravamen” of the cause of
action.’ [Citation.] The nature of the cause of action and the primary right involved, not
the form or label of the cause of action or the relief demanded, determine which statute of
limitations applies. [Citations.]” (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 412.) Thus, we
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look not to the labels used by plaintiffs in the pleading, but rather to the nature of the
underlying right at issue.
Reference to a statutory violation on its own does not determine whether the
underlying right at issue is a liability created by statute. Generally, “ ‘[a] violation of a
state statute does not necessarily give rise to a private cause of action.’ ” (Vasquez v.
Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 84, 90.) Instead, “[a] cause of action is
based upon a liability created by statute ‘only where the liability is embodied in a
statutory provision and was of a type which did not exist at common law.’ [Citations.]”
(Jackson v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1320, italics
omitted.)
California courts have long held that “[a]n owner or operator of a motor vehicle
has both a statutory and common law duty to use reasonable and ordinary care, by
properly maintaining the motor vehicle, to prevent an increase in the chances of inflicting
injury on others by use of the vehicle. [Citations.]” (Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Paseman
(1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 958, 965.) However, the statutory basis for such duty arises from
the general negligence principles embodied in Civil Code section 1714. (See Cabral v.
Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774 [“the general duty to take ordinary care
in the conduct of one’s activities . . . indisputably applies to the operation of a motor
vehicle”].) As our Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, Civil Code section 1714 was
merely a codification of common law principles. (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d
804, 814 [Civil Code section 1714 is “declarative of the common law”]; Goonewardene
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v. ADP, LLC (2019) 6 Cal.5th 817, 827 [Civil Code as originally enacted codified “then-
existing common law rules”].)
Here, the gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim is the right to be free from injury caused by
the negligence of defendants in the operation and maintenance of the church bus.
California authorities make clear that defendants’ duty to use reasonable care in the
maintenance or operation of their church bus to avoid injury to another is a duty that
arises from the common law. As such, plaintiffs’ claim is not a liability created by
statute. While subsequent statutes which regulate defendants’ conduct in the use,
maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle may implicate the standard of care
applicable to determine the reasonableness of defendants’ actions, these statutes do not
create any new liability. Instead, these statutes guide the determination of whether the
defendants failed to use reasonable care with respect to an already existing duty.4
Plaintiffs’ reference to such statutes do not transform the gravamen of their action into a
“liability created by statute” entitled to the longer statute of limitations period set forth in
section 338.
D. Plaintiffs Have Not Met Their Burden to Show an Abuse of Discretion
Finally, plaintiffs contend the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the
demurrer without leave to amend. We find no abuse of discretion on this record.
4 See Alcala v. Vazmar Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 747, 755-756 [Vehicle Code is relevant to the doctrine of negligence per se which “ ‘means that the court has adopted the conduct prescribed by the statute as the standard of care for a reasonable person in the circumstances’ ”]. See also Webster v. Ebright (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 784, 787 [Civil Code section 2100 codifies previous common law principles imposing a heightened duty of care for common carriers].
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“[N]otwithstanding the liberal policy favoring amendment of complaints, upon
sustaining a demurrer to a first amended complaint, the court may deny leave to amend
when the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the possibility of amendments curing the first
amended complaint’s defects. [Citation.]” (Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 564, 579.) “ ‘To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff “must show in
what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal
effect of his pleading.” [Citation.] The assertion of an abstract right to amend does not
satisfy this burden. . . . Allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or
conclusionary. . . . Where the appellant offers no allegations to support the possibility of
amendment . . . there is no basis for finding the trial court abused its discretion when it
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. [Citations.]’ ” (Ibid., citing Rakestraw v.
California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43-44.)
Here, plaintiffs have not set forth in their opening brief any specific facts which
they claim can be added to the complaint to overcome the statute of limitations defense to
their cause of action. Nor have plaintiffs attached a proposed amended complaint for our
consideration. This is not surprising considering the trial court specifically asked
plaintiffs at the time of oral argument to provide any additional facts they believed could
be added to cure the defect and plaintiffs were unable to articulate any specific facts they
desired to add. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show an abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s denial of leave to amend, and we see no reason to reverse the judgment on
this ground.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
FIELDS J. We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MENETREZ J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident is governed by the two-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1, rather than the three-year statute for liabilities created by statute, because the underlying duty of care is rooted in common law negligence.
Issues
Whether a personal injury claim based on alleged statutory violations of the Vehicle Code and Civil Code constitutes a 'liability created by statute' subject to a three-year statute of limitations.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend when the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how they could cure the pleading defects.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The nature of the cause of action and the primary right involved, not the form or label of the cause of action or the relief demanded, determine which statute of limitations applies.”
“A claim for injury to an individual “caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another” must be brought within two years.”
“Plaintiffs’ reference to such statutes do not transform the gravamen of their action into a “liability created by statute” entitled to the longer statute of limitations period set forth in section 338.”