People v. Cooper CA2/1

Filed 8/21/20 P. v. Cooper CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B293044

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NA094945) v.

MARK COOPER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Reversed and remanded for resentencing. David L. Annicchiarico, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen and Blythe J. Leszkay, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. ____________________

This is defendant Mark Cooper’s second appeal following his convictions for first degree murder and eight other offenses. In his first appeal, we reversed two of his nine convictions and one firearm enhancement, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. We directed the trial court to, inter alia, consider whether to exercise its newly enacted discretion to strike some or all of the remaining firearm enhancements. While Cooper’s first appeal was pending before us, the trial court held a hearing at which it increased Cooper’s custody credits, imposed fines it had not imposed orally at his original sentencing, and declined to strike his firearm enhancements. Cooper appeals from those orders. The parties agree the trial court was without jurisdiction to modify the sentence while Cooper’s appeal was pending. The Attorney General argues that remand for resentencing is unnecessary, however, primarily because the trial court made clear that it would not strike the enhancements even with proper jurisdiction. Our decision in the first appeal, however, vacated Cooper’s sentence in its entirety. The trial court has not yet had the opportunity to reevaluate Cooper’s sentence in light of our decision in the first appeal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with our earlier decision.