Stearns v. Chiang CA4/1

Filed 9/28/20 Stearns v. Chiang CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD STEARNS, D075810

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2016- 00025595-CU-BC-CTL) CHARLES CHIANG,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Timothy B. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed. Small Law and William F. Small for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent. I INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Richard Stearns and Defendant Charles Chiang entered into an oral agreement requiring Stearns to refer a financial lender to Chiang in return for a finder’s fee. Stearns referred a suitable lender to Chiang, but Chiang did not pay the promised finder’s fee to Stearns. Stearns filed suit

against Chiang for breach of contract and, after a one-day bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Stearns. Chiang appeals the judgment. He asserts Stearns acted at all times relevant to the dispute as an agent of Stearns’s company, Thornton & Stearns, Inc. dba Carmel Valley Capital (Carmel Valley Capital). Because Stearns allegedly acted as a mere agent of Carmel Valley Capital, Chiang contends Stearns was not a real party in interest with standing to pursue the breach of contract cause of action against Chiang. We reject Chiang’s contention and affirm the judgment. II BACKGROUND Stearns and co-plaintiff Jason Kishaba filed a single cause of action for breach of contract against Chiang and related corporate entities. They alleged the defendants desired to refinance commercial real estate in or about November 2015. The parties allegedly entered into an oral agreement whereby the plaintiffs would seek out and refer funding sources to the defendants in exchange for a specified percentage of any refinancing loan the defendants obtained as a result of the plaintiffs’ efforts. According to the plaintiffs, they referred a funding source to the defendants and the defendants obtained a refinancing loan from the funding source; however, the defendants never paid the plaintiffs the agreed-upon finder’s fee. The case proceeded to a one-day bench trial. After the plaintiffs’ case in chief, the defendants moved for judgment of nonsuit under Code of Civil