was insufficient evidence E.’s siblings were at risk of harm, as well as insufficient
evidence all of the children could not live safely with father, with her out of the home.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the challenged findings and orders, and
therefore affirm.
I
FACTS
A. Detention
In December 2018, respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family
Services (CFS) received a referral alleging that mother’s newborn, E., had tested positive
for amphetamine and marijuana at birth and that mother had tested positive for
amphetamine during a prenatal visit a few months earlier. Mother and father have three
other children, J.J. (who was two years old at the time), V. (six), and J. (ten).
2
CFS made several unsuccessful attempts to contact the family in person, by phone,
and by mail. Because the family had a prior history with CFS, the social worker was able
to determine the elementary school J. and V. attended and made an unannounced visit to
interview them.1 J. and V. said they felt safe in the home and their basic needs were being
met. They said they slept on an inflatable mattress in the living room or in their relative’s
room when he was traveling. They said E. didn’t have a crib and slept on blankets on the
floor, next to their parents. They were able to give an age-appropriate definition of drugs
and alcohol and denied their parents used either.
On February 5, 2019, the social worker interviewed the parents at the apartment in
Rialto where they then lived. In his separate interview, father said his family had moved
into the apartment a few months earlier. He said mother hadn’t told him why CFS was
investigating his family, and he denied she used any drugs. He said she used to smoke
marijuana but had stopped and had never used the drug while pregnant. He said he had
also quit smoking marijuana before his oldest child, J., was born. He said he had been
arrested for DUI in 2013 and had not completed his alcohol abuse classes. The social
worker searched his criminal history and confirmed the DUI (he had been convicted of
the charge in 2015), and also found weapons-related charges from 2006 and 2007
(specifically, carrying a dagger and manufacture or import of an undetectable firearm).
1 CFS had received a general neglect and physical abuse referral regarding the family in 2014 and a general neglect and emotional abuse referral in 2018. Both cases were closed as unfounded or inconclusive. 3
In her separate interview, mother said father did know E. had tested positive for
drugs at birth. She said she uses marijuana for pain management because she injured her
legs in a car accident. She said she had only used marijuana once while she was pregnant
with E. because the pain had become unbearable. She denied using amphetamines. She
claimed she had gone to a party a few days before E. was born and accidentally drank
from a cup that wasn’t hers. The liquid had made her feel “very weird,” but she didn’t go
to the hospital because she was scared. She became upset when the social worker asked
her about the other positive amphetamine test from the prenatal visit. She said she had
been “going through a rough time” back then, and nobody had told her they would be
drug testing during the visit. She denied having a substance abuse problem. She also
denied co-sleeping with E., explaining he slept on a mattress on the floor and she slept on
the floor next to him.
Both parents agreed to drug test, and the social worker informed them that missed
tests would be considered positive. Later that day (February 5), mother called the social
worker “audibly hysterical” and said she hadn’t known it was going to be an observed
drug test. She said she “could not pee in front of somebody” and complained that the
testing staff had made her “feel like a bad mother.” The test results reflected she had
attempted to urinate twice but had a “shy bladder” and refused to try to urinate a third
time. Father’s February 5 drug test was positive for amphetamine. He told the social
worker he had taken Sudafed for allergies that day and requested another test. The lab ran
a confirmation test on the same urine sample and it came back negative. On February 6
4
and 7, mother said she could not test because she wasn’t in the facility’s system, but the
social worker checked and confirmed she was in the system and was able to test.
In late February, the social worker contacted mother to arrange another drug test.
Mother said she felt harassed by CFS and said her children were fine and “not being
abused.” The social worker promised mother she was not trying to open a case against
her but in fact was hoping to do the opposite, resolve the case without court intervention.
She explained she couldn’t close the family’s referral, however, without a negative test
from mother and a formal “Children and Family Team Meeting” (team meeting). She
explained that, given the positive toxicology results for E., it was crucial and necessary to
create a safety plan. Mother said she did not want her family to find out about her drug
use or CFS’s involvement.
The social worker followed up with mother on this issue, and this time her
supervisor also participated in the phone call. The supervisor reiterated the social
worker’s assurances that CFS was not trying to harass mother’s family. The supervisor
explained that CFS management had decided a team meeting and clean drug test were
needed before they could close the investigation. Ultimately, mother agreed to drug test
and attend a team meeting.
But mother’s decision to cooperate changed over the ensuing weeks. She did not
respond to the social worker’s attempts to schedule another drug test, and then, on March
4, father sent the social worker the following text: “There is no reason for a meeting. You
tried and tried to find something and there wasn’t anything. We’ve complied [with]
5
everything that you have asked us to do. At this point I’m feeling like this is personal. I
feel like my family and my inalienable right to pursuit of happiness is being denied to us.
You will have to speak to our lawyer from this point on.” Father did not provide the
lawyer’s name or contact information. Mother then called the social worker to follow up
on father’s text. She said she would not agree to a team meeting or any more drug tests.
She also said to contact their lawyer going forward but hung up when the social worker
asked for the lawyer’s contact information.
On March 6, CFS decided to file section 300 petitions on behalf of the children,
due to its unresolved concerns about mother’s drug use and father’s refusal to
acknowledge that issue or cooperate with CFS. The social worker called the parents and
informed them of the upcoming detention hearing. They responded that a dependency
case wasn’t necessary because the children were no longer in their custody. Father said
they had recently “signed their rights over” and the children had not been in their care for
a week.
On March 7, CFS filed petitions alleging the children were dependents under
section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). The operative allegations against the
parents were that: mother has a “substance use” problem that impairs her ability to
provide appropriate care for her children; father reasonably should have known of
mother’s problem; and father has a “marijuana abuse problem,” placing the children at
risk.
6
The juvenile court held the detention hearing the following day. The parents were
not present, and both CFS and counsel for the children recommended detention. The
court found prima facie evidence of a substantial risk to the children’s physical health and
safety, ordered them detained out of the home, and set the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing for April 2. On March 25, with the assistance of Rialto police, CFS detained the
children in foster care.
B. Jurisdiction and Disposition
The social worker interviewed the parents when CFS took the children into
custody. Mother said it was difficult for her to drug test because of her job. She said they
had refused a team meeting back in February because they had been misadvised by a
friend that such a step was not necessary if jurisdiction had not been established. Father
added that by the time the social worker tried to schedule the meeting, they had already
given “temporary guardianship” of the children to a family friend, a woman named Carla.
The parents said they did not attend the detention hearing because, during a free
consultation, an attorney had told them they didn’t have to go if CFS had not given them
notice of the hearing by mail. Father told the social worker that his family had gone
through a rough period when mother was pregnant with E., just before they moved into
the Rialto apartment. He said they had “lost their home, stayed with friends, been kicked
out, and moved from motel to motel and were around people who were using
substances.”
7
Mother said she was currently using marijuana for pain management but said she
only did so at night and never around the children. She maintained that she had
accidentally ingested amphetamine at a party. She added that her water broke the
following day and she had “informed the hospital that she did not know what she drank.”
Father denied mother had a drug problem and said the only substance he had ever seen
her use was marijuana. Despite his earlier statement to the contrary, father admitted he
still used marijuana. He said he would use it when he got off work, for work-related pain.
The social worker also interviewed Carla, the family friend and purported
guardian of the children. Carla said the parents had signed a notarized document giving
her guardianship on February 26, 2019, and since that time she had been caring for the
children “on and off” because they were still “transitioning.” She was not aware she had
to go to court to become their legal guardian.
On March 26, 2019, the parents attended a team meeting with the social worker.
CFS ordered random drug testing for the parents and referred them to individual
counseling, parenting classes, and substance abuse treatment.
The following day, CFS filed its jurisdiction and disposition report, recommending
removal of all four children and provision of family reunification services. The social
worker was concerned about the parents’ willingness to cooperate with CFS. She was
also concerned that, despite mother’s and father’s positive amphetamine tests, they
continued to claim marijuana was the only drug they used.
8
At the April 2 hearing, the court continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing
to June 17 and ordered the parties to attend mediation. The court gave CFS authority to
detain the children with father, with mother out of the home, if CFS determined the
parents were cooperating with the investigation. The court explained that, like the social
worker, it was also concerned about the parents’ willingness to cooperate with the
investigation, given their behavior since the referral. The court asked if there was a
request to drug test the parents that day, and counsel for the minors answered in the
affirmative. The court then ordered the parents to drug test and advised them that missed
tests would be considered positive tests.
We note here that the juvenile court could not order the parents to submit to drug
testing at this stage in the proceedings. Before jurisdiction is established through a
finding that a minor is a person described by section 300, a juvenile court’s authority to
issue orders against a parent is limited and does not include the power to issue an order
like the one here, compelling a parent to drug test. (See In re Jody R. (1990) 218
Cal.App.3d 1615, 1622-1623; §§ 319, 323.) If a juvenile court determines that drug
testing is warranted before jurisdiction, section 319 gives the court authority to order the
social services agency to provide testing referrals. (See § 319, subd. (e) [“If a court orders
a child detained, the court shall . . . order services to be provided as soon as possible to
reunify the child and his or her family if appropriate”], italics added.) Section 319 does
not, however, authorize the court to order the parents to make use of those referrals. In
most cases, the distinction—that is, whether the court orders the agency to provide drug
9
testing or the parent to submit to drug testing—will have no practical impact on the case.
Here, however, the point is not just an academic one. It is relevant to our analysis in
response to CFS’s contention that we should dismiss mother’s appeal under the
disentitlement doctrine because (among other things) she violated the court’s order to
drug test. We discuss this issue more fully, below.
Turning back to the facts of this case, on May 22, the social worker met with the
parents. Father was living with a relative who had a “significant criminal history.” He had
not participated in any services and claimed he had not been referred for services. The
social worker checked and confirmed that both parents had in fact been referred for
services two months earlier. Father’s drug testing record was inconsistent. He had missed
three tests (April 2, May 6, and June 12), had two negative tests (May 17 and June 6), and
tested positive for marijuana on April 1. Mother’s testing record was also inconsistent.
She had missed two tests (April 1 and May 14), tested negative on three occasions (May
24, April 17, and April 10), and tested positive for marijuana on April 2. Father remained
in denial about mother’s history of drug use and maintained her ingestion of
amphetamine just before E. was born was accidental.
On June 5, CFS moved the children from their foster home to the home of a
relative who had recently been cleared for placement.
On June 17, the court continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing one month
to give CFS the opportunity to assess the parents’ progress in services and consider the
possibility of letting father move in with the relative caretaker. Mother’s counsel
10
informed the court that mother was now living in Los Angeles and had filed a change of
address. Counsel also lodged exhibits with the court consisting of various character
references from the parents’ friends and relatives and J.’s school records reflecting he
was doing very well academically.
The parents told a CFS social worker that they were fully engaged in all services,
but this turned out not to be true. The social worker assigned to their case learned that, as
of July 10, mother had participated in only one session of a drug treatment program. She
had tested negative three times since the last hearing. Father had been dropped from a
drug treatment program twice, for failure to attend. He had been called to test only once
since the last hearing, and the results were still pending. The parents had not participated
in any parenting classes or individual therapy.
CFS was unable to recommend letting father move in with the caretaker because it
was concerned about her ability to protect the children from father’s potential drug
problem. The caretaker had lived with the family when E. was born and had denied
noticing any substance issues when CFS began its investigation. She assured the social
worker that she would be protective now that she was aware of the issue, but the social
worker doubted her ability to recognize if father was using.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place on July 18, 2019. Father filed a
waiver of rights form (JV-190), submitting on CFS’s reports and waiving his right to a
contested hearing on jurisdiction. He did, however, contest CFS’s disposition
recommendation, arguing the children could safely live with him while he received
11
family maintenance services. Mother contested the jurisdiction allegations against her,
and the court and parties accepted the following offer of proof from her attorney:
“Mother would testify that even with the positive drug test [for E.] the three older
children were well cared for and did well in school and her argument is about nexus.”
Her counsel argued the positive amphetamine tests were remote and there was currently
no substantial risk of danger or harm to the children. As to disposition, mother contested
removal from father and represented she would be willing to “move anywhere” if the
court allowed the children to live with him.
The court sustained the jurisdiction allegations against the parents. Addressing
mother’s nexus argument, it stated: “[T]his was not just a one-time positive test at birth
. . . the mother also tested positive at a prenatal visit. [¶] After that the agency made
attempts to alleviate risk by working with the family. The family avoided all contact with
CFS, minimized all of the risks involved, refused to set up a CFT or a safety plan and
generally was noncooperative with the agency. [¶] Since that time the parents have had
over six months in which to engage in services and there likely could have been a return
at today’s date. [¶] However, they failed to consistently engage in services, continued to
miss tests . . . [and] failed to recognize why [drug use in the home] presents a risk to
young children including an infant.”
Moving to disposition, the court found clear and convincing evidence that the
children could not safely be returned to either parent’s care. As to father, the court found
he failed to acknowledge or recognize any issues with mother’s drug use, to cooperate
12
with CFS, or to make progress on his case plan. “[W]e’ve given a number of months for
the parents to show that they’re going to cooperate with the agency. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] At [the
beginning of the case] the father was largely uncooperative with the agency. . . . [T]he
parents hid the children by doing a nonbinding guardianship . . . refused to meet or have a
CFT which led to the original detention. [¶] Since that time the Court has also given
additional time, indicated a willingness to consider either returning to the father on his
own or in the home of the relative [but] . . . [¶] [f]ather continues to minimize the
concerns of [CFS], indicates [he] doesn’t recognize the issues related to the mother’s
drug use, has his own missed test. And once enrolled in a program, which took almost
four months to get enrolled in, only showed up twice.” The court ordered the children to
remain in the care of the relative they were currently living with. It also ordered family
reunification services for the parents, with two-hour supervised visits at least three times
a week.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
ANALYSIS
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all the court’s
jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders except for its exercise of jurisdiction
over E. For the reasons we explain below, we find no error.
13
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“‘A dependency proceeding under section 300 is essentially a bifurcated
proceeding.’ [Citation.] First, the court must determine whether the minor is within any
of the descriptions set out in section 300 and therefore subject to its jurisdiction.” (In re
Stephen W. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 629, 645.) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes
a juvenile court to exercise dependency jurisdiction over a child if the “child has suffered,
or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as
a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child.” (Italics added.) “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), requires [the agency] to demonstrate the following three elements by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent;
(2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious
physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 (L.W.), citing In re
Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561; In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624.)
Second, if the court exercises jurisdiction over the minor, it must decide the
appropriate disposition. Generally, the court chooses between allowing the child to
remain in the home with protective services in place and removing the child from the
home while the parent engages in services to facilitate reunification. “Removal from
parental custody at disposition may be ordered where a return home would pose a
substantial danger to the child’s physical health and where there are no reasonable
alternatives to removal. (§ 361, subd. (b)(1).)” (In re Stephen W., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d
14
at p. 645.) The burden of proof for jurisdictional findings is preponderance of the
evidence; for removal, it is clear and convincing evidence. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.)
“‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making
this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most
favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are
the province of the trial court.’” (In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The appellant has
the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support
the findings or orders. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B. The Disentitlement Doctrine Does Not Apply
Preliminarily, we address CFS’s argument that we should decline to reach the
merits of mother’s substantial evidence challenge and dismiss her appeal under the
disentitlement doctrine. CFS argues that if mother had been “honest, cooperated with pre-
detention services, [and] did not stonewall CFS, [or] play crafty games [like] establishing
a non-binding guardianship to hide the children pre-detention,” the section 300 petition
“would have been unnecessary.” According to CFS, we should dismiss mother’s appeal
because she resisted reform and “defi[ed] . . . court orders” during the six months leading
up to the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. CFS misunderstands the disentitlement
doctrine. In the dependency context, the doctrine is not a punishment for failing to
15
cooperate with the social services agency but rather for violating court orders in such a
way that prevents the court from protecting the child.
The disentitlement doctrine, or appellate disentitlement, refers to a reviewing
court’s “inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a party who has refused to comply with
the orders of the trial court.” (People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 894, 897.) It
“is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied when the
balance of the equitable concerns make it a proper sanction.” (Ibid.) In the criminal
context, the doctrine applies when the appellant is a fugitive from justice. (Ibid.)
“Appellate disentitlement is, fundamentally, a doctrine based on forfeiture: a defendant
who escapes or otherwise flees the authorities gives up the right to challenge a conviction
or sentence while refusing to abide by its consequences.” (Id. at p. 898.)
The doctrine has also been applied in the civil context, for example, when a
party’s violation of a court order frustrates the other party’s ability to protect their legal
rights. (E.g., TMS, Inc. v. Aihara (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 377, 379-380 [dismissing
judgment debtors’ appeal because they refused to comply with court order to answer
postjudgment interrogatories]; Tobin v. Casaus (1954) 128 Cal.App.2d 588 [conditionally
dismissing appeal from a money judgment because appellant refused to appear at a
judgment debtor’s examination and to surrender in response to an arrest warrant].) Courts
imposing the disentitlement refer to it as the “ultimate sanction” for violating court
orders. (E.g., Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787; Guardianship of
Melissa W. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1299.)
16
As the California Supreme Court explained in MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939)
13 Cal.2d 271, the only case where our high court has applied the doctrine in the parent-
child context, dismissing a party’s appeal is an extreme measure that deprives a party of
their right to “ask the aid and assistance of [the] court.” (Id. at p. 277.) MacPherson
involved a divorce proceeding. During the pendency of that proceeding, after the court
had awarded custody of the children to the mother, the father absconded with the children
and refused to reveal their whereabouts. The trial court ultimately issued orders requiring
the father to, among other things, immediately return the children to mother’s custody
and pay the attorney fees, expenses, and costs she incurred in trying to locate the
children. (Id. at p. 276.) When the father appealed the fees and costs portion of the
judgment, the California Supreme Court dismissed his challenge, reasoning that by
“secluding the children in a foreign country and alienating them, [he] violated not only
his agreement with [the mother] and the provisions of the interlocutory and final decrees
of divorce, but he has also wilfully and purposely evaded legal processes and
contumaciously defied and nullified every attempt to enforce the judgments and orders of
the California courts, including the very order from which he seeks relief by this appeal.”
(Ibid., italics added.) The Court concluded the father had “effectually bar[red] him[self]
from receiving the assistance of an appellate tribunal” by engaging in “[s]uch flagrant
disobedience and contempt.” (Ibid.)
In dependency cases, the interest at stake for a parent is “enormous.” (In re Dakota
H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 223; see also In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688; In re
17
K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236 [the interest of a parent in the “companionship, care,
custody, and management” of their children is a “compelling one, ranked among the most
basic of civil rights”].) As a result, appellate courts have rarely applied the disentitlement
doctrine to dismiss a parent’s appeal. To illustrate, the court applied the doctrine In re
Kamelia S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1224 to a father who, after appealing the order placing
his daughter in foster care, “abduct[ed]” his daughter and could not be found. (Id. at p.
1227.) Similarly, in In re E.M. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 467, the court applied the doctrine
to dismiss the mother’s appeal of the jurisdictional findings because she “willfully left the
jurisdiction with her children while the petition was pending” and after the court issued
protective custody warrants for the children. (Id. at pp. 469, 471.) Application of the
doctrine in those cases was not only fair, but also practical. By fleeing with their children
to a different jurisdiction while their cases were pending, the parents violated custody or
placement orders regarding their children, thereby making it impossible for the court to
safeguard the children’s best interests. When a parent’s violation of a juvenile court’s
orders makes the most crucial aspect of that court’s job impossible, it stands to reason
they should not be able to ask a reviewing court to overturn the juvenile court’s orders.
This is obviously not such a case. All of the conduct CFS cites as grounds for the
disentitlement doctrine occurred before the court took jurisdiction over the children.
Indeed, most of the conduct occurred before the court had even detained the children,
while CFS was investigating the referral. This timing distinction is important when
determining whether appellate disentitlement is an appropriate sanction.
18
As we discussed above, before the juvenile court takes jurisdiction over a child by
finding them to be a person described by section 300, the court may not order a parent to
cooperate with the social services agency, engage in services, or submit to alcohol or
drug testing. “The juvenile court is a special department of the superior court whose
powers are limited to those granted by the Juvenile Court Law.” (In re Ashley M. (2003)
114 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 (Ashley M.), citing § 200 et seq.) The dependency statutes authorize
the juvenile court “to make orders pertaining to abused or neglected children who come
within the court’s jurisdiction. (§§ 361, 362.)” (Ashley M., at p. 7.) “Authorization for the
juvenile court to order participation in child welfare and reunification services is set forth
in sections 361.2, 361.5, and 362.” (In re Jody R., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 1625,
italics added.) Those sections govern the court’s power to make dispositional orders after
jurisdiction has been established.
Section 319, which sets forth the juvenile court’s authority during an initial or
detention hearing, provides that if the court orders a child detained, it “shall . . . order
services to be provided as soon as possible to reunify the child and his or her family if
appropriate.” (§ 319, subd. (e), italics added.) Such an order does not compel the parent
to participate in services, rather it compels the social services agency to make services
available to the parent. ‘“The juvenile law system envisions a cooperative effort between
the [social services agency] and the juvenile court.’ [Citation.] The social services agency
has the initial responsibility to investigate allegations of abuse or neglect and has
authority to take temporary custody of an abused or neglected child. (§ 306.) But the
19
agency must account to the court on the reasons for removing the child from home and on
the services available to facilitate the child’s return. (§ 319.)” (Ashley M., supra, 114
Cal.App.4th at p. 7.) “In providing child welfare services, the county’s social services
agency acts as an administrative agency of the executive branch . . . .” (Ibid.)
In short, before jurisdiction, the court can issue orders detaining the child and
orders directing the social services agency to provide services, but it cannot order or
otherwise compel the parent to cooperate with the agency. A parent’s participation in
services, whether before jurisdiction and disposition or after, is always voluntary. (See In
re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233 [“it is not the court’s role to force a parent to
participate in services . . . ‘“[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced
on an unwilling or indifferent parent.”’”) The same is true regarding a parent’s
participation in the social service agency’s investigation to determine whether to file a
section 300 petition.
That’s not to say there are no consequences for failing to cooperate in the
investigation or participate in services. One consequence is that those failures “can be
used later as evidence in a review hearing or a hearing on a [section 300] petition.”
(Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2017) § 2.44, p. 2-97,
the loss of reunification services and the most serious consequence of all, loss of parental
rights. (In re Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1235-1236 [the dependency statutes
“repeatedly make clear” that “the punishment for noncompliance with reunification
20
services [is] . . . loss of those services and, ultimately, loss of parental rights”].) But
because parents are under no legal obligation to cooperate with the social services
agency, we see nothing equitable about adding appellate disentitlement to those
consequences.
Our colleagues in the Second District concluded similarly in In re Baby Boy M.
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588 (Baby Boy M). The mother in that case, “while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court because of the dependency proceedings involving her
other children, willfully impeded the ability of the court and the Department to protect
Baby Boy M. by delivering the child to his biological father to take to an unknown
location, recognizing that, if she kept the baby, the Department would immediately take
custody of him.” (Id. at p. 597.) The court rejected the department’s request to extend the
disentitlement doctrine to the mother’s pre-jurisdiction conduct. The court explained that
while it did not condone her obstructive behavior, she “had no legal obligation” to
discuss the birth of her newborn with the department. (Ibid.) The court concluded that
although she “may have impeded the Department’s efforts to help her family and
frustrated the underlying purpose of the dependency law,” appellate disentitlement was
unjustified because she had not violated a court order and therefore did not “‘stand[ ] in
an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.’” (Ibid.)
Similarly here, and contrary to CFS’s characterization, mother’s conduct of giving
her children to a family friend during the investigation and failing to consistently drug
test or engage meaningfully in services violated no court order. At that stage in the
21
proceedings, the only order she could have violated was the court’s order placing her
children in foster care. Had she taken her children from foster care and fled, appellate
disentitlement would be an appropriate sanction. (Cf. In re Kamelia S., supra, 82
Cal.App.4th at p. 1227; In re E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) But she did not.
Instead, she was uncooperative during the investigation. Thus, like the Baby Boy M.
court, we also “decline to expand the disentitlement doctrine to preclude the appeal of a
recalcitrant parent, who, despite her initial lack of cooperation, has violated no court
order.” (Baby Boy M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597-598, italics added.)
CFS’s reliance on In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76 (C.C.), a prior opinion
from this court, is unhelpful. In C.C., the mother avoided participating in a
prejurisdictional psychological evaluation and, as a result, the juvenile court could not
determine at the dispositional hearing whether she had a mental disability that rendered
her “incapable of utilizing reunification services” within the meaning of section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(2). (C.C., at p. 85.) The juvenile court ordered reunification services for
mother, believing it had no authority to deny services without such evidence. (Id. at
pp. 80, 82.) The minor appealed, and we reversed and remanded, directing the juvenile
court to order the mother to submit to a psychological evaluation (as opposed to merely
authorizing an evaluation, prejurisdiction). (Id. at p. 92.) Though the issue was not before
us, we advised that if the mother refused to submit to the court-ordered evaluation, the
juvenile court would be justified in using the disentitlement doctrine to deny reunification
services on remand. (Id. at p. 85.) We used broad language, staking out the position that
22
where “the parent is not cooperative, a court has the inherent power under the
disentitlement doctrine to bar that parent from seeking further assistance from the court,
including the provision of reunification services.” (Ibid.)
We don’t think C.C. provides a basis for applying the disentitlement doctrine here.
First, the case did not involve appellate disentitlement, but more fundamentally, our
discussion of the doctrine was only dicta. (C.C., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 [noting
that “it remains to be seen whether the court will order an evaluation and whether Mother
will cooperate”].) In addition, we question the appropriateness of C.C.’s broad
pronouncement regarding the doctrine’s application. The Legislature has created a
meticulous statutory scheme requiring the provision of reunification services unless
specific statutorily mandated findings are made based on clear and convincing evidence.
(§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b).) We are not aware of any other published case holding that a
parent may be denied reunification services based solely on the disentitlement doctrine,
and we doubt the discretionary doctrine creates a sweeping power to deny reunification
services in view of the Legislature’s clear preference for keeping families together at the
disposition stage. (See In re Nolan W., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1228 [explaining “‘[f]amily
preservation, with the attendant reunification plan and reunification services, is the first
priority when child dependency proceedings are commenced’” and “‘[r]eunification
services implement “the law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships
if at all possible”’”].)
23
Although CFS did not rely on this case in its brief, we note that in In re A.K.
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 281 (A.K.) this court applied the disentitlement doctrine in
circumstances similar to, though more egregious than, this case. In A.K., the father had
been extremely defiant toward the social worker during the agency’s investigation and
failed to submit to court-ordered drug tests before the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing. (Id. at p. 284; see also id. at p. 286 [concluding the father “possessed ‘an attitude
of contempt to legal orders’”].) While we share the sentiments of the Baby Boy M. court
that defiant or obstructive behavior during the investigation stage is not to be condoned,
we believe the appropriate consequence for such behavior is that it will reflect poorly on
the parent when the juvenile court and later the appellate court assess the merits of their
case. The father in A.K. had violated no court order. As in our case, the court ordered
drug testing after detention, but, as we explained above, that order compelled the social
services agency to provide testing referrals, it did not compel the father to submit to
testing. Thus, the father’s failure to drug test under those circumstances cannot serve as a
basis for applying appellate disentitlement. We therefore decline to follow A.K.’s holding
that a parent who is defiant towards the social services agency but has not violated a court
order or prevented the court from protecting the child can be disentitled to their right to
appeal.
Appellate disentitlement should not be used as a tool for punishing parents who do
not fully cooperate with the social services agency during the investigation stage leading
up to jurisdiction. In our view, the dependency statutes provide appropriate and adequate
24
consequences for such behavior. Disentitlement should be reserved for those cases where
the parent’s violation of court orders makes it impossible for the juvenile court to protect
the child’s best interests. (E.g., In re Kamelia S., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227; In re
E.M., supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) The kind of defiant behavior or failure to engage
in services that might support removal from parental custody at disposition—such as
failing to cooperate with the social services agency, being less than forthcoming during
interviews, or missing drug tests—does not also warrant the ultimate sanction of
appellate disentitlement.
Because mother’s lack of cooperation and obstructive tactics did not rise to the
level of absconding with her children or engaging in conduct that would similarly prevent
the court from protecting her children’s best interests, we will proceed to the merits of her
appeal.
C. Jurisdiction
Mother argues neither her nor father’s conduct supports a finding that E.’s siblings
fall within the court’s dependency jurisdiction. As we will explain, we conclude
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to find the siblings dependents
based on mother’s conduct. As a result of this conclusion, we need not review the
evidentiary basis for the sustained allegations against father. (See In re I.A. (2011) 201
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491-1492 [minors are dependents “if the actions of either parent
25
bring [them] within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent”].) In other words, the
court properly exercised jurisdiction over E.’s siblings regardless of father’s conduct.2
Conceding the court has jurisdiction over E. due to the positive drug tests during
his gestation and birth, mother argues there was no evidence that his older siblings had
been harmed or were at risk of harm at the time of the hearing. She contends there is no
evidence she is a substance abuser and argues her past use of drugs is an insufficient
reason to assert jurisdiction over E.’s siblings. We are not persuaded.
“[S]ection 300 does not require that a child actually be . . . neglected before the
juvenile court can assume jurisdiction. The subdivisions at issue here require only a
‘substantial risk’ that the child will be . . . neglected. The legislatively declared purpose
of these provisions ‘is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are
currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being
exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of
children who are at risk of that harm.’ (§ 300.2, italics added.) ‘The court need not wait
until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps
necessary to protect the child.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
“The Legislature has declared, ‘The provision of a home environment free from
the negative effects of substance abuse is a necessary condition for the safety, protection
and physical and emotional well-being of the child.’ (§ 300.2.)” (L.W., supra, 32
2 Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to address CFS’s argument that mother lacks standing to challenge the evidentiary basis for the sustained jurisdictional allegations against father. 26
Cal.App.5th at p. 849.) “On the other hand, our case law stands for the proposition that
drug use or substance abuse, without more, is an insufficient ground to assert jurisdiction
in dependency proceedings under section 300.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Emphasizing that E.’s siblings were in good health and doing well in her care,
mother argues her case falls under the substance use “without more” category. Given our
standard of review, we reject this argument on the ground the juvenile court could
reasonably draw a different conclusion from the evidence. First of all, mother’s past use
of drugs was serious in and of itself. As the court aptly reasoned during the hearing,
mother’s past drug use was reckless and occurred on more than one occasion—she used
drugs three times that we know of during her pregnancy. And, while a big part of this
case is the drug use that we know about, that’s not the only facet of mother’s behavior
that could give the juvenile court cause for concern over the children’s safety.
The record reveals that in addition to using drugs while pregnant, she was also
evasive and resisted investigation and help from CFS. Not long after the agency learned
of E.’s positive toxicology, mother refused to speak with the social worker and tried to
hide her children by temporarily giving them to a friend to care for. The record also
supports a conclusion that she has been dishonest about the extent of her drug use. She
never actually admitted using amphetamine while pregnant and consistently maintained
an implausible story of accidental ingestion to explain the second positive amphetamine
test. In addition, she initially refused a team meeting because she wanted to keep the
positive toxicology results from her family, which could be interpreted as a sign that
27
avoiding detection was more important to her than addressing the issue and developing a
plan to keep her children safe.
The record also supports a conclusion that mother has been resistant to treatment
and monitoring. She avoided or missed several drug tests and, at the time of the hearing,
had not seriously begun any services to address her issues. Finally, mother’s drug use
coupled with father’s admission that, while she was pregnant with E., the family had been
staying with people who were using substances reasonably supports an inference that
mother minimizes or does not appreciate the potential dangers to children caused by
being around drug use.
Mother’s attempt to analogize this case to In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 646 is
unpersuasive. In that case, the legal guardian of L.C. (who by all accounts was healthy
and doing well) admitted to having used methamphetamine six or seven times. He said
that on each occasion he had stayed in a hotel and arranged for child care so he would not
be around L.C. while he was under the influence. (Id. at p. 650.) Initially, the guardian
had denied using methamphetamine, but once he learned he could lose custody of L.C.,
he admitted having used, began consistently testing on his own initiative (even before the
agency enrolled him in random drug testing), and promptly enrolled in substance abuse
treatment. (Ibid.) The obvious and significant difference between L.C. and this case is
that mother had the poor judgment to use while she was pregnant and then failed to take
the proactive monitoring and treatment steps that L.C.’s guardian took.
28
We find this case more like In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210,
1217, where the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination that the
mother’s four children were persons described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1). At
birth, the mother’s youngest child tested positive for cocaine, amphetamine, and
methamphetamine, but she denied having used cocaine while pregnant. (Christopher R.,
at p. 1213.) She conceded jurisdiction was proper as to her youngest because the child
“was born with a positive toxicology screen for cocaine and other illicit drugs,” but
argued that “the evidence of her sporadic drug use was insufficient to support the findings
she was a current substance abuser and [that her other three children] were at substantial
risk of serious physical harm justifying the exercise of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”
(Id. at p. 1215.) The appellate court rejected this argument, reasoning the juvenile court
was free to disbelieve the mother’s claim of sporadic drug use, based on her conduct
during the case. “[The mother] used cocaine (and, based on the positive toxicology screen
for [the infant] at birth, amphetamine and methamphetamine) while she was pregnant,
unquestionably endangering the health and safety of her unborn child. She also admitted
she had used cocaine in the past although claiming she had stopped using when she was
17 years old. Given her initial false denial of any cocaine use in the days before [her
youngest] was born, the juvenile court reasonably disbelieved [her] portrayal of limited,
sporadic drug use. . . . This evidence, taken together with [her] unstable lifestyle and
Similarly here, given mother’s implausible denial of the extent of her drug use
while pregnant, her evasive behavior, and her resistance to monitoring and services, the
juvenile court could reasonably disbelieve her offer of proof that she was no longer using.
We conclude the record contains substantial evidence to support a finding that, at the
time of the hearing, E.’s siblings were at risk of suffering serious harm as the result of
neglect on mother’s part.3
D. Disposition
Mother also challenges the evidentiary basis for removing all of the children from
her and father’s care.
We start with the order removing the children from mother. At the time of the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, she had moved to Los Angeles and was no longer
living with father. She did not provide any details about her new residence or ask the
court to place the children with her. Instead, her counsel said he “underst[oo]d the Court
has a legal basis for removal from [mother] based on the Court’s [jurisdictional]
findings,” and argued the court could safely place the children with father and provide
family reunification services for mother. In other words, mother provided the court with
no basis to conclude it could safely return the children to her custody. She had not made
any meaningful progress in services and the court knew nothing of her new home
3 Mother spends much of her brief challenging the idea that her family’s living and sleeping arrangements supported jurisdiction. For example, she argues the sole fact that E.’s siblings sometimes slept on an inflatable mattress did not make their home unsafe. We agree. But as we explained, it is the circumstances surrounding her drug use that have created the danger of harm for her children, not the state of her former apartment. 30
environment. For those reasons alone, we conclude the court’s decision to remove the
children from mother was supported by substantial evidence.
As to the order removing the children from father, mother argues the only
potentially negative evidence regarding his parenting abilities was his single positive test
for amphetamine, which he claimed was caused by taking Sudafed the day of the test and
which came back negative after a confirmation test.4 Again, a reasonable trier of fact
could interpret the evidence differently.
During the six months between the referral and the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, father denied mother had a drug problem (despite learning of E.’s positive
toxicology at birth), sent the social worker a recalcitrant text message demanding she
leave his family alone, attempted to give the children to a family friend during the
investigation, tested positive for marijuana, missed a number of tests, made no progress
in services, and moved in with a relative who had a significant criminal history. Based on
this evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that father lived in an
environment unsuitable for children, would not cooperate with CFS (to the point of
willful obstruction), would not protect his children from mother’s drug problem, and
possibly had a drug problem of his own. These inferences support a conclusion that the
children could not safely be returned to his custody.
4 We reject CFS’s contention that mother lacks standing to challenge the disposition order as to father. Mother has standing because the children’s placement in out-of-home care “has the potential to adversely affect [her] own interests in reunifying with [them].” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 848-849.) 31
Mother argues this case is identical to In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139,
146 (Hailey T.), where the appellate court affirmed the jurisdictional findings but
reversed the removal order as to one of the parents’ children. In that case, the parents had
a four-month-old son and a three-year-old daughter, Hailey. One day after the maternal
grandmother had been watching the children, the mother noticed the son was crying and
one of his eyes was red. (Id. at p. 142.) The parents took the child to a doctor who
concluded he had a subconjunctival hemorrhage that was inflicted by nonaccidental
means. (Ibid.) Neither parent was able to explain the child’s injury other than to posit that
Hailey might have hurt him when she was combing his hair or playing with his toys.
(Ibid.) The parents had been married for nine years and had no prior child welfare
history, and the social worker believed they appeared to be good parents. (Id. at p. 143.)
Hailey said no one fought or yelled in the home. After the agency detained the children,
the parents started attending weekly parenting courses, individual counseling, and a 52-
week child abuse class, and they visited the children daily and helped with their basic
care. (Id. at p. 144.) The court took jurisdiction over both children and ordered removal
from the parents because the identity of the perpetrator was unknown and the children
were so young. (Id. at p. 145.)
The appellate court reversed the removal order as to Hailey, explaining that past
abuse of a sibling does not, on its own, justify removing a child from their parents. The
court found that the risk to Hailey of any future abuse was “strikingly less” than the risk
facing her infant brother. (Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 147.) “Hailey was not
32
an infant of only a few months old, who would be unable to articulate any abuse to which
she might be subjected, and who would be completely isolated from the observations of
mandated reporters of abuse. By the time of the disposition hearing, Hailey was a four-
year-old child, with good language skills and an outgoing and social nature. She attended
school where she had regular contact with teachers and other mandated reporters of any
suspected abuse.” (Ibid.) The court also found significant the fact that there was
“abundant evidence” that the parents were good parents who enjoyed a healthy
relationship. “[T]here was no evidence of any physical domestic violence between the
parents during their nine-year marriage. Neither parent had substance abuse problems,
and there was no evidence that either suffered from mental health conditions,
developmental delays or other social issues that often are at the root of dependency cases
and might place children at continuing risk in the home. [They] were parents who started
services at the earliest opportunity, showed progress in the services and had meaningful
and productive visits with the children. Even Agency participants in a team decision
meeting early on in the case recognized [the mother and the father] were good parents.”
(Id. at pp. 147-148.)
We find that case easily distinguishable from this one. Unlike the parents in Hailey
T., mother and father did not cooperate with the social worker or engage meaningfully in
services when CFS became involved with their family. To the contrary, they were
emphatically resistant to the agency’s investigation, demanding the social worker leave
them alone and trying to avoid further investigation by giving their children to a family
33
friend. Over the ensuing six months, they became only slightly more cooperative by
appearing at hearings and submitting to some drug tests. But on the whole, their resistant
behavior and lack of progress in services reflect a desire to avoid investigation into the
extent of their drug use and a lack of insight into the serious problems parental drug use
poses.
“The trial court is in the best position to determine the degree to which a child is at
risk based on an assessment of all the relevant factors in each case.” (In re Drake M.
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 766.) On this record, we cannot agree with mother that there
was an insufficient evidentiary basis to remove the children from her and father.
As a final point, we address an incorrect argument CFS makes in its briefing that
appears to have stemmed from a rise in appellate opinions misinterpreting section 361,
subdivision (c)(1) and the burden of proof required to justify removal from a parent’s
custody. Citing In re R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th 837, CFS asserts that the “jurisdiction
findings constitute prima face evidence supporting a juvenile court’s finding a child
cannot safely remain in the home.” The Welfare and Institutions Code does contain a
statutory presumption in favor of removal, but that presumption applies only to a narrow
class of cases—those where the child has been adjudicated a dependent under section
300, subdivision (e) (severe physical abuse of a minor under five years old).
As a general rule, the required burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
Section 361 provides that a juvenile court must not remove a child from parental custody
“unless [it] finds clear and convincing evidence of any of the following circumstances
34
listed in paragraphs (1) to (5),” which include the circumstance where “[t]here is or
would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . custody.” (§ 361, subds. (c) & (c)(1).)
“‘The elevated burden of proof for removal from the home . . . reflects the Legislature’s
recognition of the rights of parents to the care, custody and management of their children,
and further reflects an effort to keep children in their homes where it is safe to do so.
[Citations.] By requiring clear and convincing evidence of the risk of substantial harm to
the child if returned home and the lack of reasonable means short of removal to protect
the child’s safety, section 361, subdivision (c) demonstrates the ‘bias of the controlling
statute is on family preservation, not removal.’” (In re A.R. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1102,
1115.)
Section 361 provides a single exception to the general rule: “The fact that a minor
has been adjudicated a dependent child of the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section
300 shall constitute prima facie evidence that the minor cannot be safely left in the
physical custody of the parent.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) Section 300,
subdivision (e) applies when the court has found that “the child is under the age of five
years and has suffered severe physical abuse by a parent, or by any person known by the
parent, if the parent knew or reasonably should have known” of the abuse. Thus, the
Welfare and Institutions Code establishes a rebuttable presumption that removal is
35
necessary in a narrow subset of cases—those where a young child has been severely
physically abused and the parent was either the perpetrator of the abuse or unreasonably
failed to protect the child from the abuse. In those cases, the fact the court adjudicated the
child a dependent under section 300, subdivision (e) serves as prima facie evidence that
the child faces a substantial risk of physical harm in the parent’s custody and there are no
reasonable means to protect the child short of removal. For all other cases, however, the
general rule applies and the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence to
justify removal. (§ 361, subd. (c).)
R.V. is one of the earliest opinions to say the statutory presumption applies in a
case where the child had not been adjudicated a dependent under a section 300,
subdivision (e). (See also In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917 (Cole C.)
[presumption applied even though child was adjudicated a dependent under § 300, subd.
(j) based on the father’s excessive discipline of the child’s older stepsiblings].) The child
in R.V. had been adjudicated a dependent under section 300, subdivision (j) based on the
father’s sexual abuse of an older sister. The appellate court stated the jurisdictional
findings against father were “prima facie evidence the child cannot safely remain in the
home.” (R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) The court’s only citation to support this
proposition was section 361, subdivision (c)(1), which, as just explained, limits the
statutory presumption to section 300, subdivision (e). (Ibid.)
After Cole C. and R.V., other appellate courts followed suit, similarly overlooking
the limitation on the presumption. (E.g., Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 146
36
[presumption applied even though child was adjudicated a dependent under § 300, subd.
(a)]; In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126 [same, in a § 300, subd. (b) case];
In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 135 [same]; In re A.E. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
820, 825 [same, in a § 300, subds. (a) & (b) case]; In re J.S. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
1483, 1492 [same, in a § 300, subd. (b) case]; In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 289,
292 [same].) The recent trend in misreading section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is not without
real consequences. Applying the presumption to all dependency cases effectively
“deprives parents of appellate review of removal if there was a sufficient evidentiary
basis for jurisdiction.” (In re G.C. (Apr. 24, 2020, E072514) __Cal.App.5th __ [2020
constitute prima facie evidence that the children cannot safely remain in the home, then
whenever there is substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings, the removal
findings and orders must be affirmed as well”].)
At least one published case, In re K.S. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 327 (K.S.), has
rejected the argument that the statutory presumption applies at every disposition hearing.
(See Id. at p. 342 [“The Agency argues that jurisdiction findings are prima facie evidence
that a child cannot safely remain in a parent’s care under section 361, subdivision (c)(1).
But that prima facie finding only applies to a jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (e) that a child under five years old has been physically abused”].) We agree
with K.S. The statutory presumption in favor of removal applies only when the child has
been adjudicated a dependent under section 300, subdivision (e).
37
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
SLOUGH Acting P. J.
We concur:
FIELDS J.
MENETREZ J.
38
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and removal orders, concluding that substantial evidence supported the determination that the children were at risk of harm due to the parents' substance abuse, lack of cooperation, and failure to engage in services. The court also held that the appellate disentitlement doctrine did not apply to the mother's appeal.
Issues
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's dispositional order removing the children from parental custody.
Whether the appellate disentitlement doctrine warrants dismissal of the mother's appeal due to her lack of cooperation with the agency and court orders.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude substantial evidence supports the challenged findings and orders, and therefore affirm.”
“In dependency cases, the interest at stake for a parent is “enormous.””
“The disentitlement doctrine, or appellate disentitlement, refers to a reviewing court’s “inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a party who has refused to comply with the orders of the trial court.””