California Court of Appeal Aug 25, 2020 No. D075618Unpublished
Filed 8/25/20 P. v. Mann CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D075618
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD274733)
CHHAYNAT MANN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David M. Gill, Judge. Affirmed.
Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Chhaynat Mann punched a man during a fist fight and, about a week
later, fired a gun at the man’s car while they were both driving. A .45-caliber
hollow point bullet lodged in the car. During their investigation of these
incidents, police officers discovered that Mann possessed a collection of
semiautomatic gun paraphernalia and .45-caliber hollow point ammunition
3 Count 3 was charged as an alternative to count 1. The jury was instructed that Mann could not be convicted of both counts 1 and 3 and that it must determine whether Mann personally used a firearm as to each crime. 7
During pretrial motions, the court decided to exclude evidence of
alleged prior uncharged misconduct by victim 1. In addition, the court
declined to grant Mann’s wife immunity from prosecution for any crimes she
might incriminate herself in if she were to testify as a defensive witness.
These rulings are discussed further, post.
At trial in January 2019, the jury heard testimony regarding the events
we have described, including from the victims, the person who purchased the
SUV from Mann, and police officers involved in the investigation. The jury
viewed surveillance videos (including footage of Mann in the SUV’s driver
seat), pictures taken by victim 1, and heard detailed expert testimony from a
criminalist (regarding firearms and ballistics) and an investigator trained
and experienced with firearms and cell tower analysis. The parties
stipulated that Mann was previously convicted of a felony.
The People’s experts testified that the only kind of handguns
manufactured by Glock were semiautomatic handguns, and .45-caliber
rounds were most commonly used in semiautomatic weapons. The fired
bullet found in the victims’ car possessed a particular pattern on it that was
consistent with being fired from a Glock semiautomatic weapon equipped
with an after-market barrel. No specialized tools were needed to equip or
modify a Glock’s standard barrel with an after-market barrel. Further, the
8
Glock magazines found in Mann’s bedroom were designed for use in
semiautomatic weapons and were not used in revolvers.4
Mann testified in his own defense. According to Mann, victim 1 lunged
at him first during the fist fight, causing Mann to punch victim 1 in self-
defense. Mann denied kicking the car door. As to the freeway shooting, he
acknowledged that both he and the victims were on the onramp at the same
time but denied shooting at the victims’ car and stated that he took a
different route home (the Interstate 15 freeway) because he thought victim 1
was experiencing “road rage.” Mann admitted he possessed ammunition and
various gun paraphernalia, which had been in his home for “a while.” He
claimed not to own or possess any firearms. He said he had only gone
shooting in the past with other people’s guns and that the “thing” he told his
wife to “get rid of” during his jailhouse call was an airbag system.
The jury convicted Mann of counts 1, 2, 5, and 6 as charged, and, with
respect to the fist fight, simple assault as a lesser included offense of assault
with a deadly weapon. The jury also found the personal-use-of-firearm
allegations to be true.
4 A revolver is not a semiautomatic weapon. It has a revolving cylinder with multiple chambers that cartridges are loaded into. The design of the revolver limits its ammunition capacity compared to a semiautomatic weapon, which draws cartridges from an external magazine that is inserted into the firearm. 9
In March 2019, the court sentenced Mann to a total of 17 years and
four months in prison, as follows: six years for count 1 plus a 10-year
personal gun use enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and eight consecutive
months on both counts 5 and 6. The court stayed its sentence on count 2
under section 654 and imposed a sentence of time served on count 4. The
court further imposed various fines, fees, and assessments.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports Conviction for Assault with a Semiautomatic Firearm
Mann contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction on
count 1. He does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support an
assault with a firearm, but rather specifically argues there is not substantial
evidence to show that a semiautomatic firearm was used. He points to the
fact that no semiautomatic firearm was found in his home and no one directly
saw him using one.
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v.
Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) “Substantial evidence includes
10
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn” therefrom. (In
re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126.) The character of a weapon
used by the defendant may be shown by circumstantial evidence. (People v.
Green (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 514, 517 [gun use established through victim’s
testimony that she “felt” a gun placed on her head and two bullets found in
defendant’s pocket]; People v. Liner (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 411, 414
[dangerous/deadly weapon use established through victim’s testimony that he
believed he was hit by a blunt object and evidence of injury].)
If sufficient evidence supports a finding, it is irrelevant that the
evidence is also reasonably susceptible to a different finding. (People v.
Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750.) Put another way, we may not set aside a
finding for insufficiency of evidence unless it appears that under no
hypothesis is there sufficient evidence to support it. (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
In this case, substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Mann
committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm. It is uncontested on appeal
that Mann fired a .45-caliber gun of some kind at the victims. The firearms
expert testified that .45-caliber ammunition was most commonly used in
semiautomatic weapons and that Glock only manufactured handguns that
were semiautomatic. Mann had numerous Glock gun paraphernalia and .45-
caliber ammunition within easy reach around his bedroom, compellingly
11
pointing to his recent possession of a semiautomatic firearm. There is no
evidence that Mann ever used a revolver. Moreover, he was conversant in
firearms and had an appreciation for their nuances; he could have readily
modified the barrel of a Glock. It is not surprising that the firearm used in
the shooting was not recovered since Mann directed his wife to “get rid of it
ASAP.” The jury could reasonably infer that he possessed a semiautomatic
firearm equipped with an after-market barrel, used it to shoot at the victims,
and disposed of the gun afterward.
Although theoretically possible that Mann possessed an array of Glock
gun accessories (including Glock gun carriers and cleaning mat) but no
corresponding gun, the jury did not find such a theory plausible. Mann’s
explanations were unbelievable, and at times, outlandish. He claimed he
owned a Glock gun case to merely hold Glock magazines (but not a gun), yet
also testified that the magazines belonged to a friend, so in essence, he
claimed to own multiple gun cases to hold someone else’s ammunition. When
asked why he had a “Glock gun cleaning mat” in his home if he had no gun,
Mann stammered that the mat was “nice to have.” He could not explain why
he had a Glock concealment holster. We see no basis to reverse his conviction
on count one. (People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552, 561 [“We may not
set aside the trial court judgment for insufficiency of evidence unless it
12
clearly appears that under no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support it.”].)
II. No Abuse of Discretion in Excluding Evidence of Victim 1’s Uncharged Prior Conduct
Mann contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of uncharged
misconduct by victim 1. We provide further background and analysis below.
A. Further Background
In January 2017, victim 1 was allegedly involved in a domestic incident
with his wife. According to her report at the time, they had an argument
during which he pushed her and kicked a door. She suffered no injuries.
Victim 1 denied the conduct and claimed that victim 2 had thrown pizza at
him. Victim 1 was arrested for two misdemeanor offenses—spousal battery
(§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A))—but no charges
were filed.
The People moved in limine to exclude evidence of victim 1’s uncharged
conduct under Evidence Code section 352, and conversely, Mann moved to
introduce the evidence under Evidence Code section 1103 and because the
conduct involved moral turpitude. Both parties essentially agreed that
victim 1 could only be impeached with his underlying conduct and not the
criminal offenses since he was not charged. Further, the court remarked that
the conduct could theoretically involve moral turpitude. The prosecutor
13
argued that introducing evidence of the domestic incident would involve a
time-consuming “he said, she said” mini-trial, and even if victim 2 was
believed, victim 1’s “push with no injury” in the particular context was of “so
little probative value.” Mann’s counsel argued that the conduct would show
that victim 1 had a “character for violence and aggression.”
After considering counsel’s arguments and conducting a weighing
process, the court decided not to admit evidence of victim 1’s conduct. The
court noted that misdemeanor spousal battery and vandalism might be
crimes of moral turpitude and potentially used for impeachment, but on
balance, found that victim 1’s conduct was of “minimal probative value” and
should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
B. Analysis
“Evidence Code section 1103 authorizes the defense in a criminal case
to offer evidence of the victim’s character to prove his conduct [in conformity
with the character] at the time of the charged crime. Consequently, in a
prosecution for a homicide or an assaultive crime where self-defense is raised,
evidence of the violent character of the victim is admissible to show that the
victim was the aggressor.” (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442,
446 (Shoemaker) [internal footnotes omitted].) Such evidence may be
presented in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of
specific instances of conduct. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a).)
14
Additionally, evidence of crimes or misconduct involving moral
turpitude, i.e., moral depravity, may be admitted for impeachment.
“Misconduct involving moral turpitude may suggest a willingness to lie.”
(People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 295 (Wheeler).)
Nonetheless, the trial court has discretion under Evidence Code section
352 to exclude character or impeachment evidence if “ ‘its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.’ ”
(Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 448; Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
pp. 296-297 [because “impeachment evidence other than felony convictions
entails problems of proof, unfair surprise, and moral turpitude evaluation
which felony convictions do not present,” weighing process must be conducted
with great care].)
“Absent a clear showing of abuse, we are compelled to uphold the trial
court’s exercise of discretion under [Evidence Code] section 352.”
(Shoemaker, supra, 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 449; see also People v. Hillhouse
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 495-496.)
We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of the domestic incident between victim 1 and his wife. It was
either unclear or untrue that the proffered evidence would show victim 1 to
15
be a violent aggressor consistent with Mann’s theory of self-defense. For
example, victim 2 might have initiated a fight by throwing pizza at her
husband, and he, in the process of trying to stop her, might have inflicted a
noninjury causing “push.” Moreover, the context was seemingly quite
different—a private dispute at home versus an unprovoked attack on a male
stranger in a place of employment. As to the fist fight, both victims were
consistent and aligned in their statements that Mann was the initial
aggressor, which is supported by evidence of the deep cut on victim 1’s face
while Mann was completely uninjured. In short, the probative value of the
evidence was minimal on the issue whether victim 1 was a violent aggressor
against Mann or generally willing to lie. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
On the other hand, introducing such character evidence would be time-
consuming and involve an incident having no apparent connection to the
charged offenses. The jury would be required to delve into domestic issues
between victims 1 and 2, and, the victims might not recall the minutiae of the
dispute, in which case, it would have little or no probative value. The
evidence would undoubtedly distract the jury from consideration of the
circumstances surrounding the charged crimes. In light of the weak
probative value of the proffered evidence and danger that it would be unduly
16
time-consuming and confusing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the evidence.5
III. No Error In Refusing to Grant Immunity to Mann’s Wife
During pretrial proceedings, Mann indicated that he wished to call his
wife as a witness. She was counseled about her right against self-
incrimination. Mann’s wife faced potential criminal liability for some of her
actions in the case, and she was concerned about incriminating herself by
testifying. No charges had yet been filed against her, and the prosecutor
refused to grant her or any witness immunity from prosecution. Likewise,
the court declined to grant her immunity.
At trial, when called as a defensive witness, Mann’s wife refused to
testify by invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Later, the issue of immunity for her was discussed once again, with the court
reiterating its decision that it was not inclined to grant immunity assuming it
had some inherent authority to do so in extraordinary cases.
On appeal, Mann argues the trial court erred in failing to grant
immunity to his wife. The People respond that, although earlier cases
entertained the notion that California trial courts might have inherent
authority to grant immunity, our Supreme Court has more recently held that
5 It is unnecessary for us to address whether misdemeanor spousal battery and vandalism constituted crimes of moral turpitude. 17
trial courts do not have such authority. (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th
1019, 1051 (Masters) [“California courts have no authority to confer use
immunity on witnesses”]; see People v. Hull (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1023
(Hull) [following Masters].) Granting immunity is solely within the executive
branch’s prosecutorial discretion. (Masters, at p. 1051; Hull, at p. 1023.) In
his reply brief, Mann concedes that Masters is binding precedent on the trial
court. Thus, under Masters, the court did not err.
Moreover, even if the court had inherent authority to grant immunity,
we would conclude it did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant
immunity to Mann’s wife. (See, e.g., People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425,
468-469 (Stewart) [setting forth test for conferring judicial immunity
assuming trial courts have inherent authority]; United States v. Straub (9th
Cir. 2008) 538 F.3d 1147, 1162 (Straub) [grant of immunity required to
preserve defendant’s due process right to a fair trial].) Under Stewart,
granting judicial immunity is not appropriate where, as here, there is a
strong countervailing governmental interest. (Stewart, at p. 469.) As the
prosecutor pointed out, if Mann’s wife was granted immunity, she could
testify that she was the shooter since she was in the SUV at the time, casting
doubt on the People’s case against Mann yet evade prosecution herself. (See
ibid. [if witness may have been the culprit, then strong governmental interest
exists in not granting that witness immunity].) Also, the elements present in
18
Straub are lacking in this case, including the Straub prosecution’s selective
grant of immunity to a favorable witness but not to a defense witness who
would directly contradict the immunized witness. (Straub, at p. 1162.) Mann
has failed to establish trial court error.
IV. No Error in Giving Flight Instruction (CALCRIM No. 372)
Over Mann’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury on flight as
follows: “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed,
that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that
the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of
that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove guilt
by itself.” (CALCRIM No. 372.) On appeal, Mann argues the jury instruction
was unsupported by the evidence because he remained on public streets after
the freeway shooting and was not fleeing police.
“In general, a flight instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows
that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting
that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.’ ” (People v.
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055.) “Evidence that a defendant left the
scene is not alone sufficient; instead, the circumstances of departure must
suggest ‘a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.’ [Citations.] To
obtain the instruction, the prosecution need not prove the defendant in fact
fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, only that a jury could find the
19
defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt from the
evidence.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328.)
Here, the jury could infer from Mann’s actions that he fled the crime
scene to avoid detection and/or arrest and thus, permissibly infer
consciousness of guilt. Substantial evidence supports that Mann took an
unnecessary and unusual deviation from his normal driving route right after
the freeway shooting. He admitted as much. The circuitous route Mann took
did not align with his own explanation about “road rage” concerns since he
could have simply pulled over or gotten off the Interstate 805 freeway, waited
a few minutes, and stayed on the same freeway. It did not make sense for
Mann to drive many miles out of the way, considering that he and his wife
were in the process of completing their deliveries.
Even were we to conclude that the instruction should not have been
given, it was clearly harmless. The instruction did not assume that flight
was established but left that factual determination and its significance to the
jury. (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60; see also People v. Hernandez
Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 [CALCRIM No. 372 does not
“impermissibly presume[] the existence of his guilt [or] lower[] the
prosecution’s burden of proof”].) Mann has failed to establish instructional
error.
20
V. No Sentencing Error on Count 5
Mann contends the trial court erred in failing to stay its consecutive 8-
month sentence on count 5 (felon in possession of a firearm) under section
654. He argues that he possessed a firearm only as a means to commit an
assault with a semiautomatic weapon (count 1), for which he was also
convicted and sentenced. In other words, Mann claims his firearm possession
and assault offenses were a single course of conduct and shared the same
objective. We disagree.
Under section 654, a defendant may not be punished more than once
for a single act or for a course of conduct comprising indivisible acts.
Divisibility of a course of conduct depends on the intent and objective of the
actor. “ ‘[I]f all the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of
accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have
harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.’ ” (People
v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1142-1143 (Jones).) “However, if the
defendant harbored ‘multiple or simultaneous objectives, independent of and
not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each
violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations
share common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 1143.)
21
“Whether section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for the
trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination.
[Citations.] Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any
substantial evidence to support them.” (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1143.)
In Jones, the court distilled the following legal principle: “[S]ection 654
is inapplicable when the evidence shows that the defendant arrived at the
scene of his or her primary crime already in possession of the firearm.”
(Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.) The court analyzed multiple cases
involving defendants who had been sentenced for both a firearm possession
offense and some other, usually assault-type offense. (Ibid.; see People v.
Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1412-1413 (Ratcliff) [section 654 did not
apply where defendant committed two robberies one hour and a half apart,
and half hour later, was still in possession of the handgun]; People v.
wrested away an officer’s revolver and then immediately used it to shoot at
the officer]; People v. Venegas (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [section 654
applied where evidence showed that defendant obtained gun from the victim
during a struggle moments before shooting the victim in a bar].) In Jones,
separate punishments were affirmed where the defendant drove by a
woman’s home in possession of a firearm and then shot at the woman’s home.
22
(Jones, at pp. 1142, 1147.) The court reasoned that “Jones committed two
separate acts: arming himself with a firearm, and shooting at an inhabited
dwelling.” (Id. at p. 1147.)
In this case, substantial evidence demonstrates that Mann engaged in
two acts with distinct objectives: (1) possessing a semiautomatic firearm and
(2) committing an assault with the firearm. As in Jones, Mann necessarily
possessed a firearm in the SUV for some period of time before committing the
freeway shooting. It took him well over an hour to travel from his home to
the distribution warehouse and complete the newspaper loading process,
during which time he had a firearm in his possession. He then used that
firearm to assault the victims. The Glock gun paraphernalia and
ammunition (and by inference, the gun itself) came from Mann’s home; this is
not a case where the “firearm came into the defendant’s possession
fortuitously ‘at the instant of committing another offense. . . .’ ” (Jones,
supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145, quoting Ratcliff.) The trial court did not
err in imposing punishment on both counts 1 and 5.6
6 Mann argues for the first time in his reply brief that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on unanimity, without which the jury purportedly did not reach unanimity on when he possessed a firearm. The argument is forfeited. (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 [“arguments made for the first time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other party”].) In any event, there was no error. The jury was instructed that the crime charged in count 5 occurred on or about November 30, 2017, and the prosecutor argued one theory of when 23
VI. Imposition of Fines, Fees, and Assessments
On January 8, 2019, People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas), was filed. In that case, the court held that the challenged fines,
fees, and assessments could not be imposed under the due process clause
without considering the defendant’s ability to pay. (Id. at p. 1172.)
On March 21, 2019, Mann’s sentencing hearing was held. Without
objection from defense counsel, the trial court imposed certain fines, fees, and
assessments recommended by the probation department, including (1) a
$10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), the statutory maximum; (2) a
suspended matching parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45); (3) $160 court
fee (Gov. Code, § 29550.1) (collectively, fines and fees).
Relying on Dueñas, Mann claims that the fines and fees were
erroneously imposed because the trial court did not determine his ability to
pay. He requests we vacate the fines and fees or remand the matter for the
trial court to determine his ability to pay. Mann admits his defense counsel
failed to object at trial.
the possession offense occurred—on or about November 30, 2017, in connection with the freeway shooting. On this record, the jurors necessarily agreed at least that Mann possessed a firearm in his SUV before the freeway shooting. 24
The People respond that the claim is forfeited, and we agree. Because
Mann failed to raise the issue below, and Dueñas had already been decided,
he has forfeited his appellate challenge. (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155 [Dueñas challenge forfeited by failure to object
to fines and assessments at sentencing]; People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 [same]; People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227
(Nelson) [inability to pay a maximum restitution fine forfeited by failure to
object].)
Mann invites this court to nevertheless consider his challenge based on
his argument that Dueñas announced a new constitutional principle and he is
presenting a pure issue of law, causing no prejudice to the People were we to
consider it. His arguments are not convincing. Mann had actual or
constructive knowledge of any new legal principles announced in Dueñas.
(Boehm v. Spreckels (1920) 183 Cal. 239, 248 [“Everyone is presumed to know
the law”].) Unlike other cases he cites, Mann’s sentencing hearing occurred
after the Dueñas opinion was issued. In addition, he is not presenting a
purely legal claim on appeal; vacating the imposed fines and fees requires
some factual basis that he is unable to pay. (Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th 198,
227 [no evidence of defendant’s inability to pay foreclosed his claim on the
merits].)
25
Dueñas was based on an indigent defendant under arguably
exceptional factual circumstances. (See People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
47, 94 [“In Dueñas, the defendant was an indigent, homeless mother of two,
who subsisted on public aid while suffering from cerebral palsy.”].) Here,
Mann does not claim to be indigent nor is there any indication in the record
that he is. He was represented by retained counsel at trial, testified to
owning eight vehicles, appeared to be able bodied, and earned a steady
income for at least 13 years preceding trial. We decline to consider the
forfeited claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
26
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that substantial evidence supported the conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings. The court further held that trial courts lack inherent authority to grant judicial immunity to witnesses and that the defendant's separate sentences for assault and firearm possession were proper.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim's prior uncharged conduct.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant immunity to a defense witness.
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight (CALCRIM No. 372).
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that Mann committed assault with a semiautomatic firearm.”