Marentes v. Impac Funding Corp. CA4/2

Filed 9/11/20 Marentes v. Impac Funding Corp. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

RENE MARENTES et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G057616

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00565615)

IMPAC FUNDING CORPORATION, OPINION

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kim Garlin Dunning and Peter J. Wilson, Judges. Affirmed. Kabateck and Brian S. Kabateck, Shant A. Karnikian; The Ehrlich Law Firm and Jeffrey I. Ehrlich for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rutan & Tucker, Bradley A. Chapin, Allina M. Amuchie, and Lucas K. Hori for Defendant and Respondent.

Rene and Martha Marentes (the Marenteses) appeal from the trial court’s judgment for Impac Funding Corporation (IFC) on the Marenteses’ Unfair Competition Law (UCL) claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200.1 In the first phase of a three-phase trial, the trial court ruled the proper measure of restitution was the time value theory of money. The sole issue on appeal is whether that decision was made in error. We conclude it was not and affirm the judgment. FACTS A detailed recitation of the substantive facts can be found in our prior nonpublished opinion, Marentes et al. v. Impac Funding Corporation (May 23, 2014, G047973 [nonpub. opn.] (Marentes I). Suffice it to say, on two occasions, the Marenteses paid IFC an “upfront fee” to modify their home loan before their mortgage loan modifications were completed. The modifications resulted in lower payments for the Marenteses. As relevant here, the Marenteses filed a first amended class action complaint against IFC alleging one cause of action for violating the UCL. IFC filed a demurrer. The trial court sustained IFC’s demurrer without leave to amend. In Marentes I, supra, G047973, we reversed the judgment. We concluded IFC violated Civil Code section 2944.7, subdivision (a), by charging the upfront fees and the Marenteses had standing based on their factual allegation they lost money and/or credit for six months, i.e., the time value of money theory. After remand, the trial court, Judge Kim Garlin Dunning, certified a class of all California residents who paid a loan modification fee to IFC from October 11, 2009, to the date the class was notified. The parties stipulated to bifurcate trial on various issues.