et seq; and (2) all orders must be reversed because the juvenile court failed to comply
with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because
California did not have subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons explained herein, we
reject Mother’s contentions and affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 2, 2017, DPSS received an immediate response referral with
allegations of general neglect and sexual abuse. It was reported that Mother had allowed
her two sons to go into a hotel room for hours with an 18-year-old male stranger who
sexually abused them. After Mother discovered the sexual abuse, she failed to report the
1 R.O. (Father R.O.) is the father of A.M. and is not a party to this appeal. J.T., Sr., is the father of J.T. (Father J.T.) and is also not a party to this appeal.
2 All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
2
alleged crime to law enforcement. Instead, the suspect disclosed what he had done to his
mother, who then drove the suspect to the police station to turn himself in.
When the social worker interviewed the boys, A.M. disclosed that he attended the
third grade at an elementary school in Beaumont, but could not recall the last time he had
attended school. He and J.T. had previously lived “with their father someplace far away
as well.” A.M. “believed they were living in Los Angeles with his father.” They had
“lived in a number of homes with friends.” A.M. also reported Mother did not have
much money so they had stayed in more than five or six homes with people willing to
help them, “and all while he was eight years old.” He and his family moved into their
present hotel two days prior, but previously had lived with “various friends, family
members of friends, and people they did not know before.” A.M. also disclosed several
incidents of domestic violence involving Mother and her significant other. J.T. stated
that he “reside[d] with friends, his mother, his brother, his dad, ‘Uncle Grandpa,’ and
‘Batman.’”
The social worker also interviewed and drug tested Mother due to her behavior.
Mother drug tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Mother admitted to
smoking methamphetamine. She reported that she had been diagnosed with anxiety,
depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and was not on
medication. When asked about her residence plan, Mother stated that she and her boys
will stay with a friend in Victorville or she will find another place to go for the night.
Her safety network consisted only of J.L., also known as “‘Batman,’” because her former
3
foster family “moved out of state and abandoned her and the children.” Mother also had
a few friends who helped her by giving she and her sons a place to stay for a few days.
Due to concerns for the children’s safety, J.T. and A.M. were taken into protective
custody.
When questioned about the children’s placement, Mother informed the social
worker that J.T.’s father resided in Arizona and is the only father A.M. had ever known.3
Mother reported there was a family law case open in Las Vegas, Nevada. Father J.T. did
not bring the boys back to Mother on time after a visit earlier this year. Mother did not
believe Father J.T. could care for the children, because he was not stable and had a
problem with alcohol.
The social worker thereafter contacted Father J.T. He stated that he lived in
Arizona with relatives but was unable to provide a physical address, because he had just
moved in. He and the paternal grandmother had been primarily caring for the children
since they were babies. The children were with his mother for more than a year and with
him for approximately five months in Las Vegas earlier this year. He also stated that
Mother came to get A.M. and left with both children after a visit and that Mother has had
the children in her care for only a few months. Father J.T. admitted having a drug and
alcohol history and wanted the children to be released to him. He also agreed to contact
the paternal grandmother to discuss possible placement of the children in her care.
3 Father R.O. was incarcerated in state prison serving a 41-year-to-life sentence for first degree murder. He had been incarcerated since 2009 and had no contact with A.M. except through letters and telephone. The juvenile court later found Father J.T. to be the presumed father for both children.
4
On December 5, 2017, a petition was filed on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to support), (d) (sexual abuse), and (g) (no provision
for support).
Regarding ICWA, Mother was “unsure if she [was] of American Indian descent”
and “denied that she or the children [were] registered with a tribe.” Fathers J.T. and R.O.
denied American Indian ancestry. At the detention hearing, both Mother and Father J.T.
indicated having no American Indian ancestry. However, in Mother’s ICWA-020 form,
she checked the box indicating that she was or may be a member of, or eligible for
membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe and wrote the tribe’s name as
“unknown.” She also checked the box indicating that one or more of her parents,
grandparents, or other lineal ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized tribe
and wrote “MGF, MGA[C.M.]” beside the box. In Father J.T.’s ICWA-020 form, he
stated that he had no Indian ancestry.
On December 6, 2017, the juvenile court formally removed the children from
parental custody and found that ICWA may apply. The court authorized an Interstate
Compact for Placement of Children (ICPC) with the state of Arizona and directed DPSS
to continue with their assessment of relatives for placement.
On December 15, 2017, DPSS filed an ICWA-030 Notice of Child Custody
Proceeding (ICWA notice) as to each child. In the ICWA notice, DPSS included each
child’s name, date and place of birth, and attached each child’s birth certificate. The
ICWA notices also included Mother’s name, former address, and date and place of birth,
5
as well as Father J.T.’s name, former address, and date and place of birth. As to A.M.,
the ICWA notice included Father R.O.’s name, current address, and date of birth. Place
of birth is indicated as “Unknown.” Under the tribe box for Mother, the ICWA notices
stated, “Bureau of Indian Affairs [(BIA)], No Tribe Specified.” Under the tribe box for
Father J.T. and Father R.O., the ICWA notices stated, “Does not apply.” The ICWA
notices also included the maternal grandmother’s and maternal grandfather’s names,
former addresses, dates and places of birth, and dates and places of death. No tribe was
specified for either maternal grandparent. The ICWA notices further noted the paternal
grandmother’s name (Father J.T.’s mother), current address and birth date. Under tribe,
DPSS noted “Does not apply.” No information was provided as to A.M.’s paternal
grandmother or either childs’ paternal grandfather. “M.T.” is noted to be J.T.’s maternal
great-grandmother with a current address of Los Angeles, California. No additional
information was provided as to the children’s maternal great-grandparents or Mother’s
grandfather’s name (C.M.), or either child’s paternal great-grandparents.
DPSS mailed the ICWA notices by certified mail on December 14, 2017, to the
BIA. On December 29, 2017, the BIA acknowledged receipt of the ICWA notices and
indicated that it is returning the “letter of inquiry due to insufficient information to
determine tribal affiliation (25 CFR 23.11 (d)) or you have not identified a tribe. When
additional information becomes available, please forward the Notice to the appropriate
tribe(s) using the latest ICWA Designated Tribal Agents List.”
6
On December 21, 2017, Mother informed the social worker that “she was told that
she has Blackfoot and Cherokee tribe affiliation but was not registered.” She also stated
that she “planned to register with them on the day of contact.” The social worker
attempted to assist Mother in obtaining the contact information for the tribes so Mother
could register but was unable to find such information. The social worker informed
Mother that if she was “found to have affiliation with the tribes, she could be appointed
an attorney from the tribes and placement of the children could change.”
Mother disclosed that she was raised in the foster care system due to her biological
parents not being involved in her life. She was placed in legal guardianship at the age of
18 months until she was 11 years old, and then was placed in group homes until she was
emancipated from the system. She moved to Arizona in 2009 and remained there until
August 29, 2016. She had been diagnosed with bipolar, depression, and ADHD, and had
been prescribed multiple psychotropic medications.
Father J.T. reported that he was born in California, moving to Arizona shortly after
his birth, returning to California for the second half of high school. He met Mother in
2009 and they moved in together with his family in 2011 until the end of their
relationship in 2014. Mother then moved out and became a transient, while he kept the
children. In the summer of 2017, Mother took the children back to California with her.
He contacted law enforcement but “was informed he had no grounds to claim she
kidnap[ped the children] since there was no court order from family law.” He reported
that he “filed the paperwork but was unable to follow through with it due to the mother’s
7
whereabouts being unknown at that time.” He “eventually was informed by people living
in Arizona that the children were [in California].”
The social worker received a telephone call from a family member who reported
the last time they had contact with the children was “during the summer of 2017” and that
they were informed Mother “‘stole’” the children from Las Vegas by hopping on a
Greyhound bus. The family member also stated the last known location for Mother and
children was them residing in Indio, California. The family member expressed a concern
that the parents had been unable to keep a stable home for the children.
On December 21, 2017, Father J.T. informed the social worker that he had
completed and submitted “family law orders” regarding J.T. after Mother “took his son
without question.” “He reported because the mother’s whereabouts were unknown, he
was unable to successfully serve her with the documents.” He had received numerous
messages on Facebook that the children were in Tucson, Arizona, but denied refiling the
paperwork due to Mother then moving to Barstow and her allowing him to see the
children. Mother was unaware of whether there were family law orders in place for J.T.
She noted receiving documents in the mail a few days before her birthday in 2016 but the
documents told her she did not have to appear in court. She believed Father J.T. “did not
appear either and child support was established at that hearing.”
Father J.T. also stated that A.M. was not attending school in Las Vegas and he was
not aware if the child was attending school in either California or Arizona. He believed
A.M. was enrolled in an elementary school in Barstow. The social worker attempted to
8
gather information from the “Corona/Norco” school district to determine how many
schools A.M. had attended in California.
DPSS was unable to locate relatives for the children and placed them in foster
care. DPSS eventually submitted an ICPC request on behalf of the paternal grandmother.
On January 8, 2018, Mother was arrested for robbery and was in jail.
On January 9, 2018, the juvenile court found “good ICWA notice” and continued
the contested jurisdictional hearing for a placement assessment. The court authorized an
ICPC with the paternal grandmother in Nevada.
On February 14, 2018, Mother was sentenced to two years in state prison for
assault with a deadly weapon causing great bodily injury and evading a police officer.
At the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing held February 15, 2018, the
juvenile court found the allegations in the first amended petition true and declared the
children dependents of the court. Custody was removed from the parents and
reunification services were ordered for Mother and Father J.T. Father R.O. was denied
services under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(12) and (e)(1). The court also ordered an
ICPC with Father J.T. and found DPSS had conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that
ICWA may apply.
On July 10, 2018, Mother reported that she “may have Blackfoot Tribe ancestry”
but that she was not registered. The social worker noted that it had been over six months
since Mother first reported affiliation with the Blackfeet tribe and that she was not
registered. However, Mother had not made any attempts to follow up on this
9
information. The social worker therefore recommended the court find ICWA “does not
apply to this case.” No ICWA notices were sent to the Blackfeet or Cherokee tribes.
On July 12, 2018, Mother reported that it was she who had initially completed and
submitted family law orders for J.T., because Father J.T. had attempted to keep J.T. from
her. However, Mother did not follow through with filing the papers. There were no
family law orders in place at that time.
After Mother was released from custody on July 27, 2018, she enrolled in a drug
treatment program. She also participated in some of her services while incarcerated, and
was taking prescription medication for depression and anxiety. She did not have stable
housing or employment.
Father J.T. did not participate in any services during the review period. In
addition, he was “‘hearing voices in his head.’” The state of Arizona denied his ICPC
due to Father J.T.’s lack of compliance with the ICPC process. Several attempts were
made by Arizona’s ICPC unit to conduct a home study of Father J.T.’s residence, but he
did not cooperate. Therefore, the ICPC referral was denied and closed. Father J.T. said
that he was homeless and currently staying at a friend’s home in Arizona.
Neither parent had any in-person visitation with the children. However, Mother
had weekly monitored telephone contact with the children. Father called the children
once in the past six months but did not speak to them.
On August 15, 2018, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply, continued
reunification services for Mother, and terminated services for Father J.T.
10
By the 12-month review hearing, Mother did not have stable housing or
employment. She was temporarily residing with a friend and occasionally cleaning
houses for money. She had two active warrants for her arrest. In addition, she left her
substance abuse program prior to its completion and did not enroll in another drug
treatment program or counseling. Mother, however, completed a parenting course and
randomly drug tested negatively. Her visits with the children were inconsistent and
Father J.T. did not visit the children at all. During the reporting period, no new
information had been provided to suggest that ICWA applied to the children.
On December 14, 2018, the children were placed with the paternal grandmother in
Nevada. The children were thriving and doing well in the paternal grandmother’s home.
The paternal grandmother was nurturing and loving towards the children and their
emotional and physical needs were being met.
On February 8, 2019, the juvenile court found that ICWA did not apply,
terminated Mother’s reunification services, reduced the parents’ visitation to once per
month, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
In its section 366.26 hearing report, DPSS noted that during “this reporting period,
no new information has been provided to suggest that ICWA applies to the children.”
The children continued to thrive in their placement with the paternal grandmother. The
paternal grandmother was nurturing toward the children, attended to all their needs, and
the children appeared to be bonded to her. The paternal grandmother desired to adopt the
children. Father J.T. had not visited the children, but called them “sporadically.” Since
11
being placed in Nevada, Mother had called to talk to the children “sporadically every
three to four weeks.”
On September 5, 2019, Mother filed section 388 petitions, seeking return of the
children to her care on family maintenance services. Mother alleged that she had
completed her case plan, maintained visitation, and shared a strong bond with the
children.
On September 6, 2019, DPSS reported that Mother was sentenced to state prison
for a term of three years and that her release date was scheduled for March 2021. DPSS
also noted that the children were doing well and were stable in their placement with the
paternal grandmother who desired to adopt them.
The combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearings were held on September 6,
2019. Mother was present in custody. DPSS submitted on its reports and all counsel
stipulated that Mother’s stipulated testimony could apply for both hearings. The juvenile
court denied Mother’s section 388 petitions for failing to state either changed
circumstances or best interest of the children. The court also terminated parental rights
and found the children adoptable.
On September 30, 2019, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, challenging the
orders made at the September 6, 2019 hearings.
12
III
DISCUSSION
A. Compliance with ICWA
Mother contends the order terminating parental rights must be reversed because
DPSS did not comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of ICWA, resulting in
incomplete ICWA notices being sent.4 We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
“The juvenile court must determine whether proper notice was given under ICWA
and whether ICWA applies to the proceedings. [Citation.]” (In re Charlotte V. (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 51, 57.) When, as is the case here, the facts are undisputed, we review
independently whether the requirements of ICWA have been satisfied. (In re J.L. (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 913, 918 (J.L.).) However, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s order. (In re Hunter W. (2011) 200
Cal.App.4th 1454, 1467; In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 119-120.) We must
uphold the court’s orders and findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in favor of affirmance. (In re
Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.)
4 The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights did not specifically mention ICWA, but the order was “necessarily premised on a current finding by the juvenile court that it had no reason to know [the children] [were] [] Indian child[ren] and thus ICWA notice was not required.” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 10, italics omitted (Isaiah W.).)
13
2. Relevant Law
“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising concern in the mid-1970’s
over the consequences to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive
child welfare practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-
Indian homes.’” (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 7-8.) “ICWA reflects a congressional
determination to protect Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards a state court must
follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family. [Citations.] For purposes
of ICWA, an ‘Indian child’ is an unmarried individual under age 18 who is either a
member of a federally recognized Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in a federally
recognized tribe and is the biological child of a member of a federally recognized tribe.
[Citations.]” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 768, 783 (Elizabeth M.).)
There are two separate ICWA requirements which are sometimes conflated: the
obligation to give notice to a tribe, and the obligation to conduct further inquiry to
determine whether notice is necessary. Notice to a tribe is required, under federal and
state law, when the court knows or has reason to know the child is an Indian child.
(Elizabeth M., supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 784.) In contrast, prior to January 2019, the
department was to make further inquiry if it “knows or has reason to know that an Indian
child is or may be involved” in the case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), italics
added.)
14
The “‘courts and county welfare departments “have an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300 . . . is to be, or has
been, filed is or may be an Indian child in all dependency proceedings . . . if the child is at
risk of entering foster care or is in foster care.”’ [Citation.]” (J.L., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 918, italics omitted.) “This notice requirement, which is also codified in California
law [citation], enables a tribe to determine whether the child is an Indian child and, if so,
whether to intervene in or exercise jurisdiction over the proceeding.” (Isaiah W., supra, 1
Cal.5th at p. 5.)
Although the notice requirement has always been triggered by a court having
“‘reason to know’” a child may be an Indian child, for many years the term was
undefined under federal law. (See In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 650.) It
was not until 2016 that the Department of the Interior promulgated regulations defining
Furthermore, the children and Mother had significant connections with the state
beyond mere presence. Mother had been raised in California and her foster siblings
resided in California. In addition, Father and a relative stated that when Mother took the
children “back” to California during the summer of 2017, she and the children resided in
Indio, California. A.M. was born in California, and Father J.T. believed A.M. was
enrolled in an elementary school in Barstow, California. A.M. informed the social
worker that they lived with friends, and that he attended third grade at an elementary
school in Beaumont, California. Because the requirements of Family Code section 3421
were met, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination pursuant to this section.
Even if it did not have jurisdiction pursuant to Family Code section 3421, the
juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under Family Code section 3424.
Temporary emergency jurisdiction is available to a California court if the child is present
in this state and it is necessary to protect the child from mistreatment or abuse. (Fam.
Code, § 3424, subd. (a).) This provision is to be interpreted expansively. (Fam. Code,
33
§ 3424, subd. (e).) Mother does not argue that the circumstances present here do not
qualify for emergency jurisdiction.
Mother correctly points out that when a juvenile court exercises emergency
jurisdiction, “upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced
in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having
jurisdiction under [Family Code] [s]ections 3421 to 3423, inclusive, [it] shall
immediately communicate with the other court.” (Fam. Code, § 3424, subd. (d).) While
there was some suggestion that a family law or child custody proceeding had commenced
in either Nevada or Arizona, DPSS did not obtain any information about any such
proceeding and specified that there were no family law orders in place.
Although Mother initially stated that there was a family law case open in Nevada,
she later clarified that there was not a pending family law proceeding. On December 26,
2017, Mother reported “she [was] unaware of whether or not there are family law orders
in place for her son,” J.T. On July 12, 2018, Mother further explained that she had
initially completed and submitted family law orders regarding J.T., because Father J.T.
was attempting to keep J.T. from her, but that she did not follow through with filing the
papers to obtain family law orders.
Furthermore, Father J.T., who would necessarily be a party to any such action, was
unaware of any family law or child custody proceedings in either Nevada or Arizona. On
December 21, 2017, Father J.T. reported that he had completed and submitted family law
orders regarding J.T., after Mother took J.T. during the summer of 2017. Father J.T. later
34
clarified that because Mother’s whereabouts were unknown to him, he was unable to
successfully serve her with the documents. He denied refiling the paperwork, due to
Mother moving to Barstow and her allowing him to see the children. Law enforcement
also informed Father J.T. that he had no grounds to claim Mother kidnapped the children
“since there was no court order from family law.”
There is no evidence that Mother was served with documents regarding child
custody proceedings, as she claims. Mother reported receiving some documents in the
mail a few days before her birthday in 2016, but stated the documents told her she did not
have to appear in court. She believed Father J.T. “did not appear either and child support
was established at that hearing.” Even if an order for child support was established at
that hearing, there is no evidence that child custody orders were made at that hearing.
Both parents stated that no such child custody order existed. Law enforcement also noted
that no family law orders were in effect as of the summer of 2017.
In the absence of actual judicial records from either Nevada or Arizona, or official
notice to Father J.T. or notice to Mother, the juvenile court was entitled to discredit the
parents’ vague references to family law proceedings in either Nevada or Arizona. Mother
has not made an offer of proof or affirmative assertion on appeal regarding the existence
of a relevant Nevada or Arizona proceeding. We therefore find, to the extent that the
juvenile court impliedly discredited the verbal, hearsay claim of a proceeding in Nevada
or Arizona, the evidence supports an implied factual finding that no such proceeding took
place. The court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction can ripen into continuing
35
jurisdiction where, as here, no other state with grounds for continuing jurisdiction exists.
(In re Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 967 (Gino C.).)
In sum, the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction, and the orders need not
be vacated for lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, any error in failing to comply with the UCCJEA was harmless.
“Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the UCCJEA is subject to
harmless error analysis. [Citations.]” (Cristian I., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.)
Under a harmless error analysis, no judgment can be reversed for ordinary error unless
the error complained of “has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13.) Reversal is justified “only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see Cristian I., at pp. 1098-
1099.)
We find Mother’s contention that the juvenile court erred in failing to comply with
the requirements of the UCCJEA harmless. Mother has not shown that she was
prejudiced either by the juvenile court’s failure to address UCCJEA, or to contact Nevada
or Arizona authorities. First, we have determined that California had jurisdiction
pursuant to Family Code section 3421. Because it had such jurisdiction, the court’s
failure to directly address the UCCJEA issue was harmless. Neither Nevada nor Arizona
qualified as the children’s home state, thus the juvenile court did not need to contact the
36
Nevada or Arizona court. Mother has not shown that, had the juvenile court specifically
addressed the UCCJEA, the juvenile court would have come to the conclusion that it did
not have jurisdiction, that it was required to contact Nevada or Arizona, or that it was
required to cede jurisdiction to Nevada or Arizona.
Even if the juvenile court’s jurisdiction were merely emergency jurisdiction, the
juvenile court was entitled to disregard the vague, verbal reference to a child custody
proceeding in Nevada or Arizona. In the absence of more concrete evidence of such a
proceeding, the juvenile court was not required to “communicate with the other court” as
set forth in Family Code section 3424, subdivision (d). (See, e.g., In re R.L. (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 125, 145 [harmless error for the juvenile court not to contact a Mexican
court, where the juvenile court properly asserted temporary emergency jurisdiction, and
no child custody action was filed in Mexico].) We note that in the absence of a court
order or other official court document, the juvenile court would not know what court to
contact. Mother had ample opportunity to provide such evidence in this proceeding, and
has failed to do so.
Mother cites several cases in which a juvenile court’s failure to comply with the
requirements of the UCCJEA have been considered reversible error. These cases are
factually distinguishable.
37
In Gino C., Mexico was the children’s home state because the children had lived
there for six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the case. (Gino C.,
supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 964-965.) The juvenile court declined to contact Mexico,
despite its knowledge that Mexico was the children’s home state. Thus, the juvenile
court did not have jurisdiction under Family Code section 3421, subdivision (a). While it
had temporary emergency jurisdiction, the juvenile court’s orders could not become final
unless Mexico affirmatively declined to exercise its home state jurisdiction. (Gino C., at
p. 966.) The judgment was therefore reversed, and remanded for further proceedings.
(Id. at p. 968.) Here, unlike in Gino C., there is insufficient evidence to show either
Nevada or Arizona was the children’s home state.
Similarly, in In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, the father and children lived
in Tijuana for at least six months before child protective services in California filed a
petition on the children’s behalf. The children were detained when their mother was
arrested as she attempted to smuggle drugs across the border with the children in the car.
(Id. at p. 596.) While the juvenile court properly assumed temporary emergency
jurisdiction, the matter was remanded to provide notice to Mexican authorities and
inquire whether Mexico wished to commence proceedings to protect the children. (Id. at
pp. 599-600.) Again, the matter is distinguishable because Mexico was unquestionably
the children’s home state.
Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court properly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction.
38
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CODRINGTON Acting P. J. We concur:
FIELDS J.
RAPHAEL J.
39
Filed 4/2/20 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. E073805 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, (Super.Ct.No. RIJ1700999) Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION A.M., FOR PUBLICATION Defendant and Appellant.
The court has reviewed a request filed March 17, 2020, to publish the nonpublished opinion filed in the above matter March 5, 2020. The request is GRANTED. The opinion meets the standards for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c)(4), (6), and (7).
IT IS SO ORDERED that said opinion be certified for partial publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b).
CODRINGTON Acting P. J. We concur:
FIELDS J.
RAPHAEL J.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part III.B.
1
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the termination of parental rights, holding that the Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) satisfied its inquiry and notice obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and that the juvenile court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction.
Issues
Did the Department of Public Social Services comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act?
Did the juvenile court have subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights did not specifically mention ICWA, but the order was “necessarily premised on a current finding by the juvenile court that it had no reason to know [the children] [were] [] Indian child[ren]”
“We reject Mother’s contentions and affirm the judgment.”