committed when the defendant is confined in a state prison. The statutory scheme makes
clear that such felonies, i.e., those felonies committed in prison, are exempt from the
general sentencing scheme. [Citation.] A sentence under subdivision (c) is longer than a
sentence imposed under subdivision (a) because the in-prison offenses are fully
consecutive to the sentence for the offense for which the defendant was in prison. Using
sentencing jargon ‘the in-prison offense is treated as a new principal term rather than as a
subordinate term to the out-of-prison offense.’ ” (Id. at pp. 869-870; see also In re Tate
(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 756, 764-765; People v. Cardenas (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51,
58; see generally People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1242-1244.)
During oral argument, defense counsel argued that a mandatory consecutive
sentence cannot be reconciled with the statutory language in section 1170.1, subdivision
(b), which states “[i]f the new offenses are consecutive with each other.” (Boldface and
italics added.) Notwithstanding counsel’s argument, as noted ante, the Three Strikes law
states that “Any sentence imposed pursuant to subdivision (e) will be imposed
consecutive to any other sentence which the defendant is already serving, unless
otherwise provided by law.” (§ 667, subd. (c)(8).) There is nothing in section 1170.1,
subdivision (b), that trumps the mandate to impose consecutive sentences under the Three
Strikes law. The two statutes, read together and applied with the legislative goal to
punish in-prison crimes more severely than crimes committed outside of prison, lead us
to the conclusion that the trial court was mandated to impose consecutive terms. As the
6
People noted during oral argument, following defense counsel’s argument would gut the
language and intent of the statutes.
Therefore, because we find that the trial judge had no discretion to sentence
defendant to a concurrent term for his in-prison possession convictions in the original
sentencing on the Riverside Case, the trial court properly sentenced defendant to a term
to be served fully consecutively to the sentence defendant was already serving.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
McKINSTER J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court lacked discretion to impose a concurrent sentence for in-prison offenses under the Three Strikes law, which mandates that such sentences be served consecutively to any existing term. Consequently, the trial court's correction of the unauthorized concurrent sentence to a consecutive one was proper.
Issues
Whether the trial court had discretion to impose a concurrent sentence for in-prison offenses under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (c)(8).
Whether the trial court erred by correcting an unauthorized concurrent sentence to a consecutive sentence.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Any sentence imposed pursuant to subdivision (e) will be imposed consecutive to any other sentence which the defendant is already serving, unless otherwise provided by law.”
“We decline to follow Arant and conclude the trial court had no discretion to impose a concurrent sentence.”
“a “legally unauthorized sentence is subject to correction at any time.”