offender (Pen. Code,1 §§ 290.012, 290.018, subd. (b)). He also admitted a strike prior
(§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court indicated it
would strike the strike prior at sentencing.
During the pendency of his sentencing hearing, Keene was released on his own
recognizance. Thereafter, Keene failed to appear for sentencing and was ultimately
arrested on a bench warrant.
At the sentencing hearing, Keene's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied.
The court struck the "strike" prior and sentenced Keene to the middle term of two years
for the offense plus one year for the prison prior. The court also imposed a $1500
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and $224 in other fees and assessments. Keene did
not object to the fines, fees or assessments; nor did he request a hearing on his ability to
pay any of the imposed amounts.
Keene appeals relying on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).
He contends the imposition of fines, fees and assessments without first holding a hearing
on his present ability to pay denied him due process. He also contends that if we find the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2
issue to be forfeited for failure to timely raise it, trial counsel was ineffective. We will
reject his contentions and affirm.
DISCUSSION
A. The Dueñas Issue Has Been Forfeited
At the core of the Dueñas opinion is its holding that imposition of fines, fees or
assessments without a hearing on ability to pay denies due process. It was that court's
view it was the trial court's duty to hold a hearing and thus failure to seek a hearing did
not result in forfeiture. Further, the court found that the burden to prove "present" ability
to pay was on the prosecution. Other courts, including this court have disagreed with
Dueñas on these key principles.
In People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1155, the court
disagreed with Dueñas and held the issue of ability to pay was subject to forfeiture. The
court reasoned that ability to pay fines and other costs have long been litigated in the
courts. Forfeiture can be applied when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
The vast extension of due process by the Dueñas opinion certainly presents a different
approach to the issue but does not amount to a wholly new concept that might justify
abandonment of well-established forfeiture principles.
Since the Dueñas opinion, various courts have adopted its approach, and others,
including this court, have not endorsed the Dueñas court's reasoning.
In People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 95-97, review granted, November
13, 2019, S257844, we expressed some of our disagreement with the Dueñas opinion. In
particular, we agreed that a defendant has a right to a hearing on ability to pay, where it is
3
requested by the defense. We held the burden of proof was on the defendant to show
inability to pay the amounts assessed. We also rejected the idea that ability to pay was
focused solely on the present ability at the time of sentencing.
The concept of forfeiture for failure to raise ability to pay fines, fees or
assessments is well established in our caselaw prior to Dueñas. Some of the cases
include People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 864; People v. Trujillo (2015)
60 Cal.4th 850, 853-854; People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227; and People v.
Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 729.
We agree with the court's holding and reasoning in People v. Frandsen, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at pages 1153-1154, and will apply it here. We are satisfied that the doctrine
of forfeiture should be applied in this case. The defendant represented by counsel was
aware of the recommended amount of money proposed to be assessed against him. No
objection was made, and no comments of any kind suggested a challenge to the amounts
identified. Keene has forfeited the opportunity to challenge the fines, fees and
assessments imposed by the trial court.
B. Defense Counsel Was Not Ineffective
In somewhat of a throw-away argument, Keene contends that if we find forfeiture
on appeal, then of necessity his counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment. Keene bears the burden of showing counsel's representation was
defective, and he was prejudiced as a result. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 690.) The record does not establish either prong of the Strickland test. We have no
idea why counsel did not raise the ability to pay issue. We know counsel was trying hard
4
to overcome Keene's failure to appear and to get the trial court to eliminate the strike
prior. We have no idea whether the fines, fees or assessments were of any consequence.
Nothing enlightens us on the consequences of any failure of Keene in the future to pay
any of the amounts.
Our Supreme Court addressed the issue of establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel on a silent record in People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-268.
The court found it difficult to establish error or prejudice without a full record. The court
suggested the defendant's remedy, if any, must be by way of a petition for habeas corpus.
(Ibid.)
C. Senate Bill No. 136
After the briefing in this case was completed, the Governor signed Senate Bill
No. 136 which changed the application of the one-year prison prior enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b). Effective January 1, 2020, the alleged enhancement in this
case under that section would no longer be valid. We requested and received
supplemental briefing on the question of whether Keene is entitled to the benefit of the
new statute under the principles of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). The
parties agree that Keene's case will not be final as of January 1, 2020; thus, he is entitled
to the benefit of the new statute. We agree with the parties and find the appropriate
remedy is to remand the case with directions to strike the one-year enhancement and
resentence as may be appropriate.
5
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and the trial court is ordered to strike the enhancement
under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and resentence the defendant accordingly.
Following resentencing the court shall amend the abstract of judgment and forward the
amended abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
respects the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
6
Dato, J., concurring.
Consistent with this court's reasoning in People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 1027, I would agree that Donald G. Keene forfeited his Dueñas2 argument
by failing to raise any ability-to-pay argument in the trial court. (Gutierrez, at pp. 1032-
1033.) But I cannot join my colleagues in their endorsement of the forfeiture analysis in
People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, which I find considerably less
persuasive than cases such as People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 488-489,
People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138; People v. Jones (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 1028, 1033, and People v. Belloso (Nov. 26, 2019, B290968) __ Cal.App.5th
__, [2019 Cal.App.Lexis 1181 at [24]-[25]].
DATO, J.
2 See People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157. 1
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a defendant forfeits the right to challenge the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments by failing to object at the sentencing hearing. Additionally, the court remanded the case for resentencing to strike a prison prior enhancement pursuant to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 136.
Issues
Whether a defendant forfeits a due process challenge to fines, fees, and assessments by failing to object at sentencing.
Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the imposition of fines, fees, and assessments.
Whether the defendant is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Senate Bill No. 136 regarding a prison prior enhancement.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Keene has forfeited the opportunity to challenge the fines, fees and assessments imposed by the trial court.”
“We are satisfied that the doctrine of forfeiture should be applied in this case.”
“The sentence is vacated, and the trial court is ordered to strike the enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) and resentence the defendant accordingly.”