Hanna v. Little League Baseball (2020) · DecisionDepot
Hanna v. Little League Baseball
California Court of Appeal Aug 18, 2020 No. E070995Published
Filed 8/18/20 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHAEL JAMES HANNA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E070995, E071457
v. (Super.Ct.No. MCC1701055)
LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Angel M. Bermudez,
Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Michael James Hanna, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker and Daniel J. Taylor for Defendant
and Respondent.
The trial court declared plaintiff Michael Hanna to be a vexatious litigant under
several subparts of Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b).1 As a result of
*Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exceptions of parts A. through E. of the DISCUSSION.
1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
1
that determination and the trial court’s additional finding that Hanna was not reasonably
likely to succeed on the merits of this action, Hanna was ordered to furnish a $100,000
security bond. The trial court also imposed a prefiling restriction on Hanna in future
litigation, requiring Hanna to seek permission from the presiding justice or presiding
appealable].) Those orders did, however, become reviewable on appeal from the final
5
judgment, from which Hanna appealed. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1); County of Nevada v.
Kinicki (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.) Consequently, the issues that Hanna raises in
his opening brief all concern orders that are properly before us, so we reject Little
League’s contention that the grounds for the appeal are “not readily apparent.” We
therefore exercise our discretion to disregard Hanna’s noncompliance with the rules of
court.
B. Vexatious Litigant Statutory Scheme
“The vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391–391.7) are designed to curb misuse of the
court system by those persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedly litigating the
same issues through groundless actions, waste the time and resources of the court system
and other litigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169 (Shalant); Bravo
v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 220-221.) Section 391, subdivision (b), lists four
ways in which a person can qualify as a “vexatious litigant.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1)-(4).)
As relevant here, a “vexatious litigant” is defined as a person who “[i]n the immediately
preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria
persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been . . .
finally determined adversely to the person . . . .” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).) “‘Litigation’” is
defined as including “any civil action or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending
in any state or federal court.” (§ 391, subd. (a).) “A litigation includes an appeal or civil
writ proceeding filed in an appellate court.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
402, 406 (Garcia).) “A litigation is finally determined adversely to a plaintiff if he does
6
not win the action or proceeding he began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissed
by a plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
The “vexatious litigant statutes provide courts and nonvexatious litigants with two
distinct and complementary sets of remedies. In pending litigation, a defendant may have
the plaintiff declared a vexatious litigant and, if the plaintiff has no reasonable probability
of prevailing, ordered to furnish security. If the plaintiff fails to furnish the security, the
action will be dismissed. (§§ 391.1–391.6.) In addition, a potential defendant may
prevent the vexatious litigant plaintiff from filing any new litigation in propria persona by
obtaining a prefiling order and, if any new litigation is inadvertently permitted to be filed
in propria persona without the presiding judge’s permission, may then obtain its
dismissal. (§ 391.7.)” (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)
“The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether a person is a
vexatious litigant. Review of the order is accordingly limited and the Court of Appeal
will uphold the ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. Because the trial court is
best suited to receive evidence and hold hearings on the question of a party’s
vexatiousness, we presume the order declaring a litigant vexatious is correct and imply
findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
616, 636 (Golin); Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1169 (Fink).) We also
will uphold the trial court’s determination that the vexatious litigant does not have a
chance of success in the action if that determination is supported by substantial evidence.
(Golin, supra, at p. 636; Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) The trial court
weighs conflicting evidence and is not required to assume the truth of the allegations.
7
(Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson LLP (2007) 40 Cal.4th 780, 782, 786
(Moran).)
C. Substantial Evidence Supporting Vexatious Litigant Determination
Hanna contends that there was not substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s
determination under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), that he as a pro se litigant had
commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least five civil actions in the preceding seven
years that had been finally determined adversely to him. We do not agree.2
Little League presented evidence of 14 civil actions in which Hanna represented
himself as a plaintiff or a defendant from 2009 through 2018. The vexatious litigant
motion was filed in May 2018, so the relevant seven-year period begins in May 2011.
(Stolz v. Bank of America (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 217, 224.) On appeal, Hanna concedes
that one of the lawsuits—Hanna et al. v. State Farm General Insurance Co. et al.
(E052055, app. dismissed Jan. 10, 2012)—qualifies under the statute. We agree as to the
appeal in that action. Hanna commenced the action pro se in 2009, and it was dismissed
in August 2010, before the start of the relevant seven-year period under section 391,
subdivision (b)(1). Hanna’s pro se appeal in that action, however, was not dismissed
until January 2012. The appeal therefore was maintained during the relevant seven-year
period and qualifies as one of the five civil actions adversely determined against Hanna
2 Hanna requests that we judicially notice the declaration and accompanying exhibits that he filed in the trial court in support of his motion for reconsideration of the order declaring him a vexatious litigant. We deny the request. Hanna does not challenge any aspect of the trial court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, so the documents are not relevant.
8
as a pro se litigant in that period. (Garcia, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 406 [litigation
under § 391, subd. (b)(1), includes appeals].) The question remains whether at least four
of the remaining 13 actions qualify. Hanna contends that none of them does.
We conclude that there is substantial evidence that at least four of the remaining
13 cases qualify under section 391, subdivision (b)(1). Those cases are (1) Hanna v. Hall
et al. (C.D.Cal., Sept. 8, 2015, No. EDCV15-MC-00009-UA (DTB) (Hall); (2) Hanna v.
Hemet Youth Baseball, Inc. (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2015, No. RIC1512685)
(Hemet Youth Baseball I); (3) Hanna v. Paino (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2017, No.
HEC1701170) (Paino); and (4) Hanna v. Townsend (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2017,
No. HEC1701533) (Townsend). Hanna, as a pro se litigant, commenced all four of those
cases within the relevant time period, and all of them were finally adjudicated against
him.
The first two, Hall and Hemet Youth Baseball I, were brought against the same
individuals, with the latter including two additional corporate defendants, Hemet Youth
Baseball, Inc. and Pony, Inc. In Hall, which was brought in federal court in August 2015,
Hanna petitioned the court to perpetuate the testimony of each of the individual
defendants in anticipation of future federal litigation he planned to bring against them. In
September 2015, the petition was denied for failing to meet the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 27, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. The next
month, in October 2015, Hanna filed Hemet Youth Baseball I in Riverside Superior
Court. That action was dismissed without prejudice on December 17, 2015. Hanna does
not dispute that he commenced both of those actions as a pro se litigant, that they fall
9
within the relevant timeframe, or that they qualify as “litigation” under section 391,
subdivision (b)(1).
Hanna instead maintains that both of those cases do not qualify under the statute
because they purportedly were part of a “‘global settlement’” and therefore were not
adversely determined against him. He further contends that dismissals pursuant to
settlement agreements do not qualify as adverse determinations against the pro se litigant.
We need not address that issue, because the record contains no evidence that those two
cases were dismissed as part of any “global” settlement or were otherwise part of any
settlement agreement. The settlement agreement that Hanna claims involved those cases
was entered into in March 2016 and did involve all of the named defendants in those two
cases, as well as several additional individuals. By its express terms, however, the
settlement agreement involved yet another action brought by Hanna against those
defendants—Hanna v. Hemet Youth Baseball, Inc. (Super. Ct. Riverside County, 2016,
No. RIC1513590) (Hemet Youth Baseball II)—filed in state court in November 2015.
Hemet Youth Baseball II is the only lawsuit that was mentioned in the settlement
agreement. In the recitals section of the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that it
was the allegations in the complaint in that action (Hemet Youth Baseball II) that the
parties “desire[d] to settle” “without the necessity of trial and [had] agreed to do so”
through that settlement agreement. The agreement was executed in March 2016, and the
underlying case was subsequently dismissed.
The record contains no evidence to support Hanna’s contention that the settlement
of Hemet Youth Baseball II also included Hall (which was dismissed before Hemet Youth
10
Baseball II was even filed) or Hemet Youth Baseball I (which was dismissed four months
before the settlement agreement in Hemet Youth Baseball II and only one month after that
action was filed). It is irrelevant that those cases purportedly involved related issues.
Hanna does not contend that the settlement agreement contains any ambiguous language
on the basis of which we could construe it to include or to relate back to the two prior
actions. Nor do we perceive any. “If contractual language is clear and explicit, it
governs.” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264; Weddington
Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 [“A settlement agreement is a
contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement
contracts”].) By its express terms, the settlement agreement encompassed the allegations
in the complaint in Hemet Youth Baseball II only and not the two prior actions brought
against the same defendants, Hall and Hemet Youth Baseball I. Consequently, Hall and
Hemet Youth Baseball I qualify as litigation adversely determined against Hanna under
subdivision (b)(1) of section 391.
The two remaining civil actions pursued by Hanna as a pro se litigant and
determined adversely against him within the relevant period (Paino and Townsend) were
both unsuccessful requests Hanna made for civil harassment restraining orders. The
request in one action (Paino) was denied after a hearing in July 2017, and the other action
(Townsend) was dismissed in August 2017 after Hanna did not appear for the hearing.
On appeal, Hanna’s only argument specific to these cases is that “[t]he Register of
Actions is not evidence of the character or finality of the litigation.” Little League
submitted computer printouts of the complete dockets from both actions to demonstrate
11
that Hanna had pursued them within the relevant time period as a pro se litigant and that
the actions were determined adversely against him. No minute orders from those actions
were submitted. The only authority that Hanna cites as support for the proposition that
the dockets are inadequate proof is an unpublished Court of Appeal opinion. The rules of
court prohibit Hanna and us from citing or relying on that opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.1115(a).) If a superior court chooses to keep a register of actions, then “the title of
each cause, with the date of its commencement and a memorandum of every subsequent
proceeding in the action with its date” “shall be entered” in the register. (Gov. Code,
§ 69845.) We presume that the docket entries are accurate. (Evid. Code, § 664; In re
Lopez (1970) 2 Cal.3d 141, 146 [presumption that preparation of docket entry was
regularly performed duty of the court clerk].) Hanna does not contend otherwise. The
docket entries for both cases document what occurred in the hearings and the resolution
of those matters. The computer printouts of the dockets or registers of actions are
sufficient to demonstrate that the civil actions were brought by Hanna as a pro se litigant
within the relevant time period and that those actions were decided adversely against
him.3
Hanna argues that Little League failed to carry its burden of presenting evidence
that the prior litigations were “finally determined,” because Little League did not
3 In his reply brief, Hanna complains that Little League “attempted to introduce evidence, via an inappropriate method (Request for Judicial Notice) which bars presumption of truth of the matters stated therein.” We consider the argument forfeited because Hanna did not make it in his opening brief and has not demonstrated good cause for failing to do so. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.)
12
demonstrate that “the prior litigations ha[d] been adjudicated on appeal or that the time to
request appellate review ha[d] expired.” Hanna relies on Childs, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th
at page 994, for the proposition that Little League was required to “submit evidence that
the prior litigations ha[d] been adjudicated on appeal or that the time to request appellate
review ha[d] expired.” Childs is inapposite here. It stands for the proposition that a case
in which an appeal is pending is not determined finally against the litigant because all
avenues of appellate review have not been exhausted. (Id. at pp. 992-993.)
Here, unlike in Childs, the record contains substantial evidence of finality for all
five of the cases that qualify under section 391, subdivision (b)(1). Of the four
nonconceded cases, three are state court cases that were terminated in December 2015,
July 2017, and August 2017. The fourth is the federal action that was dismissed in
September 2015. The time limit for filing appeals in each of these actions had long
passed by the time that Little League filed its motion in May 2018. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(a)(1) [normal time to appeal in civil case is 60 days]; Fed. Rules App.Proc.,
rule 4(a)(1)(A) [normal time to appeal in civil case is 30 days].) No further evidence of
finality was needed.
Because we conclude that the trial court order finding Hanna to be a vexatious
litigant under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), is supported by substantial evidence of five
qualifying actions brought by or maintained by Hanna pro se during the relevant seven-
year timeframe and determined adversely against him, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding Hanna to be a vexatious litigant under that
13
subdivision.4 We consequently need not and do not address whether the trial court’s
findings under the other subdivisions were supported by substantial evidence.
D. Substantial Evidence Supporting Determination of No Reasonable Likelihood of
Success
Hanna contends that the trial court’s finding under section 391.3, subdivision (a),
that he did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the UCL claims
was not supported by substantial evidence. The contention lacks merit.
“The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it
defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’” (Kwikset Corp.
v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320 (Kwikset), superseded by statute on another
ground as stated in Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 589, 594,
fn. 2; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) Private standing under the UCL “‘is limited to any
“person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property’ as a result of
unfair competition.”’” (Kwikset, supra, at pp. 320-321; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.)
The trial court found that Hanna’s UCL causes of action did not have a reasonable
likelihood of success because Hanna did not have standing to pursue those claims. That
finding is supported by substantial evidence. Little League submitted substantial
evidence that Hanna did not suffer an injury in fact. The only payments that Little
League received related to Team Hemet were a $150 check to pay the charter fee and a
4 Because the vexatious litigant statute requires only that five litigations be determined adversely against the pro se litigant in the prior seven years, we need not and do not address Hanna’s arguments about whether any of the other past actions qualify under the statute.
14
$20.52 credit card payment to pay for the addition of teams to the league. Hanna did not
make those payments individually. Instead, those payments were made by Team Hemet.
In addition, Hanna never paid any money to Little League. The vice president of
operations for Team Hemet in 2017 further stated that to his knowledge “Hanna ha[d]
never contributed any of his own money to Team Hemet.”
The only evidence that Hanna submitted in opposition to Little League’s motion to
declare him a vexatious litigant and to require him to furnish security was Hanna’s own
declaration, to which he attached screen shots from social media posts. Nowhere in the
declaration does Hanna offer any evidence of how he personally suffered any financial or
property loss. The social media posts likewise had no relation to any possible financial
injury. At the hearing on the motion, Hanna stated that he planned to submit evidence at
trial demonstrating his injury, but he presented no such evidence at the hearing.
Hanna argued in the trial court, as he does here, that the Little League “[c]harter
[a]pplication and [i]nsurance [e]nrollment [f]orm” that he attached to the original
complaint (and we assume for the sake of argument was also attached to the first
amended complaint)5 demonstrates that he was personally liable for Team Hemet’s
obligations. He argues that he, as “controller of the organization,” was “liable for all of
5 Although the agreement with Little League is listed as an exhibit to the amended complaint, that exhibit is not included in the clerk’s transcript on appeal. The agreement is included as an attachment to the original complaint. “An ‘amended’ complaint supersedes all prior complaints,” and “[t]he original ceases to ‘“perform any function as a pleading.”’” (Lee v. Bank of America (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 197, 215.) We assume for the sake of argument that the agreement was also attached to the amended complaint in the trial court. Neither party suggests otherwise.
15
the debts and obligations of the organization” because the agreement that he signed as the
president of Team Hemet contained the following provision: “I pledge myself and my
organization to strict compliance with all the Rules and Regulations of Little League
Baseball, Incorporated.” That statement does not support the proposition that Hanna was
in any way personally liable for Team Hemet or that he suffered any financial injury
based on the hold placed on Team Hemet by Little League. It instead provides that
Hanna was required in his capacity as president to comply with Little League’s rules.
Nowhere does the agreement provide that Hanna was personally responsible for Team
Hemet’s financial obligations by virtue of his role as president of the organization or
otherwise.
After weighing the evidence submitted by the parties, the trial court found that it
was not reasonably likely that Hanna would succeed on the merits of the UCL claims.
Because that finding is supported by substantial evidence, it “‘“is in this as in every civil
case binding upon the appellate court.”’” (Moran, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 785.)
E. Effect of Initial Appeal
Hanna contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the case because
he had already filed a notice of appeal from the order declaring him a vexatious litigant.
We do not reach the merits of this argument because any error would be harmless.
There are two different ways in which a court can lack jurisdiction. (People v.
Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282, 286.) “A court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense
when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any
power to hear or determine the case. [Citation.] If a court lacks such ‘“fundamental”’
16
jurisdiction, its ruling is void.” (Ibid.) “Even when a court has fundamental jurisdiction,
however, the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law may constrain the court to act
only in a particular manner, or subject to certain limitations.” (Id. at pp. 286-287.)
“When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed,
it is said to have acted ‘in excess of its jurisdiction.’” (Id. at p. 287.) “Because an
ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction does not negate a court's fundamental jurisdiction to
hear the matter altogether [citation], such a ruling is treated as valid until set aside.”
(Ibid.)
Hanna does not specify whether he believes that the trial court lacked fundamental
jurisdiction or acted in excess of its jurisdiction. There is no question that the court did
not lack jurisdiction in the fundamental sense—the trial court possessed jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties. Consequently, the trial court at worst acted in excess
of its jurisdiction. But we need not decide whether the trial court acted in such a manner,
because any such error would be harmless. The only way that Hanna could have been
prejudiced by such an error would be if the vexatious litigant determination were not
supported by substantial evidence or were otherwise erroneous. But we have concluded
otherwise. Because of that conclusion, Hanna still would have been required to file the
security bond to proceed with his lawsuit in the trial court, which he did not do.
Therefore, the trial court’s reason for dismissing the action—that Hanna failed to furnish
the requisite security bond—was supported too. Thus, regardless of whether the trial
court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by failing to stay the litigation while the appeal
from the prefiling order was pending, any error was harmless.
17
F. Litigation Stay
Hanna contends that the trial court was without authority to rule on Little League’s
pending discovery motions, which included requests for sanctions, because the litigation
should have been stayed after Little League filed its motion to declare Hanna a vexatious
litigant and to require him to furnish security.6 We agree.
We independently review questions of statutory interpretation. (Reid v. Google,
Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 (Reid); Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 219.)
“‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a statute we ascertain the
Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We must look to
the statute’s words and give them “their usual and ordinary meaning.” [Citation.] “The
statute’s plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are
ambiguous.” [Citations.] “If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative
history, and public policy.”’” (Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 527.)
6 Little League’s appellate brief does not address this argument on the merits. Instead, it maintains that Hanna failed in his opening brief “to show whether a final judgment is being appealed and how the discovery addressed in the appeal could relate to such a judgment.” Little League’s argument is based on this court’s order limiting Hanna’s initial appeal to the vexatious litigant prefiling order and denying his request to appeal from the interlocutory discovery orders, which were not appealable. (Doe v. United States Swimming, Inc (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432 [“There is no statutory provision for appeal from an order compelling compliance with a discovery order”].) Little League’s argument fails because Hanna also appealed from the final judgment. As Little League acknowledges, discovery orders are reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. (§ 906; County of Nevada v. Kinicki (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 357, 363.)
18
Section 391.6 provides: “Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 391.3,
when a motion [to furnish security] pursuant to Section 391.1 is filed prior to trial the
litigation is stayed, and the moving defendant need not plead, until 10 days after the
motion shall have been denied, or if granted, until 10 days after the required security has
been furnished and the moving defendant given written notice thereof.” (§ 391.6.) No
published cases have interpreted the scope of the litigation stay under section 391.6.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “stay” as “[t]he postponement or halting of a
proceeding, judgment, or the like.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) Under the plain
language of section 391.6, the entirety of the litigation is stayed once the defendant files a
motion to determine that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant who should be required to
furnish security in that action. Furthermore, the stay shall remain effective until 10 days
after the motion is denied or 10 days after the security is furnished. (§ 391.6.) Section
391.6 does not carve out any exception for proceedings that may continue during that
period except for the dismissal of the action under section 391.3, subdivision (b). That
exception does not apply here.
Little League filed its motion to declare Hanna a vexatious litigant under section
391.1 and to have him furnish security on May 14, 2018. At that time, Little League had
several pending discovery motions, all requesting the imposition of discovery sanctions.
At the same June 7, 2018, hearing at which the trial court granted Little League’s
vexatious litigant motion, the trial court also granted Little League’s discovery motions
and imposed a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions ($400 for each of the three motions)
against Hanna. The trial court did not have authority to rule on the discovery motions
19
once Little League filed its motion under section 391.1. Consequently, we reverse the
June 7, 2018, orders imposing a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions against Hanna.
DISPOSITION
The June 7, 2018, orders imposing a total of $1,200 in discovery sanctions against
Hanna are reversed. The June 7, 2018, order imposing a prefiling restriction on Hanna as
a pro se litigant is affirmed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties
shall bear their own costs of appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
MENETREZ J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J. MILLER J.
20
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly determined the plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant and correctly required a security bond, but erred by ruling on discovery motions and imposing sanctions after the stay mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 391.6 took effect.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.
Whether the trial court erred in determining the plaintiff lacked a reasonable likelihood of success on his Unfair Competition Law claims.
Whether the trial court lacked authority to rule on discovery motions and impose sanctions after the filing of a vexatious litigant motion.
Disposition. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Under the plain language of section 391.6, all further proceedings in the action should have been stayed once the vexatious litigant motion under section 391.1 was filed.”
“We therefore reverse the orders imposing discovery sanctions. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.”